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Mother to son: “So, you say the fridge ordered all this chocolate?”
Wede
A SMART HOME ANOMALY DETECTION FRAMEWORK
E. ORIWOH
ABSTRACT
Smart Homes (SHs), as subsets of the Internet of Things (IoT), make use of Machine
Learning and Artificial Intelligence tools to provide technology-enabled solutions which
assist their occupants and users with their Activities of Daily Living (ADL). Some SH
provide always-present, health management support and care services. Having these
services provided at home enables SH occupants such as the elderly and disabled to
continue to live in their own homes and localities thus aiding Ageing In Place goals and
eliminating the need for them to be relocated in order to be able to continue receiving
the same support and services.
Introducing and interconnecting smart, autonomous systems in homes to enable
these service provisions and Assistance Technologies (AT) requires that certain inter-
faces in, and connections to, SH are exposed to the Internet, among other public-facing
networks. This introduces the potential for cyber-physical attacks to be perpetrated
through, from and against SH. Apart from the actual threats posed by these attacks
to SH occupants and their homes, the potential that these attacks might occur can
adversely affect the adoption or uptake of SH solutions.
This thesis identifies key attributes of the different elements (things or nodes and
rooms or zones) in SHs and the relationships that exist between these elements. These
relationships can be used to build SH security baselines for SHs such that any deviations
from this baseline is described as anomalous. The thesis demonstrates the application of
these relationships to Anomaly Detection (AD) through the analysis of several hypothet-
ical scenarios and the decisions reached about whether they are normal or anomalous.
This thesis also proposes an Internet of Things Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF),
a Forensics Edge Management System (FEMS), a FEMS Decision-Making Algorithm
(FDMA) and an IoT Incident Response plan. These tools can be combined to provide
proactive (autonomous and human-led) Digital Forensics services within cyber-physical
environments like the Smart Home.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
This chapter introduces the Problem Domain, the Definitions of Anomalies, Attacks
and Errors as they are used in this thesis, and discusses the Motivation of the work.
An early Overview of the Proposed Solution is presented and a Thesis Outline section
concludes the Chapter.
1.2 Problem Domain
1.2.1 The Smart Home
Smart Homes (SH) are intelligent, autonomous networked spaces. They provide
solutions that enable and support people - for example the elderly and those with health
challenges - to live more comfortable lives, by assisting them with their Activities of
Daily Living (ADL). SH are supportive Ambient Assisted Living Technologies (AAL)
environments and they provide Assistive Technology (AT)1 services, supporting a vari-
ety of people’s needs including Ageing In Place ([3], page 8) needs, by making use of
technological solutions and exposed interfaces to provide the home occupants with re-
sources and services. Dementia sufferers with minimal family/carers support especially
benefit from the support systems provided by SH such as reminders.
Since SH enable people to live with the support of technologies, it may mean
that SH occupants will not always require physical human support for their healthcare
1According to [2], “Assistive Technology (AT) describes products or technology-based services which
support those with disabilities or other limitations in their daily activities, enabling them to enjoy a
better quality of life”.
1
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management, to provide reminders, and other such services. The elderly may therefore
find that, because of this available alternative support, they end up living alone as sole
occupants in their SH.
A typical (Smart) Home is comprised of two (2) major elements: zones (or rooms)
and nodes (sensors or devices). In addition to these non-human elements are the human
elements i.e. the SH occupants. Connecting these elements to the Internet exposes the
home, via its now exposed interfaces, to threats that it hitherto was not exposed to.
These threats, in combination with physical attacks (e.g. burglary) that are carried out
against homes, form a group of attacks known as cyber-physical attacks. Cyber-physical
attacks have negative impacts on people generally however the effects or the impact can
understandably be worse if it is carried out against a person in the space of their own
homes. From the perspective of an end-user, irrespective of how much functionality is
incorporated into a SH, there will be a reasonable expectation for these smart spaces to
provide - or at least support - adequate levels of both physical and cyber security for
their occupants. Wilson, C. et al. [4] highlight that “the acceptability of Smart Homes to
users is closely linked to issues of security...”. Also, the authors of [5] identify “improved
security” as being important to users. This research therefore aims to contribute towards
security measures that can be applied in SH to reduce the potential for successful cyber-
physical attacks. The development of this model also recognises the need for an easy to
use tool which can be managed by home users whatever their level of expertise.
The attributes of SH components (nodes and zones) as well as the attributes of
the SH itself are influenced in different ways by the actions of users around, and their
interactions with, these elements. The three main ways in which nodes in an IoT (and
Smart Homes) are interacted with and controlled are:
• Direct Touch
• Remote control and
• Learned habit (i.e. pre-programming with updated learning)
Different relationships can be formed between the SH components depending on
how the nodes are interacted with. Rules that govern these relationships can also be
derived and used to support the design and arrangement of SH to minimize the potential
for false alarms being raised or true anomalies being missed.
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1.3 Anomalies, Attacks and Errors: Definitions
For the purpose of this work, the following definitions are used:
Definition 1.1. Within the Smart Home (SH) environment, an anomaly is any occur-
rence that does not conform with expected or previously-known patterns or outcomes.
An anomaly can also be described as any element or set of elements in a collection
of related or similar elements that does not fit the pattern of a previously-known normal.
In a single occupant home, a presence anomaly can be described as having more than
one presence in the home at a certain time of a certain day when there should only be
one presence. Based on the definitions introduced in Chapter 4 of this work, an anomaly
arises when the normality of the “Happy Home Network” elements significantly differ
from their normal setting or deviate from a known threshold value.
Example anomalies include
1. A burst pipe;
2. A family member returning home an hour later than usual;
3. An aggressive network probe.
Definition 1.2. An Attack is a deliberate, malicious anomaly or an anomaly that is
caused on purpose.
In the example anomalies given, an aggressive network probe that is carried out
with the purposed of preventing legitimating access to a network is an attack. If a pipe
bursts because of the pressure of frozen water inside it, this is an anomalous situation.
If it bursts because someone physically destroys it with a weapon, then it is an attack.
Definition 1.3. An Error is a fault or a failure.
Example I For illustration purposes, consider the excerpt in Table 1.1 taken
from one of the Washington State University Center for Advanced Studies in Adap-
tive Systems (WSU CASAS) Laboratory Aruba SH datasets (http://casas.wsu.edu/
datasets/) [1]. The SH being considered is a single occupant SH. During the period
when this data was collected, the occupant received occasional ‘visitors’.
A visual observation of this data excerpt revealed that on 09/11/2010, during the
highlighted periods, two sensors in two different zones were active within 2 seconds
of each other. Based on the Proximals attribute described in Chapter 4 and, as long
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as the sensors are all functioning properly and this is not just as a result of a faulty
sensor, this data output indicates the presence of more than one person in the house.
If the assumption is made (for reasons of simplicity) that a second presence in a single-
occupant home is that of an intruder, then it can be concluded that on that day and
time there was a physical intrusion.
Date Time Sensor State Activity
09/11/2010 18:01:08 M018 ON Meal Preparation begin
09/11/2010 18:01:08 M022 ON Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:09 M015 ON Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:09 M018 OFF Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:09 M021 OFF Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:09 M028 ON Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:10 M013 OFF Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:10 M019 ON Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:11 M014 OFF Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:11 M017 ON Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:11 M020 OFF Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:11 M022 OFF Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:11 M026 ON Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:13 M018 ON Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:13 M019 OFF Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:13 M028 OFF Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:14 M015 OFF Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:14 M020 ON Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:14 M027 ON Motion
09/11/2010 18:01:15 M013 ON Motion
Table 1.1: Part of a Smart Home Motion Sensor Dataset [1]
Example II As a second example, a Sensor Activity Chart (Figure 1.1) is used
to illustrate how an anomaly can be defined. The anomaly depicted shows sensor M014
(shown in the red bar) being active at the same time as M001, M002, M003, M004
which it would not be under normal circumstances. This anomaly is better understood
by looking at the layout in Figure 5.1 and the discussions in Chapter 4 and the work in
[6].
The two example activities are recognised as anomalies through the use of a number
of factors referred to in the remainder of this work as Attributes. Attributes are used to
define the normal security baseline relationships between components of SH (i.e. nodes,
zones and occupants) such that if there is a change in these baseline relationships or the
thresholds that define them, the activities or events that led to the deviations can be
investigated and ascertained as being the causes of the anomalies.
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M001 
M002 
M003 
M004 
M014 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Duration 
Sensor Activity Visual Chart 
Figure 1.1: A Sample Sensor Activity Chart
Apart from the broad classification of anomalies into attacks and errors, another
classification of anomalies puts them in four (4) classes [7] (see also [8]) :
• intrusive but not anomalous i.e. False Negatives
• not intrusive but anomalous i.e. False Positives
• not intrusive and not anomalous i.e. True Negatives
• intrusive and anomalous i.e. True Positives
Differentiating between attacks and errors is especially challenging in a home en-
vironment due to the highly unpredictable nature of humans (i.e. people may change
their behavioural patterns thus affecting patterns learned by Machine Learning tools).
In this light, Anomaly Detection (AD) systems for SH should therefore be designed to
minimise the number of false positives triggered because responding to these false alarms
could potentially lead to time, effort/man-power and other resource wastage. However,
additionally, AD systems must not be tweaked to such an extent that, in order to reduce
the number of False Positive anomalies detected, they end up allowing True Positive
anomalies to pass through.
Another example of a Cyber-physical attack within a SH environment can be
achieved by an attacker who controls the doors remotely and either locks the occu-
pants in or out of the SH. Attacks that demonstrate that it is possible to control
doors in this way was demonstrated in http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/how-
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hackers-violate-privacy-and-security-of-the-smart-home/ where researchers ex-
ploited authentication and code execution flaws to control garage doors as well as ob-
tain information “related to the presence of people in the house”. This real-life cy-
ber attack - with physical manifestations - can have physical access consequences as
well as result in data loss. These types of attacks - which were largely hypothetical
during the preparation of this thesis - are becoming more prevalent. Another more
recent attack involved the use of IoT devices (including cameras and baby monitors)
to carry out a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) against the Domain Name Sys-
tem (DNS) provider Dyn (http://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-
october-21-attack/) which affected the services they provide to customers with the
attack causing these customers’ sites to become temporarily unavailable and in some
cases, intermittently available. The exact figures that demonstrate the prevalence of
these attacks has not been collated as at the time of writing however the current trend
indicates that due to inherent insecure practices by manufacturers (insecure designs and
code), vendors (through insecure installations) and owners of smart Things (not chang-
ing default passwords or adjusting default security settings), the attacks are almost
certainly going to increase in number.
Within the home, humans may act out of character and, without prior warning,
choose to change or modify their schedules. These changes in behaviour, though a
normal attribute of humans, may appear erratic and anomalous to Machine Learning
algorithms which may erroneously interpret them as attacks. Even if people maintain
certain behavioural patterns at their places of work, they may deviate from these pat-
terns in their own homes because within the home settings people do not necessarily
have to conform to set standards of behaviour. Falling asleep in the living room may
not be anomalous in a home whilst falling asleep anywhere at all in the workplace, irre-
spective of the location or zone in the work place, is. Therefore AD solutions that are
designed for public spaces such as offices may not be suitable for SH environments and
tailored solutions that accommodate these characteristic of humans - and are not too
restrictive when dealing with humans - may be required.
1.4 Motivation
Smart Homes (SH) are set to become some of the most ubiquitous smart spaces
around in the near future. In addition to being intelligent, networked and autonomous
spaces, SH primarily serve as abodes or dwelling places for their inhabitants. They have
more exposed networking and communications interfaces in comparison with non-SH.
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From the perspective of an end-user, irrespective of how much functionality is incorpo-
rated into a SH, there will be a reasonable expectation for these smart spaces to provide
adequate levels of both physical and cyber security for their occupants. As can be ob-
served from the recent demonstrations on smart car hacks (http://uk.businessinsider.com/
smart-cars-are-vulnerable-to-hackers-2015-7?r=US&IR=T), exposing hitherto un-
exposed objects and interfaces to networks such as the Internet and other such networks
provides a vulnerability channel that can be exploited by attackers with the right skills
for various purposes. The exposed interfaces expand the threat landscape within places
that are not normally seen as targets of cyber attacks. Therefore a comprehensive (log-
ical and physical) approach to investigating anomalies within SH is required. Logical
solutions can be in the form of security and Digital Forensics (DF) investigatory frame-
works and/or methodologies, models and approaches whilst the physical solutions will
include any and all cyber-physical security and forensics tools and solutions.
Presence-related anomalies are especially important because of the need to en-
sure the physical security of potentially defenceless, elderly patients living alone whilst
preserving their privacy by avoiding the more intrusive video-based security surveillance
tools. However, according to [9] patients would rather prefer it if all technologies designed
to support their Activities of Daily Living (ADL) daily living in Smart environments
are non-obtrusive. One of the ways in which this research addresses this is the by using
the FDMA which detects a presence where one should not be; the approach identifies
this from real-life SH datasets without visual data such as that from SH Closed Circuit
Television (CCTV). This is especially helpful since CCTV is still largely considered to
be relatively intrusive security.
This thesis uses original MathWorks R© Matlab code to identify, without prior knowl-
edge, the presence of an “other” from post-event, SH motion sensor dataset collected
from a real-life SH.
1.5 Research Aim and Objectives
The Aim of this research is to develop a Smart Home Anomaly Detection (AD)
Framework which supports AD by improving detection potential and/or reducing False
Positive detections.
The Objectives of this research are to
• critically review existing Digital Forensic (DF) frameworks, models and method-
ologies for applicability within the Smart Home (SH) as a Cyber-Physical Envi-
ronment (CPE);
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• develop and validate an IoT Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF) suitable for au-
tomating DF processes in the SH with a view to ensuring that relevant evidence
is acquired and investigations yield relevant, useful, forensically acceptable and
legally admissible results;
• outline the design of an autonomous SH security system (the Forensics Edge Man-
agement System (FEMS)) that is based on the IDFF;
• develop a Forensics Edge Management System (FEMS) Decision-Making Algo-
rithm (also written as Forensics Decision-Making Algorithm) (FDMA), as part of
the FEMS security system. Demonstrate the applicability of the FDMA through
the use of scenarios and analyses;
• combine the approach in this thesis with the work in [10] and, using this combi-
nation, demonstrate improvements in AD tasks - or a reduction in False Positive
outcomes.
1.6 Overview of the Proposed Solution
The focus of this work is the effective detection of anomalous activities from SH
datasets. The approach taken involves identifying a set of attributes, relationships, rules,
and constraints which can be combined - alongside the typical AD approach based on
user behavioural patterns and activities - to detect anomalies in SH.
This research acknowledges human unpredictability, that people can and do alter
their behaviours, patterns and routines thus potentially affecting patterns learned by
Machine Learning tools. The work thus avoids explicitly defining or creating tailored
user profiles as normal training data for Machine Learning tools. It does not place
restrictions on the Activities of Daily Living (ADL) of humans or on the way these
activities are carried out. This is because by placing such restrictions there is a risk that
alterations in human activity patterns, however minimal or even beneficial to a human
subject, may be deemed anomalous behaviour by a Machine Learning tool. In addition,
the potential retraining of the system that may be required in order for the ML and AD
tools to re-learn the new behaviours might be significant.
In this work instead, an (adjustable) “Happy Home” Profile (Section 4.2) was devel-
oped as a support for existing AD approaches that focus mainly on user behaviours and
activities. A SH profile is defined based on the data available from the relatively stable
relationships between zones, nodes as well as taking the holistic view of the SH and other
useful non-human relationships that exist in that context; the actions/behaviours and
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interactions between nodes as well as the anticipated (predominantly) fixed arrangement
of rooms (zones), walls, and certain fixed-location nodes which should be available in
most homes to derive stable, balanced (although still quite adjustable) relationships be-
tween them such that variations over certain thresholds (e.g. the distance between them,
activation times and their response time to user input) can be used to infer anomalies
(or otherwise) in the system.
This work considers node-node interactions in addition to user-object interactions
and the relationships (or absence of relationships) between nodes and zones in SH. In
summary, the following interactions are used:
Box 1.1. Interactions Considered
Node ←→ Node, Zone ←→ Node, Zone ←→ Zone, user ←→ Node, user ←→ Zone
An overview of the Smart Home AD Forensics Decision-Making Algorithm is shown
in Figure 1.2. More details on the elements of the Framework are available in Chapters
5 and 6.
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Data Source: 
Home, Zones, 
Nodes
Apply Rules 
Identify 
Relationships
Update 
Rules
Update 
Relationships
Discover Rules
Discover 
Anomalies
Annotated data (i.e. 
data with activity 
descriptors)
Generate 
Report/
Escalate
Fresh, annotated 
data
Fresh, annotated 
data
Figure 1.2: The Forensics Decision-Making Algorithm (FDMA) Overview
When a SH is set up, the attributes and relationships between the nodes and
zones in the SH are identified and input into the SH FDMA system. This can be done
manually to begin with after which the information about nodes and zones is updated
automatically by the system. The manual entry can be done by the family and friends,
carers, the SH solution providers and in some cases the SH occupants themselves. RFID
tags on the nodes in a house can b automatically scanned and the information on them
entered into the FDMA database.
The summary of the AD approach shown in Figure 1.2 is as follows: logs acquired
from several sources in and around the SH are annotated, for instance using the method
described in page 2 of [11]. The approach can be tailored to suit individual Smart
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Homes because it is based on the relationships between zones, nodes found in each zone
and the relationships formed based on user interactions with the nodes and zones in
each home. The data with activity descriptors is then parsed for normal relationships -
along with the normal settings input manually by the user. The rules that govern these
relationships are harvested. They are applied to fresh data and any anomalies - data
that does not fit the relationships, or breaches the rules, and/or are abnormal to user
behavioural patterns - are flagged as anomalous. Appendix A shows a subsection of the
FDMA - this subsection detects presence-related anomalies by making use of several of
the relationships and attributes identified in Chapter 4 - location, proximality, nodes
and edge node relationships.
For each event the following overall rule applies
Constraints + Attributes + Core Activities + ASeq ⇒ Decision
1.7 Thesis Contributions
The following are the novel contributions of this work:
• The identification of the Attributes of nodes (sensors) and zones (rooms) in
typical SH environments and the Relationships that these can have with each
other. These can be used in conjunction with existing Machine Learning and AD
approaches and tools for Anomaly Detection (AD) in Smart Homes.
• Proximality which is a term that describes the adjustable relationship that may
exist between motion-detection sensors such that their response to stimuli over a
given period is not deemed anomalous. Sensors that have this relationship are
referred to as Proximals (ρ);
• An Internet of Things Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF) which outlines
the phases and stages that can be followed during a Digital Forensics investigation
in an IoT environment;
• The Forensics Decision-Making Algorithm (FDMA). The FDMA describes
how data from and about SH nodes and zones can be used to describe relationships
between these nodes and zones, how rules can be extracted from these relationships
and how any breaches to these rules can be identified as anomalous. The overview
of the algorithm is outlined in Figure 1.2;
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• Event and Activity Constraints. Event and activity constraints set boundaries
on what is acceptable during certain events and activities; these boundaries can
include the time when an activity takes place as well as the location.
1.8 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Smart Homes (SH)
as cyber-physical environments as well as a discussion on the cyber-physical threats to
SH environments. It reviews current Anomaly Detection (AD) methods and approaches
and highlights the contributions of this work with respect to the existing works.
Chapter 3 presents some of the preliminary research in the area of IoT Forensics that
was conducted as part of this research.
Chapter 4 introduces and discusses the attributes that were identified as useful for AD
and the AD model that was developed as part of this research work. In this Chapter,
an overview of the proposed SH Security solution is also presented.
Chapter 5 covers the evaluation of the Model by applying it to a set of realistic SH
scenarios. This is compared with scenarios where the Model is not applied in order to
demonstrate any improvements gained through the use of the Model.
Chapter 6 combines the Framework with Core Activities [10] and applies this to anoma-
lous scenarios in order to demonstrate the applicability and improvements gained be-
cause of the approach.
Chapter 7 presents conclusions of the preceding chapters, discusses the challenge faced
and limitations of the research and discusses potential future work.
1.9 Chapter Summary
The need to support the elderly and those with health challenges in society by
encouraging their health management in their own homes necessitates the development
of secure Smart Home security models, solutions and tools that can be used to support
and enable these solutions. The success of these solutions - from the perspective of
health management - depends on how accurate they are at detecting anomalies (errors
and attacks) when they occur thus potentially increasing user security and confidence.
This work contributes to this goal through the introduction of an AD model for use
within Smart Home environments. The model and associated algorithm are used to
detect anomalies from datasets of Activities of Daily Living in Single-occupant SH. This
research accomplishes this through the discovery of relationships that exist between
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different elements such as nodes in SH spaces and the application of these relationships
in Anomaly Detection (AD). It is achieved by way of Hypothesis Testing. It therefore
identifies and defines attributes that can be used to help optimise accurate AD in SH
investigations.
Chapter 2
Related Work in Smart Home
Anomaly Detection
2.1 Overview
This Chapter provides background information on the Internet of Things (IoT)
and Smart Homes (SH). The Chapter also reviews existing multivariate data Anomaly
Detection (AD) algorithms and approaches and provides a background on existing work
in multivariate sensor data analysis techniques. This is because AD for SH environments
will, of necessity, involve handling data from the different variety of sources which will
be found within SH. This type of dataset made up of different data types (i.e. data from
different sources) is known as multivariate data. Example data may include motion and
temperature sensors readings and TCP/IP data from network monitoring tools. SH
contain tools and technologies that support ageing in place and can therefore be useful
for enabling the elderly, including those who suffer from dementia, to live supported lives
in their own homes rather than being relocated to care homes for them to be looked
after. It is therefore essential to ensure that, in addition to the comfort being provided
to the home occupants, their cyber-physical security is also ensured with respect to the
tools and algorithms which enable the “smartness” of the SH.
2.2 The Internet of Things (IoT)
Advancements in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), wireless communication,
Cloud, virtualisation, mobile computing, sensor technology, Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSN), embedded computing and micro-electronics have contributed to the develop-
ment of the Internet of Things (IoT). “Things” in this context range from traditional
14
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computing devices like Personal Computers (PC), to general household objects embed-
ded with capabilities for sensing and/or communication through the use of technologies
including, but not limited to, RFID, Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC),
Light Fidelity (Li-Fi), and Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi). Other systems that support the
development of the IoT include social media, smart devices and improved wireless com-
munications speed, cheaper electronics hardware, Big Data, rapid data analysis enabled
by faster processing speeds and relatively easy app development tools. The IoT is en-
abled by the coming together of all these systems. The IoT describes the interconnection
of entities (both tangible and intangible) for various purposes including identification,
communication, sensing, and data collection.
The phrase “Internet of Things” was coined by Kevin Ashton [12] in 1999. Even
though the concept of interconnecting devices and people for various reasons existed
before that year - i.e. via the traditional Internet and Social Networks - this model of
interconnecting devices and people and with the potential for interconnecting everything
else is relatively new and is in its introductory stages [13]. In the IoT domain, objects
such as baby monitors, cars and tablet computers are equipped with the capability to
communicate with each other, providing improved efficiencies for those who use them.
Objects that are not of themselves smart are being embedded with “smartness” and
communication capabilities through the use of technologies such as RFID, sensors and
other forms of embedded computing [14]. Communication with such objects will be done
by
• direct-touch or physical control;
• remote control methods, for instance, over the Internet using web browsers; and
• ‘learned’ control or ’sequential actions’: sequential actions describe situations
where the actions of a Thing cause an action in another Thing; for instance, a
user’s alarm clock ringing causing their bed to vibrate in a combined “Wake Up”
system for getting a user up in the morning.
Control over these interconnected devices will also be spread over a spectrum of
stakeholders: owners, manufacturers, law enforcement, governments and other smart
Things. IoT Things (also referred to in different literature as Spimes1 and Blogjects2)
are meant to be intelligent, autonomous and will be networked into any of a number
of different types of Area Networks e.g. Personal Area Networks (PAN), Home Area
Networks , and Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN) to name a few. The disparate
technologies within the IoT are being interconnected in networks which are hybrid and
1Objects that exist in Space and within Time
2Objects that blog
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evolving (i.e. changing their structure). For instance a user’s X-box which is part of her
HAN can become part of a neighbour’s HAN if it is borrowed by that neighbour. These
interconnections between smart disparate technologies and devices already offer various
benefits and applications to end users, industry, companies and governments. These
benefits are evident in areas of transportation, healthcare, Smart Cities, etc. [15, 16].
Cisco estimates that the IoT will offer revenue benefits of $14.4 trillion between 2013
and 2022 [17].
Some of the protocols that currently enable interconnectivity and “smartness” in
devices and Things are Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6), Micro IP (uIP/uIPv6), IPv6
over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LowPAN), Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP), Near-Field Communication (NFC), Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID), Lightweight IP (LwIP), uC/IP, and Tiny TCP.
These protocols and more are being developed to support the development of the
IoT and to help realise the IoT vision.
2.3 Smart Homes (SH)
2.3.1 Overview of Smart Homes
Smart Homes (SH) are intelligent, networked, autonomous abodes or dwelling
places [18] and they are set to become some of the most ubiquitous and prevalent smart
spaces of the near future. When compared to non-SH, by virtue of their function, SH
have an increased number of (exposed) communication, control and computing inter-
faces. These exposed interfaces make SH potential targets for cyber attacks - in addition
to the physical attacks such as burglaries that are traditionally faced by homes. The
combination of the two classes of attacks (cyber and physical) are referred to as cyber-
physical attacks. As, arguably, the most personal smart spaces around, cyber attacks
in and against SH will potentially have more direct (psychological and physical) im-
pacts on their occupants. Examples of real-life SH as advertised by vendors include
the Loxone Showhome (http://www.loxone.com/enen/smart-home/case-studies/
showhome.html) which is described as being controlled from a Loxone miniserver through
which the Showhome controls lighting, alarm system, music, air purification, monitors
the garage door contact and senses rain and wind among other functions. Another
example commercially available solution is Webee http://www.webeelife.com/ which
also makes use of a central SH hub that automatically recognises and connects any
smart objects around the home. The user can then control any of the devices cen-
trally from a Webee app on their phone. The Things which are controlled include
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“lights, temperature, motion, door locks”. Other examples include the Honeywell
Evohome (http://getconnected.honeywell.com/en/evohome) which allows users to
remotely control multiple radiators in a SH; the Philips Hue which also provides a soft-
ware tool that users can operate on their smart mobile devices to control their Phillips
Hue lights; British Gas Hive smart heating system which allows its users to con-
trol their heating and hot water supply via the Internet; Nest (Learning) Thermo-
stat (https://nest.com/uk/) and a Home automation provider Cyberhomes (https:
//www.cyberhomes.co.uk/). In addition to automatically monitoring and regulating the
temperature in homes by adjusting its settings by itself, the Nest Thermostat learns a
user’s preferred temperatures and, according to the supplier’s website, programs itself
accordingly “in about a week”. Other tools which are designed to enable the smartness of
homes are WiThings (http://www.withings.com/uk/en/), Robomow RC304 elec-
tronic Lawnmower (http://robomow.com/en-GB/), Sonos (PLAY:3) smart wireless
speaker (http://www.sonos.com/en-gb/home), Netatmo weather station (https:
//www.netatmo.com/product/weather/ and their general site with other SH solutions
https://www.netatmo.com/en-GB/site), Panasonic Home Monitoring and Con-
trol Kit (http://www.panasonic.com/uk/consumer/smart-home/kx-hn6012ew.html),
Samsung Family Hub (http://www.samsung.com/global/ces2016/familyhub/), Dojo
(which glows to let users know when they are being hacked http://www.digitaltrends.com/
home/the-dojo-protects-your-smart-home-from-cyber-attacks/), Nesspresso Prodi-
gio coffee Machine (https://www.nespresso.com/uk/en/prodigio-machines-range?cid=
SEM B2C UK-EN LOC R Google UK.Brand.Machines.BMM Prodigio nespresso.prodigio Broad),
Philips Hue Phoenix LED lamp (http://www2.meethue.com/en-us/productdetail/
philips-hue-phoenix), Dyson Pure Cool air purifier (the manufacturers claim it
“automatically monitors, reacts and purifies” the air in the home http://www.dyson.co.uk/
fans-and-heaters/purifiers/dyson-pure-hot-cool-link.aspx), Chamberlain MyQ
Internet Gateway is an Internet-based remote control of garage doors (http://
www.chamberlain.com/smartphone-control-products/smartphone-connectivity/myq-
internet-gateway), Smarthings hub (https://www.smartthings.com/uk/), Ubi (which
is a voice-controlled device for answering questions and controlling SH https://www.kickstarter.com/
projects/607691307/ubi-the-ubiquitous-computer-voice-activated-and-al-0),
Winkhub which is a central control device for home automation products (http://
www.wink.com/products/wink-hub/) and Winkrelay (http://www.wink.com/products/
wink-relay-touchscreen-controller/), Lifx (Wi-Fi enabled LED smart bulb http:
//www.lifx.com/), ismart alarm (https://www.ismartalarm.com/), August smart lock
(https://store.august.com/), Lowe Iris (https://www.irisbylowes.com/), Canary
all-in-one SH security system (https://canary.is/) which, although claims to pro-
vide overall security for all nodes and all sensor types on a smart homes, requires a home
to be empty to function.
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Other SH are those set up by various institutions for research purposes. These in-
clude the WSU CASAS Smart Home http://casas.wsu.edu/ and the http://ailab.wsu.edu/
mavhome/, http://lass.cs.umass.edu/projects/smart/, The Aware Home http://
awarehome.imtc.gatech.edu/, PlaceLab , Duke Smart Home Program http://smarthome.duke.edu/,
iSpace at the University of Essex (http://cswww.essex.ac.uk/iieg/idorm2/index.htm),
GatorTech Smart House (https://www.cise.ufl.edu/~helal/gatortech/index2.html),
In non-SH, end users make decisions on a daily basis, however routine, which they
themselves follow through on whereas in a SH, the users train the home either by giving
it explicit commands and instructions when the SH network is being set up and as
the nodes (devices) are being installed and configured; by their regular activities and
behaviour patterns which the home can learn using any of several machine learning
tools or; by modifying any learned patterns by explicitly changing the previously learned
pattern of users. These learned patterns are then utilized by the home to maintain a
habitable environment by managing all the conditions as required by its occupants. This
habitable status is referred to as a “Happy Home” status in this work Section 4.2. The
benefits of this kind of home are numerous: a time-saving benefit as users are free to
work on other aspects of their daily living while the home manages and maintains their
home life and schedule; cost saving - the home can get to work with refreshing itself
through cleaning and doing the laundry during periods of the day when energy cost
is lowest; better and timely maintenance because the home will more easily point out
faults or damages depending on its design which a home owner may not observe until a
while after; reduced potential for home accidents due to accidents or human error. For
instance, a user might forget an iron plugged in, a kettle connected, their front door
unlocked or their baby monitor remotely streaming video online (even when all family
members are physically present in the house and there is no need for remote streaming).
After the user’s pattern has been learned these scenarios can be better managed by the
home: it can turn off the iron and kettle after a fixed period has elapsed. It can lock
the front door at a time that it has learned that the user is typically away and it can
halt streaming of a ‘live’ baby monitor feed when it accurately detects that the baby’s
guardians or family are physically present in the home along with the baby that is being
monitored.
Non-SH of today can and are being made smart through the addition and use of
bolted-on technology. Alternatively, SH solutions might in future be provided as com-
prehensive offerings by single vendors who will offer and provide the different solutions
(water, electricity, health, security, money, transportation, etc.) as a holistic package.
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2.3.2 Threats, Attacks and Security Challenges
Homes typically serve various important functions; they serve as a place for short
to long-term stay, a place to store property, a place to spend time with short- and long-
term co-dwellers, a place to find privacy and even to find and enjoy some security. The
home typically represents a place for rest, family, work, a space to age instead of going
into care, a trusted domain and even a domain of absolute authority and control. Homes
can be described essentially as the ultimate personal space. Threats and attacks against
the home can therefore adversely affect people’s confidence and comfort within this most
personal of spaces. Countering these threats (especially the cyber and cyber-physical
threats which are not the threats that homes typically face) will require technological
solutions. Existing and emerging cryptographic, authentication methods being proposed
by research are part of the effort being made to provide protections against these threats
however other solutions are required such as effective detection tools against ongoing
attacks and investigatory procedures which can be applied after successful attacks.
The development of strategies and solutions for securing the SH is important for
several reasons. Humans now spend more time in their homes especially with the flexi-
bility allowed them by an increasing number of employers who encourage working from
home. People also spend more time working from home nowadays because it is now pos-
sible to do so and still be as effective as if they were in the office. Working from home
saves on the cost of renting office space, minimises travel time to the office location,
can provides savings on childcare and electricity bills, cuts out the need for other office
maintenance staff such as the cleaners, minimizes the cost of utilities and stationery and
eliminates the need to cater for the general security of the staff and the infrastructure.
The home is therefore no longer the space where things e.g property are kept or the place
where visitors are entertained and where family units can abide as, and when, needed.
It is now increasingly a functional part of the family daily life - and is increasingly a
potential repository and, therefore, source of company files and data. The value of the
home as a potential target for corporate espionage and blackmail has increased with
the introduction of smart technologies. In addition, the potential for assets within it to
be accessed remotely has made it a more viable and useful target for malicious parties
whether they wish to harm the family or the company that the family members are
associated with.
Providing adequate security measures in a SH can be useful as part of a Digital
Forensics readiness policy. The evidence from the nodes in smart homes could prove
vital to digital forensics investigations of crimes carried out against or by nodes operating
autonomously from the home. In addition, some insurance claims may require that SH
users have a certain level of cyber security set up in their homes for their claims to be
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valid in the event that they are targets of successful cyber attacks. There is some overlap
in these attacks.
From a security standpoint, there are many attacks that SH will face as they be-
come more ubiquitous. Some of these Cyber-Physical attacks which may require Cyber-
Physical forensics responses are discussed next. For the purpose of clarity the identified
attacks are divided into groups. The security (confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
or CIA) impacts of these attacks are also identified. With respect to real-life attacks,
whilst there are particular examples of attacks against - or making use of - Smart Home
nodes such as baby monitors and security cameras, as at the time of writing, there was
no representative data which shows the prevalence of such attacks.
2.3.2.1 Smart Home Attack Groups
A. Removal attacks
These groups of attacks include any and all unauthorized extraction of legitimate
assets from the home. Theft and burglary are examples of attacks in this group. Assets
may be physical (cars, game consoles) and logical (digital family photos, electricity
supply). Some existing United Kingdom laws that apply when such illegal activity is
identified are the Theft Act 1968, the Data Protection Act 1998 and even the Computer
Misuse Act 1990.
The CIA impact of this type of attack includes a general loss of trust in the entire
home security system as well as a feeling of defilement and of being invaded because of
the personal nature of a space like the home.
B. Insertion Attacks
An insertion attack can be physical or logical and can take several forms. For
example, a rogue device such as a smart meter can be added to a home network for
malicious reasons. Baig in [19] describes such a scenario as a “device implant attack”.
Another potential attack approach is a situation where a trusted device is inserted into
a network but ‘ghosted’ or hidden from, for example, the power grid so that the energy
consumed by this device is not visible to the smart meters and thus the consumer is
not charged for the electricity consumed. Botnets [20] which will require the insertion
of malicious code on the bots or nodes in the home are another example of insertion
attacks. A presence during an event or activity where there should not be one is another
example. Shopping lists can be modified by an insertion attack through Man-In-The-
Middle (MITM) attacks. This attack can be done to replace the list that is being sent
between the fridge and the local grocery store so that the wrong items are ordered.
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With respect to the CIA impact, a successful insertion attack carried out against
a SH can lead to a general loss of trust in the security tools and solutions provided by
SH security vendors. This type of attack compromises the Integrity of the SH network
and any nodes that are directly affected (e.g. the shopping list).
C. Modification attacks
Any and all damages to home appliances fall within this group of attacks. Cor-
ruption of meter readings between the nodes and the smart meter in order to reduce
the amount the user has to pay is also an example of a modification attack. The re-
placement of a trusted device with a rogue device to enable spying is a form of network
modification. A secure, 2-way authentication scheme between the fridge and the local
store is a potential remedy to this situation. Skimming, Cloning [21], Spoofing [22–24],
Damage [25], Jamming [26] are modification-type attacks.
A loss of trust in the system (due to a loss of Integrity and Confidentiality) as well
as a loss of access to resources (Availability) is affected by these types of attacks.
D. Observation attacks
A passive form of attack, the observation attack involves the monitoring of the
smart space. An observation attack can form part of the reconnaissance phase of a
physical attack i.e. preparations before actual attack. This can give the observing party
an idea as to who is home, if anyone. Another observation method may involve installing
remote video monitoring tools e.g. hijacking CCTV streams in order to physically view
the home and its occupants. The reader is directed to [27] for discussions on Cyber-
Physical security issues. An electricity meter can be sued to monitor their electricity
usage.
A loss of Confidentiality and Integrity are the major CIA impacts of this attack.
Additional negative impacts of this type of attack includes a loss of trust in the home
security systems and general discomfort.
Attacks in Cyber-physical Environments can also be grouped into Physical At-
tacks (e.g. Theft) and Logical Attacks (e.g. DoS). This grouping is useful for inves-
tigators who may wish to analyse what assets (physical and/or logical) may have been
impacted during an attack.
The effects of attacks on SH inhabitants will range from a general sense of insecu-
rity and a loss of privacy to the erosion of trust in the SH solutions and the solution
providers or vendors. These psychological impacts can lead to a negative perception of
the companies that provide the devices and services especially those whose products are
impacted most by the attacks. For example, if a live feed from a remotely accessible
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baby monitor is unlawfully accessed, the baby monitor supplier as well as the home
network’s ISP can potentially lose customers and, therefore, revenue.
More information on the security challenges faced by Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
can be found in [27]. Example attempts to hack smart fridges are chronicled here https:
//www.pentestpartners.com/blog/hacking-defcon-23s-iot-village-samsung-fridge/
and http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/how-hackers-violate-privacy-and-
security-of-the-smart-home/. In the first link the attackers attempt, among other
things, to add calendar entries to the Fridge’s calendar - without permission - and to
cause the fridge to accept a compromised firmware update. The second link discusses
successful attacks against Smart Televisions, Smart Meters and Smart Light Bulbs. It
also discusses the threats posed by insecure Baby Monitors (several brands have been
found to have security flaws according to the article) in domestic environments.
2.4 Anomaly Detection: Multivariate Sensor Data
Anomaly Detection (AD) within SH environments will be based on data aggre-
gation from the different data sources of the data evidence around the SH as well as
data analysis. This necessitates the need for a background discussion on Data Mining,
Machine Learning and a review of work which discusses data analysis for anomaly detec-
tion and even activity recognition because the mechanism for recognising activities can
be extended to recognise activities including the ones occurring in anomalous contexts.
Anomaly Detection within SH will be addressed through the analysis of data - whether
live as the anomalous event is occurring or after an event has occurred. Therefore ap-
proaches which consider the analysis of data from sensor nodes is reviewed in this section
as part of the background work for this research.
Multivariate Data is data that is made up of different data types and formats. An
example of multivariate data is a dataset containing temperature readings and motion
sensor data. Data outputs from SH will, of necessity, be multivariate because of the
variety of sensors types available in SH. Any approach to AD for SH will therefore have
to be able to accommodate different data types. Two main fields that are playing a key
roles in the development of AD methods are Data Mining and Machine Learning.
2.4.1 Data Mining
Data Mining is described as the “core stage of the Knowledge Discovery process”
[28]. It involves analysing data in such a way as to derive useful information from it.
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This information may be a set of relationships or rules that exist within the data but
which may not be apparent from any visual observation of the data when it is first
encountered. Data Mining helps with the discovery of useful correlations with data
or between different types of datasets: relationships based on the contents of shopping
baskets from shopping basket datasets have helped stores make decisions about where to
display certain products on the shelves in their shops and during what periods. This can
help such stores increase revenue by helping customers find items they predominantly
buy together faster as well as cut cost because there is a reduced need to heavily advertise
and and promote different sets of products during certain periods when they are not
likely to be in demand or bought. Data Mining is further defined and discussed in
[28]. Data Mining is described as the “most important part” of the CRISP-DM process.
CRISP-DM (Cross-Industry Standard Process for Data Mining Methodology) “defines
the crucial steps of the Knowledge Discovery process”. DM is being applied in several
ways to find solutions to issues in SH and support SH occupants. [29] discussed and
applied DM in Activity Recognition (AR). AR is useful if used to support AD. For
example, if an unexpected activity is detected - or, conversely, an expected activity does
not happen - and the AR system flags that as abnormal, then the AR system would
have served the purpose of an AD tool as well.
2.4.2 Machine Learning
Machine learning is a field that involves the use of datasets to train algorithms
in preparation for future data based tasks such as activity recognition and prediction.
There are several tools used for Machine Learning tasks: Neural Networks including
K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Time-Series Analysis as
well as the more recently developed method of Ontology-based modelling. There are two
main approaches to Machine Learning: Supervised Machine Learning and Unsupervised
Machine Learning; these are discussed in the sections that follow. Machine Learning
algorithms are used to support Anomaly Detection (AD) by detecting outliers in datasets
which can be from SH nodes.
According to [28], there are two approaches in ML: Symbolic and Statistical .
The Symbolic approaches deal with using symbolic tools to represent the relationships
that exist within data whilst the Statistical approaches make use of machine learning
tools to build models that are based on the relationships that exist within data. A
detailed discussion on how the two approaches relate to each other is available in [28].
In Section 6.5 the Symbolic approach is taken in the induction of rules from two datasets.
The rules represent the relationships that exist within the dataset analysed.
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2.4.2.1 Supervised Machine Learning
In supervised Machine Learning, labelled data is fed into a system which is then
trained to “learn” explicitly what is normal and what is anomalous. The aim is for a
model to be built from this “learning” process so that when clean, unlabelled data is
passed through the model, it will be able to identify which class any new data that is
fed into it belong to. This type of learning is also known as Classification and the model
developed is also referred to as a classifier. Example classes are normal and anomalous.
One tool which is used for data classification is the Support Vector Machine (SVM).
SVM implementations can be found in Matlab as well as in the R language software
tools such as RStudio and Weka.
In data classification, each occurrence in a dataset is labelled with the class it
belongs to e.g. data can be labelled as “fruits” or “vegetables”. This data is then fed
to an algorithm which is trained to recognise the individual groups of each occurrence
of the data. If similar but fresh, unlabelled data is made available for which the classes
of some occurrences in the data are not known, this data can be fed into the algorithm
which will then produce an output that labels the data as belonging to one class or
another based on the rules learned by the algorithm from the original dataset. This
type of learning is Supervised learning because the set of possible classes is known in
advance and made available to the algorithm. This is useful for AD purposes as the
anomalous data points are identified and known however some challenges with using
this for anomaly detection is that sufficient, accurately-labelled training data has to be
made available to the algorithm to be trained. In a SH, this type of prior data may not
exist before the home is set up and anomaly detection will need to be initiated as soon
as the home is set up i.e. all the nodes and zones are configured and interconnected.
2.4.2.2 Unsupervised Machine Learning
In Unsupervised Machine Learning, the system operates unsupervised which means,
it is not explicitly trained with prior information about which instances in the dataset
being analysed is normal and which instances are anomalous. Unsupervised Machine
Learning typically passes the data through an algorithm which calculates the separation
between the data points. The separated points which can be separated, for instance,
based on their similarity to each other, are placed in clusters that best represent, based
on the parameters made available to the algorithm, which groups the datasets belong to.
There are several unsupervised learning algorithms that are available in software tools
such as MATLAB and the R language. Unsupervised Machine Learning is also known
as Clustering.
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The inference of which grouping is normal and which is anomalous can then be
made from a physical examination of the results or using an automatic labelling scheme.
The aim of this thesis is to support unsupervised AD by proposing and testing several
attributes and relationships as identified in Chapter 4 which can be used to build a
baseline secure SH Model such that any deviation from the set normal is an anomaly.
2.4.2.3 Data synchronisation
Data synchronisation is also important for accurate AD. Synchronisation between
the clock or timers on a central SH security monitoring system such as the FEMS
and the nodes around the home that feed data to it. This will help eliminate any
uncertainty about the times that any data was generated. In addition the FEMS should
be synchronised to any external forensics companies systems or cloud backup point with
regular updates of any data being collected sent through a secure route to the external
system. This route can be encrypted and backups of data made; backups should not be
made at fixed intervals to avoid theft or corruption of the data by any malicious parties
monitoring the network who may detect the regular backup patterns which can make
it easier for them to prepare for their attacks and also make it more likely for them to
succeed.
2.5 Current Multivariate Anomaly Detection Techniques
The use of automated tools to expedite the detection of anomalies in real-time
or from Smart Home (SH) datasets is an issue that is gaining growing attention for
several reasons: the function of the home as a place of security and privacy; healthcare
management reasons; time-saving; tools, services and product improvement for vendors;
cost-saving, for example through better and smarter use of electricity; Green Living;
supporting ADL within safe and secure environments, among others.
Existing AD methods focus on several methods of intrusion detection: the use of
Machine Learning to recognise patterns using either supervised or unsupervised (classi-
fication or clustering) tools, methods and techniques to highlight the presence of outliers
which are occurrences in a dataset which deviate from a particular more highly gener-
alised and identifiable pattern. Some AD methods are discussed in this section.
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2.5.1 A Data Mining Framework for Activity Recognition in Smart
Environments
This work develops a framework for selecting and extracting useful features and
uses these features to recognise activities from SH datasets. The part of their work that
is closest to the work in this thesis is the features that they identified as being helpful
in energy prediction which is their focus in this work. The features were identified using
their feature extraction module in their Data Mining system which is comprised a Data
Collection, Data Annotation, Feature Extraction and an Activity Recognition Module.
The features are the Activity length (in seconds), Time of day, Day of week, weekday or
weekend, previous and next activity, number of motion sensors involved, total number
of times the motion sensors triggered, energy consumed in Watts, List of motion sensors
and their states [29]. Some of these features are similar to the ones applied in this work
(in this thesis they are referred to as Attributes).
2.5.2 A Knowledge-driven approach to Activity Recognition in Smart
Homes
Chen at al. [32] introduce a knowledge-driven method for recognising activities from
SH data acquired from different types of sensors (multivariate data). They highlight the
fact that there is some correlation between ADLs and the contexts within which they
occur. They introduce a generic conceptual sensor model which is used to create domain
ontologies using tools such as Protege (http://protege.stanford.edu/) which enables
the creation of classes, sub-classes, relationships between these, and carry out testing
through the use of Reasoning tools such as Pellet and FaCT++ (http://owl.man.ac.uk/
factplusplus/) and HermiT [33] (http://iswc2004.semanticweb.org/posters/PID-
ZWSCSLQK-1090286232.pdf and http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S1570826807000169). They represent activities as “concepts”. Some of the work in this
thesis is based on a similar premise - see Chapter 6. They make use of Ontological Mod-
elling for activity recognition. They illustrate this system using the MakeDrinkADL
class. They define several parameters for testing the accuracy of their system: these
include the Time per Recognition operation (TpRO), the Fine-Grained Recognition Ac-
curacy and the User-Object Interaction Recognition (UoIR). The TpRO is an indicator
of how much time it takes the system to recognize an activity for what it is after a sensor
has been activated. The Fine-Grained Recognition Accuracy is a measure of how well
their system recognises an activity as a generic activity while the activity is on-going as
well as how well the system identifies the specific user performing the activity and so can
act as a reminder system which can remind the user which nodes might be useful for the
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particular activity they are performing. The UoIR is a metric for checking how reliable
and efficient the activity monitoring system is. With all three metrics they achieved
results in the highest percentile and thus demonstrate their system is relatively accurate
as far as activity recognition is concerned.
This thesis agrees with their premise that activities can employ certain nodes
and zones as part of their normal occurrence thus placing measurable constraints on
activities and events. These constraints can be harvested and used to form part of a SH
security baseline. The use of constraints to support AD is discussed in Section 4.2.2.
2.5.3 Using Temporal Logic and Model Checking in Automated Recog-
nition of Human Activities for Ambient-Assisted Living
The work in this paper introduces some formalisms and an ARA (Automated
Recogniser of ADLs) algorithm [34]. The formalisms are drawn up from the perspective
of temporal logic and are are used for Activity Recognition. The approach considers
the order of actions and recognises that some actions may be optional in certain ac-
tivities. Using said formalisms, the authors developed several models which represent
activities being carried out correctly. They also demonstrate the AD applications of the
formalisms. This paper covers work that resembles the one in this thesis apart from the
use of different formalisms, this thesis concentrates on building a model based on secure
attribute states such that real-time network monitoring and anomaly detection based on
any change of states is the goal. Temporal Logic was not used in this thesis because it is
used to address relationships between activities based on time while this thesis addresses
relationships between nodes, zones, activities, events based, not only on start and end
times and durations of activities and events, but also on location, modes, proximality,
among other attributes and relationships as discussed in Section 4.2.1. Rather than
combine the Temporal Logic formalisms with the attributes and relationships identified
in this work - which would have led to an overlap - the explicit time of day and date
were instead used and the period was encapsulated in the proximality attribute.
2.5.4 Mining Correlation Patterns among Appliances in Smart Home
Environment
The work by Chen et al. [35] identifies correlation patterns in SH datasets using
the Correlation Pattern Miner (CoPMiner) algorithm that they developed. This work
is the previous work of [36] which is discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.
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2.5.5 Significant Correlation Pattern Mining in Smart Homes
The authors developed the Correlation Pattern Miner algorithm (CoPMiner) which
probabilistically discovers the patterns in which appliances are used as well as the cor-
relations among these appliances [36]. Their work is an improvement on most existing
work which focus on the patterns of single appliances. The CoPMiner algorithm - which
they tested on their synthetically-generated datasets and showed that it out-performed
the other algorithms CTMiner [37], TPrefixSpan [38] and IEMiner [39] - transforms
usage-interval data into what they refer to as usage representation (Page 6, Figure
2 in [36]) which they describes as an improvement on Allen’s Thirteen Temporal Re-
lations [31]. After the transformation into usage representations, CoPMiner prunes all
infrequent usage points (based on a support threshold) from this usage representation.
The time information for all the frequent usage points are then identified. Two other
algorithms that they developed in support of CoPMiner discover all correlation patterns
(UPrefixSpan) and output all the discovered correlation patterns (TPMiner). Pattern
mining is important for AD because patterns of user activities scan be stored and com-
pared against in real-time even as users perform their ADLs. Any deviations detected
can trigger alerts.
2.5.6 Practical Anomaly Detection based on Classifying frequent Traf-
fic Patterns
The work by Paredes-Oliva et al. [40] discusses the detection and classification of
anomalies in network traffic through the use of Frequent item-set mining and decision-
trees to detect anomalies. Their work produces results of up to 98 percent classification
accuracy. Their work is however based on the traditional Train-Classify-retrain-detect
approach, an approach which suffers from the same weakness of requiring accurate, sub-
stantial, training data sourced from the SH environment being investigated. In addition,
the training phase(s) require adequate training periods (time) to be carried. Any mali-
cious injection of anomalous data during the training phase - which will be accepted as a
legitimate frequent item-set - will lead to a faulty baseline which can in turn lead to fu-
ture anomalous network traffic being flagged as normal thereby giving rise to anomalous
outputs form the SH AD model.
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2.5.7 Detecting Anomalous Sensor Events in Smart Home Data for
Enhancing Living Experience
In this work One Class Support Vector Machines (OCSVM) are applied as an
AD platform by the authors [11]. Their solution is implemented using the LibSVM
tool in Weka (http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/). The method is supervised and
involves training their algorithm with labelled data and they were able to demonstrate
positive results by feeding in un-labelled test data. Their main achievement in this work
is the evaluation of the OCSVM as a tool for AD. Using this train-and-test method
they demonstrate that they are able to detect several anomalies using OCSVM. They
evaluate their approach using five (5) test measures (Precision, Recall, F-measure, Type
I and Type II errors) - although they explain that Type II error are not considered. The
approach in this thesis differs from the work in [11] in the fact that the work in this
thesis does not require training data but that data analysis (Chapters 5 and 6) is based
on the features and relationships present in the data.
2.5.8 A Model for Discovering Correlations of Ubiquitous Things
The work in [41] agrees with the premise in this thesis that Smart Things (also
referred to as nodes throughout this work) have relationships with other Things based on
several attributes. In addition, they support a premise in this thesis that user interaction
with Things produce events (see Chapter 6 for a discussion on events and activities as
applied in this thesis). These events are useful for capturing the relationships that exist
between Things in a SH. In addition, similarly to the work in this thesis, they identify the
spatial attributes (i.e. fixed and mobile) of nodes around smart spaces as being important
for identifying their activities. They developed a model for discovering the relationships
between things using Modularity-Based Community Detection [42] which they describe
as “an effective measure for community structure in many complex networks”. They
propose a method for discovering correlations between Things and accomplish this by
capturing information about the user, temporal and spatial information of each Thing
being used. They acknowledge the challenge of discovering relationships between Things.
They build spatio-temporal (location-time) graphs to capture the relationships between
Things as influenced by their location and the time, as well as a social graph that
captures user interactions with Things. The definitions and further information on the
graphs can be found in [42]. Their results demonstrate the importance of location, time
and user interactions to the discovery of hidden relationships between Things and these
elements are among the attributes applied in this thesis.
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2.5.9 Dynamic Sensor Data Segmentation for real-time Knowledge-
driven Activity Recognition
This work focuses on achieving continuous, real-time activity recognition through
the implementation of a sensor data segmentation method [43]. According to the au-
thors, their work extends the work by Chen at al. [32] by introducing the sensor data
segmentation element. Their system is divided into three (3) main function areas (in
addition to the sensor data segmentation time windows that they introduce): Context
Selection, Iterative Action inference and Activity Recognition layers. The context of any
action or activity within a Smart environment - and in the field of activity monitoring
- covers elements of the action such as the time of day, location, objects used, potential
activity that the accessed node might be used for (or, with respect to their work, which
specific ADL). They test their system on synthetic SH data that they generated from
the Synthetic ADL Data Generator that they developed.
They define a time window and its parameters such that they are able to adjust
the window to accommodate or eliminate sensor data from a stream of input data sent
to their system thereby segmenting the data as appropriate and based on feedback and
output from the system, to enable an effective real-time activity recognition system
for a SH. They implemented this in the form of a bespoke tool and their recognition
accuracy results show that the system effectively recognises some activities to a high
degree whilst others are not as accurately identified. They attribute one of the reasons
of the low recognition accuracy of certain activities to the static nature of the time
window used in their simulation; this is because data that should be in more than one
ADL may become “merged within a time window”. This is a shortcoming for their
method. The significance of this shortcoming can be demonstrated through a visual
observation of the data from a real-life SH network (see the Aruba dataset excerpt in
Table 1.1). From observation, the nodes in the home do not go on and off in neat,
precise, activity patterns and a motion sensor, for example, may still be in state on for
some time after a home occupant has vacated the location having passed by the motion
sensor in question. This means that it is possible that even if a user has, for instance,
stopped brushing their teeth and has moved to the living room to turn on the television,
the BrushTeeth event might still be active as well as the motion sensors in the bathroom.
This is not the case in this work because the Living Room and the two Bathrooms in
the Aruba SH (which is the focal SH in this thesis) are non-proximal zones. Information
on proximals is available in Section 4.2.1.3. The Aruba SH is described in Figure 5.1.
They also assume that certain nodes become active at certain (fixed) periods after
each other. This is however not representative of how real sensors function and two nodes
(e.g. CoffeePot and Cup) may go to state on 5 seconds after each other on a particular
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day and go to state on 20 seconds after each on another day and this disparity might
adversely affect the output of their tool since the flaw is in the data generated. A better
approach to their investigation may be to test their tool on any of the widely-available
real-life SH sensor datasets. It is clear that no issue is taken with their solution or
approach but with the data generation method they employ which can be better defined
and developed to more realistically represent sensor behaviours. Another shortcoming
of the tool is that it seemingly ignores the fact that certain nodes do not power on only
when the user aims to actually use them and therefore a node coming on at a certain
time may be seen as the sign of an actual ongoing activity and this may, in fact, be
inaccurate. For instance, a mapping of activity PickUpCup to event MakeTea may be
inaccurate because a user may carry out the activity, change their mind and pick up a
flask instead in order to complete the same event i.e. MakeTea except that this time,
they plan to store the tea in a flask.
Chapter 6 contains more details on how Events and Activities are applied to
Anomaly Detection scenarios in this thesis.
2.5.10 Smart Homes for the Elderly Dementia Sufferers: Identification
and Prediction of Abnormal Behaviour
Lotfi et al. in [9] explore the identification and prediction of abnormal behaviour
in dementia sufferers. They make use of recurrent Neural Networks to “predict the
future values of the activities of each sensor” thus ensuring that pre-emptive care can be
taken for predicted anomalous behaviours. With respect to AD, prediction of anomalous
behaviour is crucial for ensuring the safety of SH occupants whatever their age or health
status. Although prediction is not applied in this thesis, the attributes and relationships
introduced in this work can find potential use in existing prediction algorithms and used
to fine-tune the outcomes of the algorithms.
2.5.11 Unobtrusive Anomaly Detection in Presence of Elderly in a
Smart-home Environment
The work by Novak et al. [44] closely resembles the one in this thesis in that it
highlights the need to recognise the use of several selected factors to aid the AD process,
factors such as the sensor location, its start time and the duration of an activity. They
employed Self-Organising Maps (SOM) in their solution for unobtrusively detecting
outliers in their motion sensor datasets. They use their solution to detect five (5) types
of anomalies:
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• Unusually long inactivity period
• User absent when presence is expected
• User present when absence is expected
• Unusually short activity duration
• Changes in patterns of behaviour
Working with the MavHome project dataset (http://ailab.wsu.edu/mavhome/),
they artificially introduced anomalies to their dataset and, only considering activities
that ran for longer than fifteen (15) minutes, their system was able to successfully detect
anomalies in seventy-five (75) per cent of the cases considered.
2.5.12 Anomaly Detection in User Daily Patterns in Smart-Home En-
vironment
In [45] the authors make use of Neural Network Self-Organising Maps in the design
of a system which observes and learns users’ behavioural patterns and detects anomalies
from these patterns. The anomalies they focus on are the same as in their previous
work [44]: activities occurring at unusual periods, activities occurring for unusually long
periods and activities occurring for unusually short periods when they should normally
go on for longer. Also, similarly to their previous work, they make use of Neural Network
Self-Organising Maps and they claim that their work is not as limited as those that focus
on detecting only single anomalies and the detection of inactivity. They tested their
work on real-life data from the MavHome (http://ailab.wsu.edu/mavhome/) project
as well as on synthetic data which they generated using an ADL dataset generator.
They manually added anomalies to the real-life dataset and, by generating anomalous
reference points, were able to set their data generator to generate scenarios that included
anomalies as part of the daily activities. They simulated ten (10) daily scenarios.
The results they obtained demonstrate that their system was able to detect ninety-
six (96) per cent of the manually induced anomalies in the real dataset. Similarly to the
work in this thesis, they focus on AD in a single-occupant home in which there are no
pets. However, their simulation is based on a data generator which inserts anomalies
based on data and not based on the context of activities and events which is something
that was taken into consideration in this work Chapters 5 and 6.
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2.5.13 Information Technology Supporting Daily Activities of seniors
The authors develop a tool (ZoneSURE) which can be used to detect anomalous
presence or absence [46]. ZoneSURE operates by detecting if a user is in a particular
location during a particular time interval as expected or if a user is indeed present in
a certain location during a certain time interval when no one should be. Their work
closely resembles the one in this thesis in its aim i.e. the detection of presence however,
it does not acknowledge the fact that motion detection nodes being active do not always
indicate presence but may be as a residue of a former presence in a particular location.
They thus do not investigate the identification of multiple “presences” within the SH in
non-proximal zones. Information on proximals is available in Section 4.2.1.3.
2.5.14 Anomaly-based Data Mining for Intrusions (ADMIT)
For this work, the authors applied data mining to design a real-time Intrusion
Detection system which identifies legitimate users of a “computer terminal” from a non-
legitimate user [47]. Their work is relevant to this thesis because it recognises that
sensor “firings” or activations do not happen in a binary way. For instance, they explain
that “some sensors will keep firing even though the same event triggered them.” and
they use as an example, sensors in a Kitchen firing continuously whilst the user is
moving around in the Kitchen. These firings cannot be recorded as multiple Cooking
or MealPreparation events (example events that may happen in a Kitchen) otherwise,
an AD system set to identify individual sensor firings as separate events may label any
and all occurrences after the first firing as suspicious and, potentially, anomalous firings
thus leading to false positives.
2.5.15 Ontology-based Activity Recognition in Intelligent Pervasive
Environments
Chen and Nugent in their work [48] introduce the use of Ontological Modelling,
Representation and Reasoning to the problem of Activity Recognition. According to
the authors, their work “exploits logical semantic reasoning for the purposes of activity
recognition”. They extend their work to the realm of continuous activity recognition and
their approach - using ontological modelling tools and reasoner - yielded useful results
according to them. One challenge to their work is the assumption that the activation of
a sensor implies that the sensor is actually being used for a certain purpose. In reality a
person may pick up a particular node (for example a cup) as part of the event MakeTea.
They may then change their minds (for any number of reasons), drop the first cup and
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pick up a different cup and use the second one. In addition, users do not always stick to
a particular pattern i.e a user may not always make coffee at a particular time. Thirdly,
That a coffee pot was touched at a particular time of day that fits a pattern (e.g. lift
coffee pot at 8.30 a.m.) does not imply it was used to make coffee even if the activity fits
the event. That same activity might fit different event too. Just because a user picks
up a coffee tin does not imply that the user intends to make coffee; a person sometimes
picks up a coffee tin in the morning to clean their kitchen cabinet.
Therefore, even though their system is applicable in situations where highly regular
ADL patterns are followed (such as in patient healthcare management), the system
would not scale well where unpredictability is a factor to be contended with. Therefore,
the context in which the action is carried about is also important in addition to the
individual action.
The basis of Ontological Activity Modelling is that the domain knowledge of
activities being performed in a particular space (e.g. hospitals, shipyard loading docks
or even smart homes) is used to identify the different ways in which the contextual
information come together to form different patterns for performing certain activities.
Domain knowledge is very important for building a set of potential ways in which activ-
ities can be performed so as to identify the different expected activities that are part of
the normal pattern and those which are not. After the activities have been identified,
when a user attempts to carry out an activity which is not on the list and does not meet
set constraints, it is flagged as an anomalous action.
This thesis supports existing AD approaches by highlighting the fact that nodes,
zones and home occupants in SH ecosystems form relationships and that these relation-
ships can be exploited to build baseline security models such that deviations from these
secure models are identifiable as anomalies.
2.6 Chapter Summary
Datasets obtained from Smart Home (SH) will be multivariate in nature because
of the variety of nodes and thus, sources of data which are found in SH. This Chapter
provided an overview of current techniques used for AD from multivariate datasets. The
techniques discussed can be broadly put in two groups: supervised and non-supervised
methods. These methods apply different classification and clustering approaches and
algorithms such as the KNN and SVM methods.
Supervised methods involve making use of explicitly labelled data to train a model.
The output of this training is a classifier. This classifier can then be used to detect
Chapter 2. Literature Review 35
classes (or labels) of fresh (unlabelled) test data. Clustering techniques such as the K
Nearest Neighbour (KNN) make use of the closeness between data points in a space to
identify the groupings that data points best fit into.
Current AD methods in general detect anomalies by learning a base normal which
subsequent data is compared against so that any variation is flagged as an anomaly.
There are various variations to how each method reaches this goal however the general
premise is the same (apart from with the Ontological Modelling method which makes
use of patterns and constraints): the user’s patterns are learned and used to build a
model through which fresh user behavioural data is analysed. Any variations from the
normal threshold are flagged as anomalies. Some of the existing methods assume that
humans are binary systems and that it is enough to harvest information about them
whilst ignoring information that pertain to the nodes that they interact with in and
around their homes. Some of the reviewed methods also do not capture the interesting
reactions of certain nodes to stimuli not directly applied to them such that their reactions
appear anomalous.
This work proposes that, as a support for AD, the relationships formed by nodes and
zones in SH on the basis of their attributes can be harvested, that rules can be formed
to constrain these relationships and that these relationships, alongside user behavioural
patterns - in the form of well-known, pre-determined events and activities - can be used
to form baseline security settings for the individual SH such that any deviations from
this baseline can be investigated and a decision reached about whether the deviation is
an attack or an error, or if the anomaly is a False Positive, a False Negative, a True
Positive or a True Negative. Using the range of anomalies allows for the reduction of
an anomaly report to not always call for external parties especially if it is found not
to be an attack i.e. a True Positive. More details on True Positives can be found in
Section 5.2 in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3
Internet of Things Digital
Forensics Framework (IDFF)
3.1 Overview
This Chapter presents an overview of the preliminary research that was carried out
as part of the effort towards answering the research question. These foundational as-
pects contributed to the overall understanding of the research problem and contributed
key aspects of the solution. The Chapter begins by proposing a definition for the word
Things. This definition was proposed in order to provide an insight into what nodes in
the Internet of Things (IoT) are, for the purposes of Digital Forensics (DF) investiga-
tions. In this regard, the words Thing and Things are used in this Chapter but they are
interchangeable with the words node and nodes.
A discussion that addresses ‘acceptable’ behaviour (Code of Conduct) within the
IoT as a cyber-physical environment leads on to the introduction of The Thing Com-
mandments which, from a philosophical viewpoint, are a set of guiding principles and
policies that can be applied by all the stakeholders involved in the IoT during the IoT’s
introduction, deployment and thereafter. A discussion follows on the potential respon-
sibility challenges that will exist in smart, autonomous ecosystems and a proposal for
Responsibility Modelling to be applied within the IoT context as a way of mitigating
these challenges is introduced. The Chapter concludes with the introduction of the IoT
Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF), the IoT Incident Response (IR) Plan, and an ex-
ample analysis of a hypothetical Incidence Response Scenario using a combination of
the IDFF and the Incident Response plan.
The publications on which the chapter is based are:
36
Chapter 3. Preliminary Research 37
Publication 1: Oriwoh, E., Sant P., and Epiphaniou, G. Guidelines for Internet of
Things Deployment Approaches – The Thing Commandments. Procedia Com-
puter Science, 21(0):122-131, 2013. doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2013.09.018 Conference:
The 4th International Conference on Emerging Ubiquitous Systems and Perva-
sive Networks (EUSPN-2013) and the 3rd International Conference on Current
and Future Trends of Information and Communication Technologies in Healthcare
(ICTH), Volume: 21.
Publication 2: Oriwoh, E. and Sant P. The Forensics Edge Management System: A
Concept and Design. In Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing, 2013 IEEE 10th
International Conference on and 10th International Conference on Autonomic and
Trusted Computing (UIC/ATC), pages 544-550, 2013.
Publication 3: Oriwoh, E., Jazani D., Epiphaniou, G., and Sant P. Internet of Things
Forensics: Challenges and Approaches. In Collaborative Computing: Networking,
Applications and Worksharing (Collaboratecom), 2013, 9th International Confer-
ence, Conference on, pages 608-615, 2013.
Publication 4: Oriwoh, E. and Williams, G. Internet of Things: The Argument for
Smart Forensics. In Handbook of Research on Digital Crime, Cyberspace Security,
and Information Assurance, pages 407-423, 2014, publisher: IGI Global.
Publication 5: Oriwoh, E., Sant P., Epiphaniou, G., French T., Maple C. (2013) Do
Not Pass The Buck: the Need for Responsibility Modelling in the Internet of
Things, Procs. of the International Conference on ICT LAW 2013 (Information
and Communication Technology Law, Protection and Access Rights), Porto, Por-
tugal.
Publication 6: Oriwoh, E. and Conrad, M. ‘Things’ in the Internet of Things: Towards
a Definition. volume 4(1), pages 1-5, 2015. doi: 10.5923/j.ijit.20150401.01.
Publication 7: Oriwoh, E., al-Khateeb, H. M. (2015) ‘Internet-Of-Things: Towards a
Forensic Methodology’, Digital Forensics Magazine, 2015(22): 34-37.
3.2 ‘Things’: A definition
As part of carrying out research into the IoT, Smart Homes and security in both
these areas, it was deemed necessary to proffer a generalised definition of the word
‘Things’ in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). A brief summary of the related
publication ([49]) that discusses this definition is presented here:
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For anything to be classed as a ‘Thing’ in the IoT sense of the word, the following
criteria are suggested:
• It serves a purpose;
• It can be interconnected as part of a network even though this might not always
be. All Things possess the facility for interconnection either using technology (e.g.
802.11 or Ethernet connectivity) or via a natural method e.g. verbal, physical
or other human communication; Things can also be fully functional, standalone
nodes.
• It can have a physical or logical form;
• It is traceable physically or logically e.g. by eyesight or GPS location tags;
• It can be communicated with or it can communicate or both;
• It can be interfaced with;
• It can be living or non-living;
• It can be identified e.g. using a physical and/or logical identification marker;
• It has capacity for autonomous operation;
• It is tangible or intangible;
• It can be naturally autonomous (e.g. humans), enabled to be autonomous (e.g.
self-driven vehicles) or even non-autonomous (e.g. software code).
Drawing from these discussions and criteria, ‘Things’ are described as ‘anything
at all, depending on requirements’ . An example of a Thing is a self-driving, au-
tonomous vehicle.
3.3 Code of Conduct within the IoT
The IoT introduces a unique dimension to the relationships between humans and
the (smart) objects that belong to them and/or which help them fulfil a direct or indirect
objective. With extended and continuous interactions with these Smart Things, this
relationship can be expected to gradually become one of reliance and maybe eventually
one of trust. However, even though end users may increasingly rely on smart Things
for the achievement of goal states, there should be a clear recognition by stakeholders
(owners, users, designers, vendors, etc.) of where responsibility for Things, and actions
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by Things, should lie. This Responsibility question has recently started gaining some
attention as part of public discourses. In early March 2015 the UK Parliamentary
Transport Committee and the House of Lords raised the subject as one that needs to
be addressed [50].
There are numerous beneficial applications of interconnecting objects in the form of
an IoT in areas like emergency management, logistics, and medicine [51–53]. However,
on-going research has exposed some privacy risks thus leading to some questions. Exam-
ples of these challenges include: how the owners of Things can accurately be identified?
How to know when a Thing (as opposed to a person) has done something wrong? Who
is to blame for a Thing doing something wrong e.g. for committing a crime in the form
of a mistake or an anomalous activity? What should a society’s expectations be of its
government in relation to Things like sensors being deployed publicly or the expectations
of individuals of other individuals? Should neighbours always inform each other about
the presence of all sensors or of certain types of sensors outside their homes? When is it
permissible not to inform anyone about the presence of sensors? Lastly, who is supposed
to have control and what is the acceptable amount of control various stakeholders should
(or should not) have over certain Things?
Before introducing the proposed Thing Commandments [54], a number of chal-
lenges, issues and concerns in the IoT domain that necessitate a conditioned approach
to rights and responsibilities within the IoT are discussed in greater depth.
3.3.1 Legal
Novel attacks and cyber-crimes typically emerge with the development of new tech-
nologies. This can also be expected with the IoT [55]. The Law, for its part, tends to
lag behind these ‘novel’ crimes; indeed according to [56], by its very nature, Criminal
law lags behind technology and this legal time lag is inevitable because of the inability
of state and federal statutes to keep up with Internet and technology developments.
Also, Rolf H Weber in [57] and [52] argues that there is a need for governance and legal
oversight over how the IoT operates even while it is in its early (formative) stages. As
identified by [58], because of the far-reaching applications of the IoT in national and
private systems, the legal and policy discussions around the IoT should be dealt with
as important for its development. It is therefore important that the legal arm of society
is prepared - and even contributes - to the development of the IoT by setting guiding
principles that stakeholders would be expected to adhere to. Governments and lawmak-
ers should be ready and willing to modify existing laws or create new ones, in order
to safeguard citizens from the dangers of mismanaged or maliciously modified systems.
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For instance, in order to deal with some aspects of computer crime, the UK government
deemed it necessary to introduce the Computer Misuse Act 1990 [59] although certain
other cyber-crime-related charges are still being brought under (previously existing) laws
such as the Theft Act 1968 [60]. This approach can serve as a good precedent for deal-
ing with IoT-related crime - old laws that are applicable can be retained and new ones
or, at the very least, new guiding principles and policies such as the ones proposed by
the United States National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Policy to
govern the use of self-driving cars - should be enacted.
Some existing UK-based laws that may apply within the cyber-physical environ-
ment of the SH include
• Theft Act 1968 This law is applicable to the authorised or unlawful removal of
someone’s property. With respect to the IoT as a Cyber-physical system, property
includes all cyber and physical property. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/
60/section/9
• Computer Misuse Act 1990, 2006 A relatively new law under which several prosecu-
tions have already been successfully brought since it was enacted. www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1990/18/contents
• Communications Act 2003 This act is used to charge people who piggy-back onto
the wireless netwroks of others typically because the networks in question are
relatively insecure. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/contents
• Data Protection Act 1998 www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents
• Regulation of investigatory Powers Act 2000 www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/
23/contents
3.3.2 Accountability, Liability, Rights and Responsibility
The number of devices connected to the Internet is expected to reach 50 billion by
2020 [61]. This proliferation of connected devices may lead to management and oversight
create some control concerns for governments and personal privacy concerns for citizens.
Introducing discussions on rights and responsibilities at the development phase of the IoT
is pertinent and is what the work in this thesis aims to do. As an example of proactive
responsibility management, governments might be expected to indicate clearly to their
citizens (e.g. through the use of publicly-placed sign posts) where smart sensors have
been deployed in public even if these are deployed for the benefit of the public have
deployed tags in public places.
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3.3.3 Trust
Some concerns about trust include those expressed in [62] in which the authors
raise concerns that deployed RFID systems could encourage widespread surveillance of
members of the public without their knowledge or consent. They also argue that data
produced might be re-used for a second purpose, again without the consent of those
whose data was collected.
3.3.4 Regulation and Control
There are a number of questions around regulation and control over the IoT. Ques-
tions like who, if any one body should control the IoT? Should it be self-regulated or
government controlled? Should there be a body governing the IoT? For management
and marketing purposes, it may be deemed necessary to introduce a system for stor-
ing records of all tagged (or IoT-enabled) objects. This is similar to the system where
customers who purchase contract (mobile) phones and lines are registered on to the
provider’s database. If a system like this is introduced and customers’ details are col-
lected as part of the purchase process, then access to these records would have to be
strictly controlled.
3.3.5 Privacy
There are already concerns about the deployment of devices that can be commu-
nicated with over IoT-enabling technologies like RFID.
Consider the new e-Passports that the United States started issuing to its citizens
since August 2007. This passport has an integrated RFID chip embedded into the back
page of the passport; the chip digitally holds relevant information about the passport
assignee for security reasons [63]. When grouped according to their source of power,
RFID tags can be active, semi-active, or passive and they can be awakened and read
by RF readers at adequate distances from them - some from distances of several meters
[62]. However, the research to determine the best way to secure this communication link
(i.e. to avoid indiscriminate awakening and reading of tag data, for instance in sensitive
nodes such as the passport described above, by just any reader) is still on-going and
has not yet produced a widely accepted result. Therefore, although RFID is beneficial
since, by design, it enables automatic and time-saving identification, the benefits of
being automatically identified may not outweigh the potential privacy and data loss
disadvantages for an individual. Also, the time-saving benefits of being able to identify
the contents of a traveller’s suitcase by scanning and reading all the tags attached to
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each item - without the requirement of opening the suitcase and physically confirming
the person’s identity may lead to items with spoofed tags being used to provide false
identities for their holders and thus erroneously tagged items could be allowed through
security barriers such as border checkpoints.
In addition, [64] highlights “tracking” as a problem with the use of tags arguing
that the identifiers provided by tags - which are usually predictable - can make it possible
for associations to easily be established between tags and their owners. The same paper
argued that privacy is one of the issues that are still to be addressed before a major
roll-out of RFID systems.
Ethical questions about how any data produced by smart Things are used, by
whom, for how long this data is stored and other Data Protection considerations are
another aspect of the IoT which need to be addressed.
These questions highlight a requirement for a set of principles that can guide the de-
ployment and application of Things as they become part of the autonomous, ubiquitous
mesh of connected devices used every day in society.
Given the existing issues around the deployment of the IoT, a set of commandments
are suggested in Section 3.4 that might address them. Some of these commandments
may come across as obvious whilst others may be points of contention and probably
even encourage debate around this subject area. These Commandments are published
in [54]. They were developed to address the foreseen issues of privacy, ownership and use
of smart Things, the dangers posed by malfunctioning autonomous, self-aware systems
and the need to be able to identify the owners of Things no matter how autonomous or
smart they become.
3.4 The Thing Commandments
The aim of drawing up a set of “Thing Commandments” was to introduce principles
that can be applied to the IoT so that even as devices are being designed, manufactured
and tagged and/or embedded with identification, communication and sensing capabil-
ities, the long-term recognition of the implication of having intelligent, self-controlling
(i.e. autonomous) Things - as opposed to non-autonomous things - is recognised by
stakeholders including the manufacturers, consumers and governments. The recognition
that objects are becoming connected and interconnected ([65], [66]) has led to the devel-
opment of the Thing Commandments which should hopefully serve as a starting point
and feed into discussions around the privacy and security rights and responsibilities of
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stakeholders where the IoT and connected things are concerned. If there are no guid-
ing principles, there is a potential for the rights of stakeholders (governments, vendors
and individuals) to be stretched too far or, conversely, for their responsibilities to be
diminished.
Box 3.1. The Thing Commandments
1. Ownership: Things belong to, and are the responsibility of, their owners,
and so too are the actions of Things;
2. Access and Authorisation: Accessing Things without permission is not ac-
ceptable;
3. The Co-relationship Principle: All Things that belong to a particular in-
dividual should belong to a common network and be easily and uniquely
identifiable to each other and by each other;
4. Communication Policies: Secure mechanisms and channels of communica-
tion between Things should be established;
5. Ease of Use: Things should be made relatively easy to use and manage;
6. Control: All Things should be controllable by their owners;
7. Identification: It should be possible to identify the owner of a Thing from
information available on or embedded in the Thing;
8. Freedom from Things (the Non-reciprocity Principle): People should be free
to achieve goal states without the use of Things and at the same time not
loose out on rights, privileges, goods or services as a result;
9. Disabling, destroying or disposing of Things: People are to be free to dispose
of their Things when it suits them.
3.4.1 Ownership
This commandment argues that Things belong to, and are the responsibility of,
their owners and, by inference, so are the actions of Things. Consider as an example
a situation where a smart Thing owner, say Osas, did not send a specific request to a
Thing to carry out an action, for example, “Open the front door” (a direct action A) or
even a derived action e.g. do ‘A’ if ‘B’ happens else do ‘D’ (i.e. based on what it has
learned), then Osas cannot assume that any negative action that his thing carries out
will be excused without expecting any form of reproach to himself as the owner. This
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way, if a crime involves a Thing, the owner, identifiable by a label on or, incorporated
in the Thing, bears some responsibility for the actions of the Thing.
3.4.2 Access and Authorisation
If anybody or entity accesses or controls any thing without the permission of the
owners, such access must be regarded as illegal. Meingast et al. in [67] present an
argument on how the new applications of RFID technology in transponders can introduce
privacy risks. They contend that the objects that are permanently embedded with
transponders could be used by individuals in public places where they may have little or
no control over who can access them. The UK Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990 was
introduced to deal with crimes that involve, among other things, unauthorised access to
computer systems. Even if RFID tags and sensors have little computing capability, they
are by extension, computing equipment and this law can be extended to include them.
In addition, even if it is possible for Things to be accessed by unauthorised (but
somehow authenticated) users, it does not mean that the successful unauthorised access
is permitted. An analogous situation exists in the the field of wireless networking where
the general advice is that even if a Wireless Access Point is not adequately secured by
an owner, a person with the requisite skill who gains access to it in order to use the
WiFi (e.g. by piggy-backing) is doing something wrong.
3.4.3 The Co-relationship Principle
All Things that belong to a particular person should belong to a network of their
Things and should be easily and uniquely identifiable to and by each other through
the use of a mutual authentication system. The aim of this trust relationship is to
enable security by ensuring that rogue Things attempting to become part of someone’s
personal network of Things (such as their Personal Area Network) would be denied
access because establishing that relationship would require certain criteria to be met
and authentication threshold to be crossed. These criteria can be based on a system
of Authentication, Authorisation and Accountability (AAA) and may even incorporate
existing AAA solutions.
3.4.4 Communication Policies
All nodes should be able to identify trusted communications made by other trusted
nodes nodes. Although [68] argues conversely that no device (i.e. tagged) should be
Chapter 3. Preliminary Research 45
fully trusted by another in order to avoid a situation where every single device stands
as a single point of entry to a network, this thesis argues that this a trust relationship,
is essential for things to be able to identify and verify the identification [69] of each
other. In order for this relationship to be established, a strong but manageable system
of authentication and authorisation would have to be put in place. This way only
trusted communication would be permitted between things. Therefore, any unauthorised
“imposter” Thing that tries to communicate with an established network would be
detected and such communication would not be allowed.
3.4.5 Ease of Use
It should be made relatively easy for users to configure Things and add new Things
to or remove old Things from their network of things. If a user purchases a new Thing
and wants to ensure it can communicate with their existing Things and vice versa, the
user should be able to do so easily without the need for any special training or requiring
the services of the specialist vendor. Vendors should be required to make Things easy
to install. One level that they might aim for may be to make Things that can be
installed as plug and play devices by consumers. This commandment would ensure that
vendors don’t make unreasonable amounts of profit from providing unnecessary Thing-
related services to their consumers since some consumers would obviously start out by
being “Thing luddites”. This commandment is especially relevant to Thing designers,
developers and vendors. It is supported by the assertion in [70] that home-owners must
be able to get devices on to their home networks by themselves without any assistance
from “installers”. Therefore the back-end and front-end technologies have to be designed
with the end users’ access needs and requirements in mind. This can be achieved through
collaboration with standards bodies such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE).
3.4.6 Control
It should be expected that all Things should be under complete or at least par-
tial (shared) control of their owners. To meet this requirement, vendors and developers
should ensure that all available technology in relation to Things is designed to be user
accessible and user friendly as well as easily understandable. Rigorous tests and con-
sumer surveys must be carried out to ensure that consumers are not just aware that
they should be able to control their Things but that this is a requirement for owners of
Things.
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3.4.7 Identification
The owner must be clearly identifiable by some form of identification on, around or
hard coded in the Thing. For instance, Things can be affixed with a sign that states they
are the ‘Property of the Government of a particular country or military’. Any Thing
with no identifiable owner belongs to no one and can legally be confiscated or destroyed.
This commandment would prove especially useful for law enforcement agencies since it
would most likely be up to them to locate the owners of misplaced Things. This way,
hopefully, any crime committed by a Thing can be traced to the owners. There might
be the need to detect ownership by scanning a code but that code must be easy to locate
by (or accessible to) law enforcement.
3.4.8 Freedom from Things (the Non-reciprocity Principle)
This commandment incorporates and introduces a caveat to the previous com-
mandment. Simply put, it eschews “The Right to Freedom from tags and tagging”.
The commandment seeks to introduce to the IoT discussion the fact that not everyone
will wish to use smart, autonomous Things. This commandment therefore ensures the
freedom of individuals and society from tags of every form. It introduces the rights of
individuals to refuse all or certain things e.g. implantable tags. RFID tags are being
embedded inside pets, exotic animals and people [71, 72] but this thesis posits that
this should only be done with the consent of the individual concerned or an appointed
guardian, within recognised legal limits.
3.4.9 Disabling, destroying or disposing of Things
This commandment asserts that it must be possible and easy to disable Things
even remotely. This commandment also requires that Things should be easy to dispose
of and the data within them completely destroyed. Bernard in [73] argues that, as a
fundamental right of citizens, the “silence of the chips” must be preserved. His argument
supports the position of this commandment.
3.5 Responsibility Modelling (RM) for the Internet of Things
This section discusses the benefits of Responsibility Modelling (RM) for the IoT.
It begins by discussing some of the potential responsibility challenges that may arise in
mature, smart, autonomous environments such as the IoT.
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3.5.1 Responsibility Challenges in Smart, Autonomous, Ecosystems
As part of the Internet of Things (IoT) design and development, ordinary objects
are being equipped with the ability to sense and make decisions independently on behalf
of their owners and of end-users. In the near future it can be expected that people will
increasingly transfer daily decision-making tasks to smart non-human (or autonomous)
agents and that Things will take over tasks as required by their owners or operators.
Jiang et al. note in [74] that the effect of the IoT on daily life will be “transformational”.
For instance, parents may transfer the tasks of ensuring their children arrive at their
school on time to non-human nodes such as self-driving vehicles that work in coopera-
tion with smart traffic lights as well as other self-driving vehicles. It can be supposed,
going forward, that tasks that will be assigned to smart Things will range from simple
trivial tasks to those which can be described as being “safety critical” in nature. As a
direct consequence of having smart Things take over a variety of mundane as well as
safety critical Activities of Daily Living (ADL), people are likely to develop an increased
reliance on these Things. One of the aims of the IoT is for it to become a structure for
improving people’s lives, one in which people find that they can reliably assign tasks
to smart Things to take care of satisfactorily. However this reliance upon IoT elements
(smart, sometimes autonomous, systems) to mediate transactions and thus achievement
of goal states on behalf of their owners must not be construed as wholly handing over
responsibility for the outcomes of the actions of these systems. It is therefore essential to
recognise the limits of the IoT technology so that the transference of skills, obligations
and responsibility for accomplishing and completing tasks on to smart Things is not
viewed as the transference of responsibility for the consequences of their actions as well.
3.5.2 Benefits of Responsibility Models from the perspective of the
IoT
In the light of the preceding discussion, it is essential that the question of respon-
sibility within the IoT is addressed. According to Ashton [12], humans are intrinsically
fallible, having limited accuracy and so introducing a high level of autonomic intelligence
to Things can minimize delays and mishaps that occur due to human error. While this
argument is not undesirable, it has potential shortcomings that can be highlighted using
RM and this section discusses some of the potential benefits of introducing RM into IoT
transactions.
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3.5.2.1 Overcoming Responsibility Vulnerabilities
Responsibility vulnerabilities occur when agents do not properly discharge their
responsibilities for any number of reasons. Six (6) responsibility vulnerabilities are
identified and defined by Sommerville [75] (Table 3.1):
Vulnerability Type Description
Unassigned A responsibility is not assigned to any agent
Duplicated
More than one agent assumes each holds the same
responsibility
Uncommunicated Agent not aware of assigned responsibility
Mis-assigned
When a lack of tools or skills affects
effectiveness
Overloaded When an agent is given too much to do
Fragile
When no alternative agent is made available to
take over if the first one becomes unavailable
Table 3.1: Responsibility vulnerabilities
In an increasingly automated world, the vulnerabilities described have to be guarded
against. However, if and when they do occur, the people with whom the consequential
responsibility lies must ultimately be identifiable. This identification process can be
assisted through the use of consequential responsibility models. Consequential responsi-
bility models are useful for identifying agents in a socio-technical environment that are
ultimately responsible for consequences of outcomes.
3.5.2.2 Addressing Legal needs
The IoT, whilst it is in its early stages of development, is already providing beneficial
applications in areas of health, transportation and security, among others. However, as
with any new technology and new application of existing technology, the IoT introduces
dimensions of crime that will undoubtedly provide opportunities to malicious parties to
exploit with potentially harmful consequences. The possibility for owners to train smart
Things to commit crimes may become an issue for existing legal systems. From the
perspective of the United Kingdom, there are existing laws which might be applicable
to crimes in the IoT including, amongst others, the Computer Misuse Act (CMA 1990)
[59]. Other laws or acts that apply in other countries include the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA 1996) which regulates the access and use
of individually identifiable health information in the US [76]. However, the notion of
a legal system implies a recognition of responsibility. Lock et al. [77] state that the
definition of responsibility inherently implies that all actions and systems should “work
within the social framework of both legal and domain standards”. Without a method of
Chapter 3. Preliminary Research 49
identifying responsible parties when the situation calls for it, there might be issues when
it comes to pressing charges and this may lead to erroneous convictions or acquittals.
As a result, there is an explicit requirement in the early stages of the IoT development
for a method of identifying responsible parties.
In addition, legal systems have historically only had as their focus living and/or
deceased human characters and establishments (e.g. companies) because it is to these
that the concept of punishment and praise currently has meaning, relevance and effect.
Legal systems obviously have no impact on conscience-free, non-human objects whatever
the consequences of their actions. Therefore, it is imperative that a method of ascribing
responsibility for the consequences of actions of smart Things to people is developed and
made available to all the relevant stakeholders in IoT transactions e.g. lawmakers and
law enforcement bodies. Having such a method of identifying responsible parties and
for apportioning blame, if any situation arises within the IoT domain, the responsible
non-humans can be correctly identified and ascribed causal responsibility (what did it?)
whilst humans can be ascribed both causal (who did it?) and consequential responsibili-
ties (who is to blame?). This will eliminate the possibility for a human player to pass the
blame buck. From the perspective of consumer protection, this model will be useful for
end-users since blame for the actions of faulty Things may lie with the manufacturers,
vendor, and designers and there may be a need for them to seek redress of some sort.
3.5.2.3 As a discussion support tool
Responsibility Models are designed, not to be static, hard-and-fast, unchangeable
tools, but rather as tools to facilitate discussion around subject areas that, although
might still be subject to change and development, require some form of structure dur-
ing their evolution. This is undertaken so that the concerned stakeholders and agents
recognise what should be done if anything goes wrong [75]. As previously mentioned,
Responsibility Models are useful for the purposes of eliminating any chances for blame
to be passed around - a situation which might lead to a lack of resolution of issues when
and if something goes wrong because the responsible party is not clearly identifiable.
Designers of IoTware can also make use of RM through the discussion it generates to
better understand user requirements.
3.6 The Forensics Edge Management System
The Forensics Edge Management System (FEMS) is briefly introduced in this sec-
tion. More detailed information is available in [78]. The FEM is a system that is designed
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to provide real-time, automated and autonomous security and Digital Forensics (DF)
services within SH environments. The FEMS operation is as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Thresholds are set by the user and continually updated by a SH Management system. If
any breach is observed (based on a change in the “Home Happiness” status), the FEMS
operation is triggered. It harvests any data acquired within a specified time window
before and after the alert. This data is parsed and a decision-making algorithm (the
FDMA) performs a DF investigation at the end of which it produces a report about
whether the anomalous activity observed was an attack or an error. Example FEMS
services include network monitoring, data mining, logging, timeline creation, alert man-
agement (incident escalation) and presentation of investigation results and reports in
human-readable formats. Chain of custody management is also handled within the
FEMS itself through a combination of authentication and time-stamp details i.e. details
about who logged in to the FEMS and when are combined and used to track who
handled the evidence. More details on the FEMS is available in a related publication
[78]. The relationship between the IDFF, FEMS and FDMA is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Data Cleaning, 
Compression
Network monitoring
Data Collection
Data Analysis
Result
Record
Escalate
Decision-
Making
Notify 
authorities
Store data locally 
for period τ 
Notify 
owner
Network monitoring
N
e
tw
o
rk
 m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
N
e
tw
o
rk
 m
o
n
ito
rin
g
Investigate
Reportable 
offence
Do not 
escalate
Legal oversight
Legal oversight
Legal oversight
Legal oversight
Report 
Generation
Report 
Generation
Figure 3.1: The FEMS Operation (summarised)
The FEMS can also be set up to perform integrity self-checks using methods such
as hashing. Hashing involves using passing data through a hashing algorithm such as
SHA256 which generates a hash of the data. This output is an irreversible value which
can be subsequently securely stored. In order to find out if the data has been tampered
with, a new hash is generated from the raw data and compared with the old hash
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and if the two resultant hashes match, then the integrity has been maintained. This
can be used to ensure that any evidence collected by the FEMS is not compromised
during an investigation. This method of maintaining integrity using hashing is used in
digital forensics where investigators store an original copy of a piece of evidence then
work on copies which are first hashed and their hashes compared to the hash of the
original untouched evidence file to be sure that they are the same as the original and
uncompromised.
In addition, delays to the system are avoided by making sure that even though the
FEMS monitors the network continually and initially any anomalous pattern is detected
in real-time, further detailed analysis of any acquired evidence is carried out oﬄine. This
is because a full analysis of captured data online and in real-time may adversely affect
the performance of the FEMS as well as create bottlenecks on the overall SH network.
3.7 IoT Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF)
3.7.1 Overview
The IDFF framework (originally introduced in [78] and extensively modified in this
thesis) is a Framework that is applied as part of the general incident Response solution
operations for SH. The IDFF was drawn up from a review of existing DF frameworks
and methodologies [79] and from input (gained through interviews) from academics
and former DF field and industry experts with relevant, professional experience and
qualifications. The interviewees from whom feedback was obtained included:
• Two (2) Professors, one of whom had extensive past professional field experience
(United States);
• Six (6) Doctors i.e. PhD holders - three (3) UK, two (2) USA, one (1) Pakistan;
• One (1) co-author of a widely-used. widely-consulted, edited DF text book who
also had experience of DF frameworks development which are actually being used.
Their input was obtained through 30-40 minute, qualitative, semi-structured, in-
terviews conducted over the Internet using SkypeTM.
According to the Sample Dissertation Methodology Article available at [80], “A
semi-structured interview is a qualitative interview that is defined by a pre-set ques-
tion guide.” Also according to [80], as part of deductive Qualitative Data analysis of
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Research Findings, a pattern matching procedure “involves the development of an an-
alytical framework, utilizing existing theory, and then testing the adequacies of the
framework as a means of explaining the findings (Saunders et al, 2007). In the instance
where a pattern is found as initially predicted, it would be evidence that suggests that
there is indeed an explanation for findings.” The interviews in this thesis were conducted
after a preliminary framework had been drawn up and the feedback received was used to
adjust and update the framework where necessary thus following the recommendation
in [80].
The (theoretical) evaluation process of the framework involved drawing up an initial
version of the IDFF framework, sending this out to the identified and selected group of
DF professionals and academics and inviting them to give their feedback on the frame-
work during an interview session. The interview questions are included in Appendix B.
The interview questions were asked with the following rationale:
• to identify the interviewees’ knowledge of the IoT and their overall Digital Forensics
(DF) experience and expertise;
• to find out if there is a need for a DF framework for the IoT;
• to obtain feedback from them on the draft IDFF which was sent to them prior
to the interview date, to gain some insight from real-world DF academics and
(former) investigators into what an IDFF should contain and if they thought the
IDFF as presented did not meet those ideals.
The Interview questions had several objectives and these objectives addressed sev-
eral key factors: the expertise of the interviewees in IoT and DF fields, their views on
the future of the DF as applicable to atypical nodes within the IoT and the subject of
data explosion due to the interconnection of more nodes as part of the IoT and how this
will affect DF going forward.
The interviewees’ feedback overwhelmingly supported the argument that a good
structured Forensics approach is indeed necessary for forensics in the IoT.
Drawing from the input from the interviews - and this thesis author’s own do-
main knowledge - the following recommendations were made for strengthening the IDFF
framework:
• The expansion of the framework beyond its initial remit;
• The inclusion of legal aspects in the discussion;
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• Match the outcomes of the “Presentation” and “Report Generation” stages with
applicable laws;
• Apply the framework to a theoretical case to demonstrate its suitability;
• Present the framework in the form of a flowchart to aid easy understanding;
• Inclusion of an “Analysis” phase during which logs that are not useful as part of
the overall investigation may be identified and discarded;
• Identify clearly who trains the FEMS e.g. the home occupant, their family, friends,
carers, cyber-physical security product vendors and installers, etc.
The next section discusses the Framework in greater detail.
3.8 IDFF Framework Breakdown
3.8.1 Phase 1: Preparation Phase (Setting up the Smart Home)
3.8.1.1 Stage 1: Physical Security
In order to adequately prepare for cyber-physical forensics, the physical security
of the home has to be considered as part of the Forensics preparedness process. Some
solutions that can be used to support physical security around SH include Closed Cir-
cuit Television (CCTV); security guard dogs; physical human and node identification
methodologies (to avoid rogue nodes being introduced to the SH environment); SH phys-
ical boundary and perimeters protection e.g through fences; water leak/spill detectors;
total number of nodes threshold to prevent piggy-backing on to electricity supply; extin-
guishers (foam, water, etc.); the average number of human home occupants per period or
per day to avoid physical intrusions and to provide alerts about unauthorised congrega-
tions e.g. parties in the home; physical cable cut detectors; Wi-Fi piggy-backing; safes,
physical intrusion trip-wires; keyed/coded locks and other window and door security
solutions; protected and limited physical network access e.g. limited access to Ether-
net ports; quick and sound waste disposal policies and procedures to prevent dumpster
diving : this may involve shredding as necessary, training and information to home oc-
cupants about Social Engineering practices; monitoring Heating, Ventilation and Air-
conditioning (HVAC) systems; security at air vents to prevent human entry or harmful
gas and other chemicals being passed in through vents; secure, sturdy doors; biometrics
security solutions and so on. Even though SH would not necessarily be expected to
have all the same security features as, for instance, public places, having a minimal set
Chapter 3. Preliminary Research 54
of solutions will reduce the threat landscape. However, before any security measures
are put in place the home occupants’ input must be sought because of the cost and the
relevance of the solutions; providing security dogs to a person who does not like dogs
will, for example, be counter-productive. A useful way to determine what type and level
of security to implement in each SH is to find out the requirements of the SH occupants
through the use of approaches such as Needs and Wants assessments where the users
identify in detail what is important to them and how tightly security measures should
be tweaked or otherwise.
3.8.1.2 Stage 2: SH Network Preparation
During this stage, all the devices in the home that need to be networked are iden-
tified and then connected (i.e. networked). This stage completes the initial setting
up of the base SH network. The home network may include nodes such as fridges,
televisions, thermostats, cars, and IP-based routers and switches. Network testing and
troubleshooting should be carried out during or at the end of this stage to make sure the
network is functional. In addition, during this stage the user must install and configure
any required Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS). The registration of
nodes in and around the home can be achieved by scanning their RFID tags or other
types of tags (bar codes or QR codes) where available, by manual registration and even
self-registration by the nodes themselves. The identifiers of the nodes can be specific or
generic. Example node identifiers include BedroomFan, KitchenFridge, Node 001, or
simply, Node A. As part of this stage, the home occupant should identify the different
zones Z in the home and the nodes η in each zone as well as the number of zones and
nodes in each zone (where zones are rooms and other spaces in the Smart Home). An
example zone identifier is BigBedroom. After the nodes and zones have been identified,
any networks that individual nodes belong to should also be identified. As an example,
the TV, games console may belong to a Living room entertainment sub-network. As
part of the SH network preparation process, the following information would then be
required:
• The attributes (e.g. Type γ and mode µ) of the nodes;
• All the Relationships (Peripherals, Proximals, etc.) between the nodes and zones;
• All External Access Nodes for the purposes of the Mutual Exclusivity Rule;
• Any initial thresholds as applicable. An example threshold can be “Keep the Living
Room temperature at a minimum of 30 degrees during the winter months of the
year”, and so on;
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• All trusted firmware and software update sources e.g. websites;
• All trusted vendors, resources- and service-providers, suppliers and stores. This
list can be, for instance as shown in Table 3.2;
Node Resource Supplier
Fridge Groceries Tesco
TV Films NetFlix
Car Fuel Local mechanic
Table 3.2: An Example Smart Home Supplier/Vendor Table
The physical and logical security preparation phases help with the prevention of
attacks. However the measures put in place during these phases should also help make
detection easier.
3.8.1.3 Stage 3: Forensics Preparation
During this phase, all the devices that may have digital evidentiary value are identi-
fied. If an evidence ranking method is available, these sources may be ranked and listed
according to order of relevance or importance to investigations with regards to the ev-
idence they hold. Devices that may hold only physical evidence should also identified
during this stage. Lastly, devices that may hold cyber-physical (digital and physical)
evidence should be identified. A data aggregator can be used to collect logs and data
from the different nodes that are identified during this stage as being potentially useful
for forensics investigations.
Apart from the physical nodes and the evidence they provide, the approach in this
work proposes the use of node and zone attributes, relationships and activities and events
constraints as aids to AD processes an systems. Therefore at this stage, the following
should be identified:
• Potential activities that make up expected Activities of Daily living (ADL) or
events;
• Core events per home occupant and core activities for each event;
• All the edge nodes1, if any;
1For the sake of simplicity and streamlining the investigation process, it would be better if the nodes
are arranged in such a way as to avoid having any edge nodes
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• Trusted (third-party) cyber-physical security and forensics services company(ies);
• Logging frequency and logging amount or level. Example logging rules are given
in Table 3.3);
• Storage location(s) for logs e.g. local or remote or both.
Log data Log duration Log location Storage Location
Everything One (1) month Local Server Living Room
IP addresses only Two (2) weeks Remote Database Cloud-based Server
Everything except Motion sensor data Daily Home PC BigBedroom
Table 3.3: Example Logging levels
Part of the preparation for forensics involves the identification of critical infrastruc-
ture (physical and logical) in the home. Critical infrastructure includes those that, for
example, must never be turned off because turning them off will potentially endanger
the SH or its occupant(s). Other such infrastructure includes nodes that hold critical or
private data. If a ranking methodology is available, one may be applied at this stage to
identify the nodes that are non-critical and those that are. This phase can be seen as
the phase during which steps are taken to prepare the SH for Triage.
3.8.1.4 Stage 4: Training and Adjustment
The first step in this stage is to, as much as possible, maintain the Home status
at “Happy” (i.e. normal) so that the FEMS learns what the “Happy Home Network”
attributes and values are. During this stage, the SH system can be explicitly trained on
what is normal by the user e.g. thermostat values and preferred wake-up times can
be keyed in into the Home Management System (HMS) or even directly into the FEMS.
After this point, the home, through the HMS or FEMS can subsequently learn and
update its records on what normal is. The meaning of what is normal may change
because of changes in user behaviour. The user may also choose to manually modify
what the system has learned. These must be updated as soon as possible so they are
not erroneously detected as anomalous by the FEMS.
Further details on Phase 1 is available in Table 3.4.
3.8.2 Phase 2: Detection Phase
This phase involves the use of the combination of any available home network
monitoring tools (Firewalls, Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention Systems) in
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tandem with the trained FEMS and its decision-making module (the FDMA) to detect
any changes from normal to abnormal behaviour in the homes “Happiness” status. The
FEMS, which by this stage should have been configured with baseline operating values
of different nodes in the Home, would detect any significant changes from the learned
baselines, within a set of constraints such as time of day, location of event, etc., . The
Anomaly Detection takes place as follows. After the SH has been set up:
• As each event happens, the FEMS checks for the Activity Sequence (ASeq) fol-
lowed, the core activities (as defined in [10]), the order of activities, and the nor-
mality of the attributes and relationships;
• An anomaly is recorded if a wrong sequence of activities is followed, the activities
are in the wrong order, the core activity(-ies) is missing or if abnormal relationships
occur;
• Alerts are sent as necessary.
Essentially, the FEMS attempts to answer the question is the Home at a “Happy”
State i.e. are all attributes normal? If the answer to this question is no, it implies there
is an anomaly and that it may be necessary to investigate. In order to carry out an in-
vestigation, relevant logs or data must be acquired. This can be achieved by identifying
a start time of when the incident was detected and either tagging the data for later or
immediately capturing the logs from that point forward until an identified stop time.
Tagging the logs for capturing later can help reduce disruptions to the network but may
however allow ongoing attacks to continue. When the log is acquired it can then be
analysed by the FDMA for evidence.
 IDFF
 FEMS
FDMA
Figure 3.2: Relationship between the IDFF, FEMS and FDMA
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3.8.3 Phase 3: Decision-making Phase
The Forensics Decision-Making Algorithm (FDMA) begins its operation in this
phase. The acquired logs are parsed following the methodology as shown in Figure 1.2.
If the anomaly is recognised as being within the “normal” threshold i.e. False Negative,
no action is taken. However, if a higher threshold is reached, the Investigation Phase
is called and the user is alerted. Network monitoring continues throughout the lifetime
of the network and is carried out using any available firewall, IDPS, the FEMS, or any
other available network monitoring tool as selected by the home occupant. If an even
higher threshold is reached, the situation is contained and an alert is sent to previously
identified external cyber-physical DF parties as well as the user. These rankings are
similar to those discussed in [7]. A high ranking indicates that it has been established
that what is happening is an attack. The detected anomalies are divided into different
types as one of the four types of anomalies: True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN),
False Positive (FP) or False Negative (FN) (see the Anomaly Rankings Text Box in
Chapter 5 for information on Anomaly Ranking).
3.8.4 Phase 4: Investigation Phase
This phase involves the identification of the actual causes of the alarm/event triggers
detected in Phase 2: Detection Phase. During this phase, the sources of the attacks are
identified. Causes may be nodes such as Kettles or Windows.
3.8.5 Phase 5: Escalation
If the decision reached after Phase 4 (the Investigation Phase) is that the attention
of external parties such as an external Digital Forensics (DF) unit is required, the FEMS
may escalate the investigation. This escalation can be achieved using text or email alert
messages or via remote alarms at the remote site of the third party security and home
monitoring company.
3.8.6 Phase 6: Presentation Phase
At the conclusion of an investigation, the results obtained are prepared into human-
readable form. This report may be made available to the home occupant immediately
after the investigation (e.g. in the form of a text message) or stored and presented to
them later. Depending on the outcome of the investigation, the same report can also be
sent to third party security companies. The report may be in the form of a summarised
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message (text or email) or as an automated print-out from an available local printer
depending on the user’s (preconfigured) requirements. The output that is presented to
the user is an explanation, briefly, of what the investigation uncovered e.g. “a presence
was detected in the house while the user was away”. The report which is generated may
have the following fields: Date, Timestamp, Log Duration involved, Location of logs,
Decision, Outcome of investigation, Action(s) Taken, Current state of home, Source
of anomaly (if any), people involved (if any), End of Investigation Timestamp, End
of Report: Date, Time, Signature, Case Officer or Officer-in-Charge. In addition, for
preserving privacy, the data is stored locally with access granted to only a select few.
An example report is shown in Table 3.8.
3.8.7 Phase 7: Storage and/or Disposal
The logs that were analysed as part of an investigation are stored for a pre-defied
period of time after which they can be disposed of. How long they are stored for, where
they are stored and how they are disposed of are decided upon based on preconfigured
settings by the user. Restoration and Recovery of the home to its “Happy” state takes
place as part of rounding up the investigation.
Phase Stage Steps Notes Output
Physical Preparation
i. Identify home perimeter.
ii. Install physical security measures.
iii. Test physical security measures.
v. Zone and node identification.
Registration of all nodes -
old and new - in a database of Things;
(process continues
throughout network lifetime)
A List of zones, nodes.
A physically secured home
1 Preparation
Network Preparation
i. Set up home network.
ii. Connect the FEMS to the network.
iii. Test network connectivity.
iv. Configure FEMS.
v. Node Registration.
Identification and Registration of all nodes -
old and new - in a database of Things;
(continues throughout network lifetime)
(Updated) Register of nodes and zones
Preparation for Forensics
i. Set up logging and log expiration period
ii. Determine attributes thresholds.
iii. Define and set threshold for triggering alarms.
iv. Define and set threshold for escalation.
v. Identify Home Perimeter and zones.
Thresholds that are defined can be, for example:
A: normal network health,
B: attack noticed and being investigated and
C: attack beyond capabilities
of the FEMS;
Example threshold attributes are location in SH,
temperature, humidity level.
Threshold values are continually revised
and updated according to the users’ requirements.
This should ideally continue as long as
the owner wants their devices to be IoT-connected
or connected to any network.
i. Established logging
thresholds;
ii. Incident Response (IR) Plan;
iii. Trigger levels.
Training and Adjustment
i. Build the balanced “Happy2 Network” status
ii. Learn
ii. Detect changes and learn what is accepted
and what is abnormal based on
user actions, reactions, input or
change in behaviour or requirements.
Continue to learn user preferences
This continues throughout the FEMS
operational lifetime.
(Updated) trigger levels
and SH “Happy” status attributes.
2 Detection Detection and Acquisition
i. Monitor Home attributes for changes;
ii. If yes, trigger FEMS forensic operation.
Attributes include time of day,
node ID, zone, etc.
Captured (or tagged logs)
with anomalous attributes.
3 Decision-making The FDMA operation begins
i. Parse captured logs.
ii. Unzip, decompress, etc. and parse the logs
for evidentiary information.
i. If threshold A reached, do nothing;
ii. If threshold B reached, investigate, alert user;
iii. If threshold C reached, continue network
monitoring, contain situation, alert external
Forensics Team and user.
Investigation of acquired
logs can take place oﬄine
or in real-time
Decision i.e. A, B or C.
4 Investigation
Identification of causes and
sources of event trigger
e.g. kettle, dog, etc.
See Figure 1.2
Takes place, oﬄine using the FDMA algorithm;
Collect available data for investigation;
continue network monitoring;
perform investigation oﬄine.
i. Relevant evidence;
ii. Source of attack;
iii. Nature of attack.
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5 Escalation Escalation and Notification
i. If thought necessary during the investigation
an alarm can be sent to
an external service provider in
addition to a warning message
ii. Depending on the outcome,
a message is sent to one of two agents.
This is done if the investigation
is proving to be
beyond the capabilities of the FEMS.
i. Text message and/or email sent to:
a. user;
b. external digital forensics
service providers.
6 Presentation Report generation
i. Generate a report based
on the outcomes of Phases 2 - 5
Outcome of investigation
and evidence can be made available to
the end user on their return to the SH. Also, it is
ready to be made available
if queried locally or remotely
by the end user or a trusted
third party.
Forensics reports on
i. Status of the Home
ii. Outcome of the investigation.
7 Storage and/or disposal Local and/or remote logs storage.
i. Logs stored for pre-defined period.
ii. Log disposal after expiration period.
Pre-defined storage period.
Set of logs with
respective expiration periods.,
Revised attribute values for “Happy”
posture of the SH network.
Table 3.4: Internet of Things Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF)
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3.9 IoT Incident Response Plan
In the context of this thesis, the Incident Response (IR) Plan as presented describes
the stages and steps that can be followed by Incident Response teams and DF forensics
investigators in the event of anomalous security incidents in Smart Homes. The IR Plan
may be put into action if the decision taken at the Escalation Phase (Phase 5) of the
IDFF is that an external party is required to take over the investigation from the FEMS.
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Guide
to Integrating Forensics Techniques to Incident Response, there are four basic forensics
phases: Collection, Examination, Analysis and Reporting . The IoT Incident Response
framework proposed in this thesis is similar to the NIST IR Plan. Figure 3.3 shows the
mapping between the NIST and the IoT IR steps. This mapping was done just to show
how the IoT Incident Response Plan compares to a well-known, standardised IR Plan
such as the one proposed by NIST. The phases of the IoT IR Plan are Preparation &
Preliminary Information Gathering , Acquisition , Investigation and Analysis
and Reporting & Storage [79]. During the Preparation & Preliminary Information
Gathering phase the investigators gather information from the person who made the
report and from any other witnessing parties. They also perform a reconnaissance of
the physical and logical SH set-up in order to gain an idea of what the potential sources
of evidence are (in a generic sense). If list of evidence nodes are available from the home
occupant, these can be consulted, with a certain degree of caution, as well. Evidence is
acquired from relevant evidence sources or the next best things (see [81] for more details
on IoT forensics and the use of the Next Best Thing or NBT) during the Acquisition
stage. During the Investigation and Analysis phase the acquired evidence is analysed
and a report is prepared during the Reporting phase. Also at this stage, if necessary, the
evidence that was analysed is stored securely Storage phase. The SH is Restored to a
Happy state as much as possible after the investigation so that the Home occupant may
continue to use it (that is, assuming the investigation does not find that they themselves
caused the problem). Chain of custody is maintained through signing and secure storage
and handover of evidence between investigators in the IR Team.
NIST is a widely recognised Standards Agency. It is part of the United States
Department of Commerce. It provides technology, measurement and standards that are
used in products and services including computer chips, nano-materials, and even the
National grid. The NIST Guide was selected as a comparator in this work because it
the IR Phases are widely-known and applied globally, NIST is a well-recognised body
and the phases in the NIST Incident Response Plan are similar to the one proposed in
this work. There are other IR Plans such as those discussed in [82] and [83] however,
as explained, the NIST Guide was used in this case because of the fact that NIST is a
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Examination
Analysis
Reporting
Preparation
Investigation
and 
Analysis
Reporting and 
Storage
Gather preliminary information from SH occupants; 
identify nodes, zones, physical and logical perimeters 
and boundaries, scope of the investigation, relevant laws, 
ethical and moral concerns and considerations, etc.
Acquire data from the FEMS, logical and physical 
evidence.
Analyse acquired evidence; identify if anomaly is an 
error or attack; identify source of attack.
Prepare investigation Report; Store evidence.
Collection Acquisition
IoT Incident 
Response 
Phases
National Institute of 
Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Incident Response 
Phases
Restoration System Restoration, where applicable.
Figure 3.3: NIST to IoT Incident Response Plan Mapping
widely-recognised Standards Agency and its standards and systems such as its IR Plan
are well-known and relied upon globally.
3.9.1 Purpose
In responding to incidents, IR Teams should ideally have IR Plans. According to
Dell SecureWorks (see http://www.secureworks.co.uk/incident-response/), an IR
Plan should detail “roles and responsibilities, procedures and communications”. They
add that if an IR Plan is not used during the investigation of a breach, poor decisions
may be made which can “make the breach worse and delay its resolution”. Adequate
IR planning can therefore help to minimize damage and loss caused by an incident as
well as aid systematic system (and data) recovery and preserve evidence should there
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be a need for legal action. Some of the challenges that DF teams may encounter if there
is no structure in place to guide Incidence Response tasks and investigations within the
IoT - challenges which an IR Plan can help overcome - include:
• data loss due to a lack of established, tested, repeatable, methodical steps;
• varied outcomes per investigations due to the absence of repeatable, standard
processes and guidelines to assist future investigations;
• time wastage which may occur as a result of a lack of a pre-arranged strategy.
This can in turn lead to a lack of focus and duplicated efforts or even cause
investigators to focus on unnecessary tasks;
• potential legal and ethical breaches (e.g. breaches of personal privacy);
• potential investigation scope creep;
• potential evidence volume overrun or mismanagement. Without a proper
Plan in place, investigators may apply a seize-and-bag-all approach which may
then lead to an unnecessarily large volume of evidence that may or may not
be useful to ongoing investigations;
• delayed resolution of incidents or breaches and even escalation of the effects
of the breaches;
An IR Plan will help investigators maximise a response potential and minimise the
duration and, potentially, the impact of an incident.
3.9.2 Scope
The IoT IR Plan was developed to be applicable to DF investigations in SH and,
more widely, the IoT. It suggests the steps that can be taken during investigations in
such environments but it does not prescribe tools that should be used during specific
investigations.
3.9.3 Target audience and users
The intended audience for the IoT Incident Response Plan are IR teams, Digital
Forensics (DF) investigators, IoT and Smart environments cyber-crime and security
professionals.
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3.9.4 Application
The IR Plan provides scope for steps that may be taken before, during and after
incidents. This means that it can serve as an Incident Response Plan as well as an
overall Framework for DF investigations.
3.9.5 Benefits and merits
The ways in which classical/traditional DF methods differ from the IDFF (discussed
in [78]) are in the types of evidence, types of networks, types and amount of data (logical
evidence), evidence sources, jurisdiction and network types and boundaries. The IoT IR
Plan recognises and addresses the challenge of the cyber-physical environments domain
with respect to these differences.
Logical evidence in the IoT and SH will be obtained from data from a variety of
nodes including but not limited to mobile phones, TCP/IP network data, electricity
readings, and data from location and motion sensors. Aggregating this to a useful and
manageable form will be crucial for DF tasks because it will make the data easier to
manage. One way that this can be addressed can be through the use of a network Data
Aggregation module where the data from the different nodes are collected and centrally
processed. Such a central location can subsequently be queried for evidence during
investigations. A Home Management System or even the FEMS can serve as such a
central log processing unit. Alternatively, this module may deal with the data about
the raw data e.g. rather than store explicit electricity readings, the aggregator may hold
information such as in Table 3.5:
Node Location State Duration
KettleKitchen ON 2 minutes
FridgeLivingRoom ON 10 hours
Table 3.5: Smart Home Log Aggregation Sample
By stripping the SH data records of specific, explicit information in this way, when
investigators access the data, a degree of the SH occupants’ privacy is maintained3. The
aggregation unit must be adequately secured to avoid accidental or deliberate, malicious
log corruption or destruction. In addition, it was developed with a focus on existing laws,
2 Minimum setup requirements where everything is at a normal state.
3This was one of the suggestions from the interviews on the IDFF.
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the aim being to identify how these may apply within the CPS investigations. The goal
is to eliminate or at least reduce the potential for investigations to be abandoned due to
lack of prosecutory provisions or due to potential breaches by investigators themselves
during investigations.
3.10 Analysis of a Hypothetical Intrusion Detection Sce-
nario
In this section the IDFF and IoT Incident Response Plan are used to analyse a
hypothetical Incident Response scenario and the outcomes of the analysis are presented.
The hypothetical scenarios are representative of attacks that SH may realistically face.
Zone Zone Mapping Objects
A LivingRoom Television, Sofa, GamesConsoleOne, MobilePhones(2)
B Dining DiningTable, DiningChairs, FlowerPotOne, BabyMonitor
C Kitchen Fridge, Cooker, KitchenTelevision
D SmallBathroom BathTubTwo MirrorTwo
E Office Desk, Chair, Cupboard, Door
F SmallBedroom SmallBed
G BigBedroom
BigBed, TableLamp, BabyMonitor, GamesConsoleTwo,
CCTV Management Console, Home Management System
H Hallway Thermostat
Table 3.6: Hypothetical Scenario: Smart Home Nodes
3.10.1 Example Smart Home Incident Response Plan
The SH selected as the focus of the scenario is the Aruba SH with zones and nodes as
identified in Table 5.2. Additional Objects (i.e. Smart Home nodes) shown in Table 3.6
- but which are not confirmed as actually existing in the real WSU CASAS Aruba SH
- are introduced hypothetically into the home for the sake of analysis and discussion.
The investigation is carried out as described in the following sections.
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3.10.1.1 Preparation and Preliminary Information Gathering
The source of attacks against SH may not be from single sources and may also not
be of one particular type or against single, isolated targets. Adequately preparing to
address different types of attacks and to gather as much relevant evidence as possible as
part of an incident Response strategy is a key first step in any investigation.
Information gathering about an incident should begin as soon as the Incident Re-
sponse Team receives the user’s complaint and agrees to investigate the reported inci-
dent. Preliminary information can be gathered by asking the person(s) who made the
report some specific questions about the particular incident as well as asking general
questions. Some example questions can be What did you observe?, Could you have done
anything that may have triggered one or another of these incidents?, Bearing in mind
that the target space is a home, Since the incident occurred what, if anything, did you
do to try to address the issue(s) by yourself? Please provide as much detail as possible.
It is important that the scope of the investigation is ascertained as early as possi-
ble during an investigation. Consider for example an incident involving a Hospital. The
scope for a hospital investigation can be the everything within the hospital’s phys-
ical grounds only or all remotely-managed patients fitted with pace-makers.
The scope of an autonomous, self-driven vehicle investigation can be all cars or all cars
that have particular software and hardware installed.
Determining the scope of an investigation involves identifying if the investigation
is digital, physical or cyber-physical in nature and, where possible, what the phys-
ical and logical perimeters of the investigation are. Identifying the perimeter will help
to determine if the incident involves physical nodes local to the home or if there are
external nodes involved as well as help identify any logical elements that may be in-
volved. In addition, this stage helps identify if external parties such as family members
and friends may need to be contacted as part of the investigation. A potential scenario
in this regard can occur if a friend places an order without informing the SH occupant.
After, receiving the groceries, the occupant may make a complaint to the store about
groceries being wrongfully delivered to their home. Therefore, where possible, every
human, non-human, autonomous, non-autonomous entity, node (typical and atypical)
involved in an investigation should be explicitly identified. With respect to the sources
of logical evidence, the nodes being identified must be nodes that may or should contain
evidentiary data (referred to as Objects of Forensic Interest (OOFIs) in [78]).
Determining the perimeter of an investigation also helps identify what laws apply
to an investigation e.g. do international laws apply or national laws only?
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During this phase, the following should also be identified:
1. specifics of individual incidents, how many incidents there are and any links or
overlaps between them where applicable;
2. where any SH data logs are aggregated and stored, if at all;
3. the affected nodes;
4. the affected zones;
5. items that can be removed (for off -site analysis where necessary) and what must
be analysed in situ;
6. what logical and physical evidence each affected node holds;
7. which of the evidence is volatile. Volatile evidence should, ideally, be acquired first
or, as early as possible during investigations;
8. any laws, ethical and moral boundaries that apply for example, whether to poten-
tially interfere with an ongoing CT scan by accessing the PC that is receiving data
from it in order to acquire evidence.
This information should be gathered manually as well as from output from the
FEMS.
For this scenario, assume that the occupant of the home is physically away from
her home and that she left at 8 a.m. From the user complaint and the report of the
FEMS the following information was made available to the IR Team and represents the
user’s complaint:
• Incident One: The FEMS “detected” a presence in the home at 11a.m;
• Incident Two: The SH network monitoring system reported unusually high net-
work traffic between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m.;
• Incident Three: An unanticipated delivery of groceries was made within this time
period. The user claims she did not place this, or any other, order.
The team should ask the home occupant the questions as suggested earlier in Sub-
subsection 3.10.1.1.
The IR Team will need to find out if any of the attacks are ongoing. If the network
is still being accessed and orders placed then they may choose to limit communications
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on the network by blocking the offending IP addresses or disconnecting the entire net-
work thereby limiting the impact of the attack. However, if this will impact the home
occupants or SH itself negatively, they will need to reach decisions about what is the
best way to respond e.g. limiting only certain types of traffic and not all or trying to
investigate whilst the attach is going on. This, may help them gather even more evi-
dence and verify the source of the attack depending on how skilled the IRT is and the
capabilities of their tools. With respect to Incident One, if the person is still present
then efforts should be made to apprehend them physically.
During this phase, the Team can find out information about the types of protocols
available on the network, the types of nodes - as mentioned earlier. If there is compre-
hensive list of the nodes in the SH, it would be helpful to the team to acquire this from
the home occupant.
This service is provided after the incident occurs. The incident may still be ongoing
while the investigation is being carried out. It is cost-effective because it is only carried
out when incidents occur which the FEMS tool escalates.
3.10.1.2 Evidence Acquisition
During this stage the IT Team acquires evidence from the nodes, network, zones
and humans (as necessary and feasible, under certain constraints). They can do this by
connecting directly to the sources of evidence through any available interfaces (physical
access) or wireless communications. SH nodes, whether large or miniature, typically
have interfaces that can be connected to and used to query for the data in any internal
memories that the nodes have. As much as possible investigation teams should try to
interface with the nodes and acquire data from them. Wireless (BlueTooth and WiFi)
and wired (e.g. Ethernet) sources must all be accessed where possible, bearing the
volatility of certain evidence sources in mind.
Evidence of interest will also include IFTTT and other app schedules, app logs and
app activities, sensor node meta-data such as node ID, hardware addresses e.g. MAC
addresses, if any, node activity details such as when (i.e. time of day) they are turned
on and off and the actual sensed data (stored centrally on sink nodes or locally on the
individual nodes themselves), smart thermostat logs, humidity readings, car location
and/or operating history, motion sensor logs, IP addresses, location data, data stored
on any cloud locations, Social Media feeds,and upload locations and schedules for nodes
that are programmed to upload data periodically, etc.
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Network logs will include network activity data such as log-on and log-off times,
meta-data, port details, number of ongoing connections, details about any authentica-
tion attempts and using which usernames, grocery and other purchase history, websites
visited, and so on.
Some useful sources of data in Smart Homes will include any available network-
ing systems (routers, switches, servers, etc.) some of which may dually serve as log
storage systems and/or even Home Management Systems (HMS) [84]. Other sources of
data will include mobile phones, FEMS, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS), Firewall, games consoles, pens, smart electricity meters, and
fridge memory.
The data that some sensors hold is of a relatively small quantity. For example some
wireless sensor nodes have Flash program memory sizes as small as 128 Kilo Bytes and
4KB of RAM. However, the quantity does not matter and if the data can be accessed
then the investigators should attempt to access it. Nodes such as fridges and cars may
have more data than tiny sensors. They will potentially also have larger processing
capabilities. Some larger nodes also carry out some on-board processing and any data
stored on them may be useful to a case and this data should therefore be acquired.
The team may need to pair up with a physical Incident Response Team so that
not only the logical evidence (for example network logs) is acquired but the physical
evidence as well such as fingerprints and fabric.
As explained in Section 1.6 (see also [78]), as soon as any changes in the SH “Hap-
piness” status is detected the FEMS collects the logs from all events just before the
time-stamp when the changes were detected. The time frame of when to begin the cap-
ture can be estimated based on the time frame given by the home occupant when they
made a complaint as well as the investigation team’s domain knowledge and experience.
The issue of corrupted logs is still an open question as far as this research is concerned.
Logs can be encrypted immediately they are acquired and stored however, this may
cause the system to slow down thus leading to a potential self-inflicted DoS attack.
The autonomous service provided by the FEMS is a useful part of the evidence
acquisition stage because it reduces the potential that relevant evidence is lost because
the investigators arrive some time after the attack and, in addition, investigators are
afforded the opportunity to complete the key step of preliminary information-gathering
from the person making the report. It is also an invaluable source of evidence for
investigating teams.
The team will also need to identify what potential physical sources of evidence
(typical and atypical) are not connected on the SH wireless or wired network and whose
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logs would therefore not be available on the FEMS e.g. an analog, non-networkable
alarm clock. The IR Team will need to identify the communication protocols (a typical
protocol is Bluetooth, a less common protocol is Rime) being used and whether the
Team has the tools to communicate with the nodes using those protocols.
In addition, the relationships that the nodes in a SH form with other nodes can be
used to determine what activities the nodes were part of. Analysing the attributes, rela-
tionships and constraints of these nodes, etc., anomalous relationships can be detected
as described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Lastly, if data is not available from certain nodes directly, some information may
be available from nodes that they are attached to or with which they interact. This is
described as using the Next Best Thing (NBT) approach ([81]).
For this particular scenario, evidence is acquired from the FEMS and from the
relevant nodes as identified in the Evidence Analysis part of the investigation.
3.10.1.3 Evidence Analysis
Based on the initial complaint made by the home-owner (and any available report
from the FEMS) the three incidents 4 identified are analysed here:
Incident One:
The FEMS “detected” a presence in the home at 11 a.m. The three zones in which
the presence was detected are the Dining, the Hallway and the Garage. The home
occupant was away at that time. The home is a single-occupant home. No visitors were
expected that day so any presence while the home occupant was away was anomalous.
The IR Team should physically go to the SH and check to see if any logical or
physical evidence that proves that there was - or still is - a presence in the home is
available. They should also look for evidence about what zone the presence was/is
in. Note that by identifying the affected zone(s), the FEMS helps to narrow the scope
and perimeter of the investigation but investigators may still choose to gather physical
evidence (e.g. from CCTV recordings) for themselves and use that to corroborate the
report from the FEMS. The IRTs will also need to also look at the logs of External
Access Nodes.
4It should be noted that there might be an overlap between incidents especially considering the fact
that, from the user’s initial complaint, the three incidents occurred within a common period on the
same day in the same SH
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Assume for the purposes of this investigation that the FEMS - using the presence
detection capabilities of the FDMA algorithm (Appendix A) - detected the presence in
the Dining.
Incident Two:
The SH network monitoring system reported unusually high network traffic between
10 a.m. and 2 p.m.
From the FEMS output, the team can find out which nodes were active on the
network during the period in question i.e. between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. They can
also find out details of any outgoing and incoming traffic from any network monitoring
nodes or software like Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), Firewall
and the FEMS where they are available. If the excessive traffic (represented on the
FEMS log as Nx = Up-High, the network state that indicates an attack) is discovered
to be in-bound traffic from a single or multiple sources the investigators might be able to
identify the source and destination IP addresses of the traffic. Even if the source address
were spoofed, it might still be useful to collect this information as a way of evidencing
the attacker’s skill-level, their intention and their modus operandi for potential future
profiling of the attacker. The investigators will also need to check to see what ports
were active around this time and if the ports were on the list of allowed ports as well as
if the number of active ports was greater than the maximum allowed i.e. Ptmax or not
even on the list of identified or allowed ports.
Since the third incident involves the unexplained placing and delivery of an order,
the team may also choose to search for which websites, if any, were being accessed. The
search history will also be important as it might include search terms that include the
grocery items that were physically delivered as well as delivery companies and potential
grocery shops. Of particular importance will be any activities that involve access to
online grocery stores, delivery companies and bank purchase.
Incident Three:
An unanticipated delivery of groceries was made within this time period. The user
claims she did not place this, or any other, order.
The IR Team may begin by analysing any physical signatures that were used to
sign for and accept the delivery if any are available. They may also analyse purchase
receipts because these may have card details and details about the name of the person
who placed the order. The shopping bags in which the items were delivered might give
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an indication of which store(s) the order was placed from. This is especially useful if the
delivery driver is not identifiable (e.g. if they left after making the delivery and before
the home owner returned to the house) and no receipt is available.
The team can check for which nodes are typically used to place orders for groceries.
If orders are typically placed directly from the Fridge, then they might choose to access
the Fridge logs for potential evidence of websites that were communicated with, shop-
ping history, and which activities from the Activities List in Table 6.1 were performed.
They may choose to find out if the Fridge was scheduled to place any orders by itself
and if perhaps a software glitch caused it to place the order. In addition, it will be
important to find out if any orders were placed from remote locations using the fridge
itself (see Subsection 6.3.2 which discusses three potential ways in which groceries can
be ordered using a smart fridge).
If the order was placed from the fridge, locally or remotely, the login details (user-
names) used may also give some indication of who was logging in. In addition, the
number of login attempts on the fridge may indicate if it was an authorised user or not.
To eliminate any possibility that it was the home occupant, they may need to look at
her bank statements (payment history) that cover the period that the order was placed
during according to the records from the store.
Since the FEMS output provides a time-stamp that indicates when the presence
was detected (Incident One), the team can look up what nodes were active around this
time. Assume that the nodes that were identified in Incident One are the DiningTable,
DiningChairs, FlowerPotOne, the motion sensors M021, M022, M029, M030, D004
as well as an extra, unregistered node of Type Generic Mobile Communications Device.
The last node on the list indicates that there was one more node than expected on the
network. However any active, non-proximal sensors may require further analysis. If
it turns out that there was no outgoing traffic from the fridge, the IRT will need to
investigate the unrecognised device as a possible suspicious source.
The FEMS also holds a record of how many active, networked, nodes (NTAct) there
were in the home including during this time period (see Section 4.2.1.16) so that if more
nodes than expected were active, the system can send an alert warning of a possible
physical intrusion in the home.
Since the presence was detected in the Dining at 11 a.m., assume for this incident
that the network traffic logs showed an unknown Generic Mobile Communications Device
making an outbound connection to a well-known grocery supplier’s website. This could
be the reason for the unusually high traffic because there was some network activity
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when none was expected thereby causing the network reading to be at state Up-High
instead of Up-Normal (Section 4.2.1.12).
For this incident assume that no one physically signed for the delivery and the
delivery driver had placed the shopping outside the home before making the call to the
home-owner about the order. Also assume for the purposes for this analysis that the
unrecognised node was found to have accessed shopping websites around the time of the
incident. This was based on evidence from websites visited which showed that orders
were placed and banking details entered. Lastly assume the firewall reported that the
high network traffic was coming from multiple IP addresses external to the SH but that
the destination was the IP address of the fridge in the kitchen.
The variety of potential data sources and, therefore, potentially, data types, demon-
strates that stripping of the data and aggregating it using tools like the FEMS will prove
useful for Digital Forensics purposes as it will save time and reduce the need for inves-
tigators to have tools to interface with the different interfaces and analyse the different
data types. If this investigation was to be conducted without a system like the FEMS
it would have been more challenging. The potential contributions of the FEMS to In-
cident Response and DF have been demonstrated here and include time-saving and a
more efficient approach to investigations.
3.10.1.4 Investigation Conclusion
One conclusion is that there was someone in the house when the legitimate home
occupant was away. The person came in with an unrecognised device which was used to
place an order for groceries. During this time, there was a separate attack going on. The
second attack involved a potential network-based (i.e. not physical) Denial of Service
(DoS)5 attack on the Smart Fridge.
5An physical, logical or cyber-physical attack that causes resources to become limited or completely
unavailable to those who legitimately need it.
Factors Incident one Incident Two Incident Three
Perimeter and
network boundaries
Dining
Home* network and
external network
Home* network and
external network
Relevant Evidence Sources
Motion sensors
(may also include CCTV as backup)
Network,
affected nodes,
router(s), switch(es)
Routers, switches,
motion sensors, receipt,
physical items delivered,
shopping bags, fingerprints
Affected zones Dining, Hallway, Garage Home* and external Home* and external
Affected Nodes M014, M021, M022, M030, D004 FEMS Outside the home
Cyber Evidence Motion Sensor data
TCP/IP data,
IP addresses, ports
FEMS network data ,
network activity of the
unrecognised node,
any available purchase
history from groceries supplier
with destination physical address
of the SH in question,
Internet History,
Physical Evidence
Fingerprints on D004, DiningTable and
FlowerPotOne; other evidence of
physical intrusion6
None
Physical items delivered, fingerprints,
Fabric, Location information,
receipt, activity logs
Conclusion from evidence
Intruder in home at 11 a.m.
in Dining and moved
between Dining and Garage only;
touched objects as listed in Physical Evidence.
Someone placed an order using
the unrecognised device.
n/a
Legalese Theft Act 1968 CMA 1990 (c 2006),
CMA 1990,
Communications Act 2003,
Theft Act 1968,
Telecommunications Act
Table 3.7: Hy othetical Scenario: Incident Evidence Table
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Incident Response Report
Report Author: Mary (name and signature)
Start of Report metadata:7 00/00/1900; 10:00 a.m.; Osas, case officer
Beginning of Investigation metadata:8 00/00/1900; 10:00 a.m.; Osas, case officer
Incident(s) Reported by: Home Owner (verified)
Required Permissions obtained: Yes
Estimated log duration involved: 5 hours
Size of evidence e.g. logs: ∼ 20Mb
Current Location of logs: FEMS & USB drive
Decision One: True Positive
Source of anomaly (if any identified):
Decision Two: True Positive
Source of anomaly (if any identified):
Decision Three9: True Positive
Source of anomaly (if any identified):
Action(s) Taken: See Case Officer’s Investigation Notes
Reason(s) for Action(s) Taken: See Case Officer’s Investigation Notes
Current Smart Home state: “Happy”
People involved, if any: Home Owner
Applicable Laws10:
CMA 1990, Theft Act 1968,
Communications Act 2003
End of Investigation metadata: 00/00/1900; 11:00 a.m.; Osas, case officer
End of Report metadata: 00/00/1900; 11:30 a.m.; Osas, case officer
Table 3.8: Hypothetical Scenario: Incident Investigation Report
3.10.1.5 Reporting and Storage
During this stage the Team prepares a report based on the outcome of their inves-
tigation. The logs that were investigated are stored for a period. The report for this
hypothetical incident is given in Table 3.8. An example logs storage table is Table 3.3.
3.10.1.6 System Restoration
Where feasible, after an investigation, the SH network should be restored to its
healthy state. This can be achieved through installing software patches, removing of-
fending nodes or applications from the network, updating anti-malware solutions such
as anti-viruses, installing network monitoring tools if none were previously available and
if necessary, moving nodes back to their correct locations, registering new previously
unrecognised nodes that have been added onto the SH network, among other measures.
6 CCTV footage as backup.
7 Date, Time, Signature.
8 Date; Time; Name; Signature of Case Officer or Officer-in-Charge.
9 There are three (3) decisions because there are three incidents.
10 e.g. which laws apply to the incident? Is the incident a reportable offence under, for example, the
UK law?
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Part of completing the investigation may also include putting incident prevention strate-
gies in place. All of this has to be done with the home occupant’s agreement especially
since there will most certainly be a cost dimension to implementing these solutions how-
ever this cost might be part of a pre-existing Service Level Agreement that the home
occupants may have with their SH solution providers or home insurers or even cyber-
physical security and forensics companies.
3.11 Chapter Summary
The Chapter proposed a definition of the word “Things” in the context of the In-
ternet of Things (IoT). An increased reliance on autonomous smart Things by humans
and end users to obtain improved efficiencies in everyday life might be a consequence of
advances in the reliability of smart Things as part of the IoT. This Chapter therefore
proposed the use of Responsibility Models to demonstrate that even though there might
be an abstraction of responsibility to Things when they perform tasks and respond to
requests on behalf of end users, these end users (e.g. owners of self-controlling, au-
tonomous systems and objects) should still be aware of their potential responsibilities
for the consequences of the actions of Things. The Chapter also discussed the Internet
of Things Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF), the Forensics Edge Management System
(FEMS) and the Forensics Decision-Making Algorithm (FDMA) and illustrated how the
three relate to each other in Figure 3.2. The IDFF is a framework that describes, in
phases, a potential approach to cyber-physical Forensics within SH environments. The
FEMS is a system that is designed to provide security and forensics services within SH
environments as part of an overall Digital Forensics preparedness strategy. The FDMA
is the decision-making module or component of the FEMS. It analyses SH datasets -
and, based on several factors (attributes listed in Chapter 4 and core activities and rela-
tionships, explained in Chapters 5 and 6) - makes a decision about whether an observed
occurrence on a network is an anomaly or not. This Chapter also introduced the Inter-
net of Things Incident Response Plan and demonstrated its applicability by analysing
three hypothetical Incident Response scenarios using the IoT Incident Response Plan.
Chapter 4
Definitions and Methodology
4.1 Overview
The thrust of this work centres on the fact that nodes and zones within and around
Smart Homes (SH) have attributes that are non-changing or fixed (such as the location
of a fridge), semi-static (e.g. the locations of window blinds and cars) and, predominantly
variable (e.g. the locations of mobile phones), that these attributes can be used to
identify relationships between zones, nodes and users and that rules can be drawn up
to represent and constrain these relationships.
This Chapter introduces the formalisms used in the Smart Home (SH) Anomaly
Detection (AD) framework to define the attributes and relationships that exist between
nodes and zones in Smart Homes. These relationships can be temporal (related to time)
or spatial (related to locations in the Home) or a combination of both. Realistic scenarios
can be created to represent events and activities in SH such that if the relationships that
are created within these scenarios do not conform to the learned or known Normal then
the “Home Happiness” state is affected (an anomaly). In Chapter 5 several realistic
scenarios are analysed to demonstrate the use of these relationships in anomaly detection.
4.2 “Happy Home Network”
This section introduces the concept of a “Happy Home Network”. A “Happy Home
Network” is one in which all the conditions for normality obtain, with respect to specific
thresholds. These Normality conditions may be the activities at time of day , or num-
ber of occupants at time of day . In summary, a “Happy Home” is a set of “Happy
Zones” which are made up of “Happy Nodes” where Happy is defined by attributes that
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meet certain criteria within defined thresholds. Some example attributes are Node η,
Type γ, State S, Location Z, Proximals ρ, Network State Nx, Peripherals Per,
Mode µ. Subsection 4.2.1 and Table 4.4 provide more details about each attribute.
Each zone (i.e. room) and node (sensor, device, object) in and around Smart Homes
can have its own set of corresponding attributes. Not all possible attributes apply to all
zones (or nodes) and not all of the attributes are required to determine the “Happiness”
status of a zone (or node). For Happy nodes and zones all the applicable attributes fall
within defined acceptable thresholds. Therefore, the set of all the applicable attributes
per zone (and node) at their normal state represents the Security Baseline of a SH where
an IT Baseline, according to [85], is a “checklist against which systems can be evaluated
and audited for security posture”.
The following Formalisms or representations are used in the rest of this work:
Box 4.1. Formalisms
Zones are written in all Small Capitals font: e.g. Kitchen
Nodes are written in the teletypefont font: e.g. KitchenDoor
Events and Activities are written in italicised red coloured font
Attributes have threshold-constrained sets of values: the Network State (Nx)
attribute can be Up-Normal, the Location (Z) can be Zone C or, more specifically,
Kitchen (see Figure 5.2), the Type γ can be Fridge and the State S of the node
can be open. Some attributes are fixed -value attributes while others can be adjusted.
Consider the example of a Fridge: the attribute Colour is fixed while the Location
attribute can be changeable, adjustable or non-fixed or non-static or variable; the Size
attribute has a fixed value since the size of the fridge is not an adjustable quantity.
Lastly, the Mode of a Fridge is also fixed.
The behaviours, user interactions with - and attributes of - nodes form well-defined
relationships as users interact with the nodes. For instance, if a light comes ON as a
user enters their Kitchen, the action of the user caused a state change in the node
Light, in the Zone Kitchen and in the readings of Motion Sensors around the home
(for instance in the occupant’s previous zone (-Z)). These behaviours, interactions and
attribute values can be captured and harnessed for Anomaly Detection Purposes.
Smart Home (Networks) are made up of Zones and Zones are comprised of
Nodes. A generic SH Attribute Tree Structure is illustrated in Figure 4.1 while a
specific example SH Attribute Tree Structure in which η = Fridge is illustrated in
Figure 4.2.
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Smart Home
Peripherals
Zone D
Node
Location ModeState
Zone C
Type Proximals NetworkID
Figure 4.1: Home-Zone-Node Tree
Home
FridgeDoor
Small 
Bathroom
Fridge
Kitchen F-Fon
Kitchen
Fridge Cooker Up-High1
Figure 4.2: Home-Kitchen-Fridge Tree
4.2.1 Attributes and Relationships
Within the “Happy Home Network” Framework, several attributes are defined;
these are discussed in this section (also see Table 4.4).
4.2.1.1 Device or Node ID (η)
This is a unique identifier assigned to a device when it is first registered on a Home
network. Example Node Identifiers (η) are: 001, 002,..., 100 and a,b,c,d . The
ID is useful for easy identification of nodes both by the human occupants and by any
networking or IT security/forensics system that is in place.
4.2.1.2 Mode (µ)
In this work, a node’s location attribute is referred to as its Mode (µ). At any
given time, the µ of each Zone and Node can only be one (1) out of a set of four (4)
values (Table 4.1). A change in a node’s µ from its original value can be used to detect
a location change as well as potentially identify the activities surrounding the change
of location. For instance, a user’s presence next to a Fridge before it changes location
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might indicate that the user moved the Fridge. Conversely, the absence of any user
activity next to a node that changes location could mean that the reported location
change is a false alarm (i.e. an error by a location-detection system) or a simulated
location modification which might be indicative of a network-based cyber attack.
Mode (µ) Short Form
Fixed-Fixed F-F
Fixed-Mobile F-M
Mobile-Fixed M-F
Mobile-Mobile M-M
Table 4.1: Types of Smart Home Node Modes
By way of examples, the following Mode Types apply to the following nodes (Ta-
ble 4.2):
Entities µ
Fridge F-F
Bed F-F
Car/24-hour day M-F
Motion sensor F-F
Kitchen F-F
Table 4.2: Examples of Smart Home Node Modes
All zones in all Smart Homes have a µ of F-F (unless the home is a caravan or
other movable or reconfigurable home e.g. a home with movable walls).
Illustration of AD using a node’s Mode (µ) value
Box 4.2. Anomaly Detection using the Mode (µ) attribute
Given
normal location = Z
previous location = (−Z) and
current location = Z´
For all nodes with µ = F-F,
Z = −Z = Z´
and any change in this relationship for the duration of an event will trigger an anomaly.
In this work the focus in on the two Mode (µ) values F-F and M-M because the
assumption is made that most nodes are either predominantly Stationary (F-F) or pre-
dominantly mobile (M-M). For stationary, fixed-zone sensors, their proximals and prox-
imal relationships never change. For non-stationary or mobile sensors, the reverse is
true and their proximals may vary over time thus altering the proximality relationships
over time.
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An AD system can adapt to special situations, for instance by recognising that
certain nodes may have either a Mode (µ) value of M-F or F-M and that a change in
location of nodes of this kind would not immediately be indicative of an anomaly; such
a system instead can calculate how long they have been static in comparison to how
long they have been mobile and therefore is able to make a decision about whether a
reported incident is the sign of an anomaly or not.
An AD system can adapt to special situations, for instance by recognising that
certain nodes may have either a Mode (µ) value of M-F or F-M and that a change in
location of nodes of this kind would not immediately be indicative of an anomaly; such
a system instead can compare a current situation of the Mode of a node with how the
same node is normally static and how long it is normally mobile and therefore make
a decision about whether a reported incident during a certain period is the sign of an
anomaly or not.
4.2.1.3 Proximals (ρ)
The Proximality relationship between nodes i and j is written as
i4j
Proximality describes the relationship that exists between nodes that respond al-
most simultaneously when stimuli is applied to only one of them directly. This is
especially observable in how motion sensors fire in the Aruba Dataset (available at
http://casas.wsu.edu/datasets/).
Consider, for example a situation where a user passes node a (or ηa) on their way
to ηc. If after the home occupant passes node ηa but before she gets to node ηc, node
ηd comes on, even if it was not interacted with directly by the user, a number of factors
may influence the decision (normal or anomalous) taken by an AD system such as the
FDMA. One such factor is the relationship between the nodes. If ηa 4 ηd , then such a
response is not anomalous. However in the case where the responding nodes (or zones)
are non-proximal (e.g. ηa 5 ηd), then, this type of reaction to stimuli applied to either
(but only) one of them is anomalous.
The conditions for Proximality are:
• Nodes in the same or different zones can be proximals. Proximal nodes in the same
zone are known as intra-Zonal Proximals and sensors in different zones share an
inter-Zonal proximality relationship (Figure 4.3);
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B
A
C
Intra-Zonal 
Proximals
Inter-Zonal 
Proximals
Figure 4.3: Intra- and Inter-Zonal Proximality
• Observe from Figure 4.3 that even though zones are proximal it does not mean
that all the sensors within them are.
• All nodes within the same zone are proximal unless they are separated by a distance
greater than a maximum ξ and/or by a significant solid obstacle such as a through
wall. See Subsubsection 4.2.1.21 for further details;
• Proximality cannot be transferred. There is neither a forward nor a reverse trans-
ference of Proximality between non-Proximal zones (or sensors) even if there exists
a common zone (or sensor) to which each of them is separately Proximal (see Fig-
ure 4.4; the cross indicates the action is disallowed; the tick mark indicates an
allowed or permitted action);
• Modes with µ = F-F always have a non-changing set of proximals (whose µ are
also = F-F) unless the proximals in question are of any other mode such as M-M.
Therefore if a Fridge has the attributes µ = F-F, the proximals of the Fridge
which have µ = F-F will have a static, unchanging proximality relationship with
the Fridge.
Bearing these conditions in mind, from a visual observation of a section of the WSU
CASAS Aruba SH dataset (see Table 1.1) the BigBedroom proximals table (Table 4.3)
can be drawn up. This is an example of a table of proximals. To populate this table and
identify the Proximal relationships, an observation-based investigation was carried out.
The investigation focussed on how the sensors responded to the user(s’) actions inside
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of Proximality rules
and around the BigBedroom. The focus of this observation is on the motion sensors.
It was observed that every time a sensor in a particular room (zone) was activated (on)
some of the same sensors around it also became activated, either immediately after or a
few seconds after. This was observed to exist between the sensors as shown in Table 4.3.
It was also observed that sensors between different zones, but separated by a small
enough distance (e.g. the sensors M014 and M021) came on within the same time frame.
The sensors in different zones do not trigger when one o the other is triggered. This is
observed to be the case throughout the section of this large dataset which was perused.
It was therefore considered anomalous when sensors did fire in this way. Observe from
the WSU CASAS Aruba dataset (No.17 http://casas.wsu.edu/datasets/) that the
motion sensors in zones A and E or zones C and D or zones C and F never fire together
normally.
Thus, a table of proximals for a SH can, initially, be created from observation and
domain knowledge about the SH and the user(s’) actions. Building the table involves
observing sensor reactions or making assumptions based on physical proximity. However,
subsequently, such a table of proximals can be updated automatically by a SH security
system.
Node (η) Proximals (ρ)
M001 M001, M002, and M007
M002 M001, and M002
M003 M001, M002, and M007
M004 M029 and M031
M005 M025, M026, M027 and M028
M006 M023 and M024
M007 M001, M002, M003, M004, M005, M006, M007 and M008
M008 M022 and M023
Table 4.3: Big Bedroom Proximals
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4.2.1.4 Current Proximals (ρ´)
This is the current set of nodes that are proximal to a focal node. The normal
proximals of a node with µ = F-F also have µ = F-F. Take as an example a Fridge
in a Kitchen next to cooker. For AD purposes, the proximals list at the beginning
and at the end of an event are compared. If the proximals on the list have changed
- or the number or proximals has changed - the system can infer an anomaly such as
an anomalous change in location or faults in the ‘missing’ proximals. The number of
proximals that a sensor normally has is denoted by Nρ.
Box 4.3. Active Zone ⇒ Presence
Let ρ = List of Proximals; ρ´ = List of Current Proximals; ηˆ = a node; ηˆ = a proximal of ηˆ
For nodes with µ = F-F, ρ = ρ´ iff the proximals of the nodes also have Mode = F-F over the
duration of the event being considered
Therefore, over the duration of an event, given η 4 ηˆ
For every η in Home* (with µ = F-F), P = P´
and
For each ηˆ in Home* (with µ = F-F), P = P´
!
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S/No. Symbol Description Example values
1 η Node ID or Device ID A whole number e.g. 1
2 µ Mode
Fixed-Fixed (F-F), Fixed-Mobile (F-M),
Mobile-Fixed (M-F), Mobile-Mobile (M-M)
3 ρ Normal Proximals of each node/zone η1, η2, ...ηn
4 ρ´ Current Proximals of each node/zone η1, η2, ...ηn
5 Per Peripherals FridgeDoor, CatFlap
6 Pr Presence 0, ≥ 1
7 Z Normal Location of a node Kitchen
8 Z´ Current Location of a node Garage
9 −Z Previous Location of a node Dining
10 γ Node Type Fridge
11 S State on, off, open, closed, present, absent, active, inactive
12 Nx Network Up-High, Up-Normal, Down
13 Pt Allowed Ports port 161; port 21
14 NT Total Nodes A whole number e.g. 5
15 NTAct Total Number of Active nodes A whole number e.g. 2
16 Nρ Total Number of proximals A whole number e.g. 10
Table 4.4: Attributes Table
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4.2.1.5 Peripherals (Per)
These are nodes which are physically attached to each other. Peripheral nodes
can be used to deduce more about the activities around nodes than can be obtained
from the nodes themselves alone. Zones can also have peripherals: one peripheral of the
BigBedroom can be a node BigBedroomDoor. Specific node peripherals are denoted
by ηper. Other examples of peripherals are FridgeDoor and CatFlap. Peripherals are
always proximal to their main nodes. Triggering the action open on the Fridge peripheral
FridgeDoor will cause the main node Fridge to go to state active.
Identifying peripheral nodes is useful for Intrusion and Anomaly Detection purposes
because accounting for the states of peripherals can be useful in eliminating - or at
least reducing - False Positive alarms. For example, if a FridgeDoor becomes active
while a user is accessing the Fridge, the FDMA anomaly detection system will not
automatically consider these to be two separate and unrelated events because of the
relationship between the FridgeDoor and its peripheral. This therefore reduces the
potential for one of these activities to be identified as an anomaly.
4.2.1.6 Presence (Pr)
This value defines if there is a user in a zone or not. It is denoted by Pr and the
value is either ≥ 1 or 0. To determine a user’s presence within a SH - for the sake of
simplification - the following assumption is made: an active motion sensor in a zone
Z implies an active zone and is therefore the current location of the home occupant.
Therefore, an when a motion sensor detects motion in a zone Z of a single-occupant
home, it means there is at least one presence in that zone Z.
4.2.1.7 (Normal) Location (Z)
Example locations around a SH include Bathroom and LivingRoom. The normal
location of a Fridge is the Kitchen and the predominant location of a Car is, for
example, a Garage. As stated previously the location attribute of a node with µ =
Fixed-Fixed (F-F) is always Fixed-Fixed (F-F). The normal location is a fixed value
that is recorded per node and which can be compared against for AD purposes. The
normal location is sometimes the same value as the Current Location (Z´) of a node.
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4.2.1.8 Current Location (Z´)
The current location attribute can be used to determine if a node has changed zone.
In conjunction with other factors such as a node’s Mode (µ), the current location value
can be used to make decisions about whether this detected location change is normal
or abnormal. This can be useful for detecting anomalous physical relocation or theft.
For example, consider a node Fridge with µ value of F-F: if a change is reported in the
values of its normal location and its current location such that the normal location is not
the same as the current location, this will indicate that the node has been abnormally
relocated.
Another location value, Previous Location -Z, is also used for determining where
a node or person has been such that it can be compared with their current location or
normal location for the purposes of anomaly detection.
4.2.1.9 Type (γ)
The Type value gives the description of what the Node actually. For example, the
γ of the node D002 is door (see Figure 5.1) and the γ of a device Fridge is fridge. The
node type of every node is stored during the registration process i.e. when nodes are
first registered on the home network. This data can be added to the security system’s
database manually or automatically through scanning a tag such as an RFID tag which
will have the information of the node stored on it.
4.2.1.10 State (S)
This is the current state or status of a device. This attribute describes the different
states that nodes (η), Zones (Z), networks (Nx), etc. can be in. Some example states
include on, off for motion sensors and Up-Normal, Up-High, and Down for network.
4.2.1.11 Powered Nodes
Powered nodes can be in either states on or off. This is a useful attribute for AD. An
example rule that can be set can be that a device of Type (γ)“Fridge”mustalwaysbeonor“offforlessthanagiventimethresholdforrepairpurposes”.WhenaSHisbeingsetup, aninitiallistofPowered Nodescanbefedintothealgorithmtoprovideabaselineinformationtoitaboutwhichnodesaremeanttobealwayson.Thisinitialstart−
uplistcanthenbeupdatedbythesystemwhichwillinferthisinformationbasedonthepowerandenergyreadingsinthehomebylearningwhichnodesarealwaysoncomparedtoothernodesinandaroundahome.ThereisliteratureonenergymanagementandpowerconsumptionbynodesinSHenvironmentswhichcanaidwiththismeasurement([86]).AnexampletableofreadingsthataSHsecurityautonomousmanagementsystemcanusetolearnwhichnodesarealwaysonissuggestedinTable 4.5.Thesystemmakesadecisionbasedonhowmanyhourseachnodeisinthestateonandtheonewiththelongestontimesaresavedinthedatabaseofpowerednodes.Ifitdetectsthatoneofthemhasgoneoff, itcanthenflagananomaly.
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Node γ Hours Powered Node?
Mobile Phone 500 No
Fridge 620 Yes
Car 20 No
Door n/a n/a
Table 4.5: Sample Average 30-day power usage readings
4.2.1.12 Network (Nx)
The Network (Nx) value can be measured in the form of maximum and minimum
throughput value e.g. 10Mbps. The up-High, up-Normal, Down network readings are
opted for in this work for reasons of abstraction and simplicity. The state up-High can
be indicative of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on a SH network; up-
Normal indicates normal activity for instance, a user placing an order; Down indicates
the network is down. An alternative way to describe this will be to use the phrase
Network Throughput. The Average Network Throughput measure is used to monitor for
excessive packet activity on or across a network which may be a sign of a DDoS attack.
The alternative, more specific measures of average bytes per packet (bpp) [87] can be
used as a baseline against which any packets traversing the network are compared. The
packets per communication of flow (ppf) [87] can also be used to determine if there is
an attempt at flooding the network.
An abnormally high Nx value could be a sign of a cyber-attack. In the up-High
case, there is too much activity (this could be because there are too many packets
passing than normal, or too many (active) connections, or too many unrecognised ports
being opened) on the SH network compared to a normal baseline. An average or normal
network baseline can be established over a period of months. This measure is based on
the whole network and not on the network activity of a particular node. However, the
network value can be applied on a Node by Node basis.
4.2.1.13 Allowed Ports (Pt)
This is a list of all allowed ports on the network. Example ports include 21, 22 (File
Transfer Protocol or FTP), 161 (Simple Network Management Protocol or SNMP), 25
(Simple Mail Transfer Protocol or SMTP), 110 (Post Office Protocol III or POP3) and
25 (Telecommunications Network or Telnet).
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4.2.1.14 Open Ports (Ptn)
This is a list of all currently open or active ports on the network. The number of
open ports (Ptn) must be ≤ Ptmax, where Ptmax is the maximum number of (known)
ports that may be open; if the number of ports that are open is higher than Ptmax, an
anomaly will be flagged because this can be the sign of an anomaly such as a IP-based
network attack.
4.2.1.15 Total Number of Registered Nodes in the Home (NT )
Total number of registered Nodes in the Home(NT ) is used as a measure of how
many nodes are actually on the home network. This can be used to decide if the total
nodes exceed the maximum registered or expected nodes.
4.2.1.16 Total Number of Active nodes (NTAct)
This is a list of all nodes which are active on the home network. The number can
be ascertained using a node recogniser or other such identity management on a Home
Management System. [88] and [89] describe some Energy Management Systems and
similar systems exist for device identity management.
4.2.1.17 Day/Date (D)
The value provides information about the current date and day.
4.2.1.18 IP Networked Nodes (NN )
These are nodes that are on a TCP/IP based network and to which IP addresses
have been assigned either manually or using automated methods such as the Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP).
4.2.1.19 Thresholds
These are the attribute values beyond which an alarm is raised. Different attributes
have different thresholds and thresholds can be a function of time or location and so on.
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4.2.1.20 Edge Nodes
These are nodes which have no physical barrier or obstacle between them but which
are separated by the least distance between 2 or more zones. Therefore, Edge Nodes
occur at the intersections between two or more sets of zones.
Box 4.4. Identifying Edge Nodes
Given two nodes ηi and ηi
where ηi 6=ηj
if |ηi ηj | ≤ dTh . the distance between them is less than a Threshold value e.g. dTh
Z(ηi) 6≡Z(ηj), . they are in different Zones
and ηi5ηj then . they are not proximal to each other
ηi and ηj are Edge Nodes.
The relationship between edge nodes is used in the development of the FDMA to
increase the accuracy of the algorithm by reducing False Positives.When two motion
sensors are active within a short period of each other such that they appear to be
proximal or peripheral - but are not, and they are in different zones but separated by
the closest distance between the two zone with no obstacle between them, the fact that
they stay on even after the user has passed form on to another is not a sign of an
anomaly. the two nodes are Edge nodes and this is a common behaviour of edge nodes
as observed from the Aruba SH dataset.
4.2.1.21 The Obstacle Factor (δ)
For instance, nodes M018 and M031 in Figure 5.1, even though they are close and
thus may appear to be proximal based on distance, are separated by a barrier and any
action that triggers one of them cannot be expected to normally trigger the other. If
this happens, it is anomalous. The OF is important from the perspective of real-life DF
and Incident Response aims and goals because it will help reduce false alarm triggers.
Although nodes that are physically close (i.e. distance < threshold) may be proxi-
mal (see M002 and M011 in [1]), those that are separated by an obstacle such as a wall are
not. For two nodes not separated by an obstacle the distance between them is calculated
as a linear value whilst for two nodes separated by an obstacle, the distance between
them is the linear distance multiplied by an Obstacle Factor (OF ). This Obstacle Factor
is introduced to account for this obstacle between two nodes that are separated by a
distance that meets the proximality requirement but which cannot logically be proximal
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to each other due to the obstacle. The OF is therefore used to determine the effective
distance between two nodes.
Illustration
If
ξ = the maximum distance between nodes beyond which they can no longer be proximals
δ = the Obstacle Factor (OF )
x = the distance between two nodes separated by an obstacle where
x is always ≤ ξ
i.e. distance | ηi,ηj | ≤ ξ is a condition of Proximality
If the linear distance between two nodes is ≤ ξ then the nodes can share a proxi-
mality relationship. Thus the OF value, δ, is calculated as follows:
x x δ > ξ
For the distance between two nodes separated by an obstacle to always be greater
than the minimum distance between them, then
|ηiηj | > ξ
Box 4.5. Obstacle Factor (δ) Illustration
If ξ = 10 and x = 4, then
where ξ is the maximum distance and x is the distance between two nodes. The obstacle Factor
(δ) is calculated thus:
xδ >ξ
Alternativelya,
xδ + 1 =ξ
Therefore
4δ + 1 = 10
Further calculations show that:
δ = 2.25
aThe approximate value of ’1 ’ was selected because it is the smallest, whole, natural number.
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The δ value therefore varies, depending on the value of x and the minimum value
varies by home arrangement and setup. An example scenario that illustrates how the
OF can be used is in Subsubsection 5.4.2.3.
4.2.1.22 Access Nodes
These include doors and windows, cat-flaps, garage doors, among other entry- and
exit-ways. These can be in states open or closed.
4.2.1.23 External Access Nodes
Just as with access nodes, External access nodes, are entry- and exit-ways of SHs.
External Access Nodes however have special significance with respect to the physical
security of SH. This section discusses the relationship and constraints that can be applied
between External Access Nodes (for the purposes of this work, these are the Doors) in
a single-occupant SH in order to aid AD purposes. The relationship and constraints
can be explained as follows: When the FrontDoor is open, the BackDoor must be in the
opposite state (i.e. closed) else there is an anomaly; the specific type of anomaly (i.e
error or attack) can be ascertained from the use of the various methods presented in this
work. Note, intermediate states such as closing or opening are not considered in this
work because these two states are both considered to be variations on the state open.
Therefore, in a home where D001, D002, D004 are the External Access Node Iden-
tifiers, and given T = True or open and F = False or closed, the Truth Table in Ta-
ble 4.6 illustrates the allowed/permitted and disallowed relationships between the nodes,
in this case the doors.
D001 D002 D004
N
or
m
a
l T F F
F T F
F F T
F F F
A
n
o
m
al
y T T F
F T T
T F T
T T T
Table 4.6: Access Nodes Relationships
A sub-routine in the FDMA as shown in Appendix A is designed to detect and
raise an alarm if two or more External Access Nodes are in state OPEN at the same
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time or within a certain time frame. It also recognises when an External Access Node
is open for an unusually long time or when one appears to have been forgotten in the
state open.
4.2.2 Constraints
As part of this research, several types of Constraints that can be placed over activ-
ities and events to aid AD were identified (Figure 4.6). These are: Presence-, Location-,
Time-, Date-, Node- and Network-bound constraints. These constraint were considered
relevant and adequate for the purposes of the research in this thesis; more or fewer
constraints, as necessary, may be considered in a wider context.
Activities 
Presence
Event
Location
Constraints
Time Date Node Network
Figure 4.6: Relationship between Events, Activities and Constraints
Consider the event Sleep: it is not location-bound event but it is Presence- and
Time-bound. However, if the presence is missing, the anomaly rating is True Positive;
but if the sleep Time is wrong, the alarm rating may be reduced to False Positive or
benign, depending on the setting at which the home occupant put them..
Binding activities and events to attributes in this way is useful for detecting anoma-
lies. For instance, presence-bound Activity, though they may be a small pool or sample
set of activities, can be used to detect anomalies. Subsubsections 4.2.2.1, 4.2.2.2, and
4.2.2.3 discuss how the constraint n is determined for each n-bound activity or event.
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4.2.2.1 To determine n: Illustration One
It is important to determine what the constraint (n) is, per event, because it helps
to identify which attributes are the most important and which ones make little to no
difference to the outcomes of AD processes and can therefore be ignored so that AD
analyses can be completed quicker. n is not a numeric value but represents an attribute
or relationship such as network Nx or presence Pr. Thus, given the Decision table
Presence (Pr) Node, State (η, S) η, S Decision
0 (FridgeDoor, Open) (M003, Off) Abnormal
0 (FridgeDoor, Closed) (M003, On) Abnormal
0 (FridgeDoor, Open) (M003, On) Abnormal
≥ 1 (FridgeDoor, Open) (M003, Off) Abnormal
Table 4.7: Scenario Decision Table One
representing the values in the table using numerals will generate the following base-
line table:
1 2 3 X
1 4 5 X
1 2 5 X
6 2 3 X
Table 4.8: To determine the Constraint n: Illustration One
where (Pr) is represented by a ‘1’, (FridgeDoor, Open) is represented by a ‘2’ and
(M003, Off) is represented by a ‘3’ and so on. The Decision Abnormal is replaced by an
X (a normal will be replaced by a Y). Next, the number of occurrences of each value
is counted and the one with the highest value is the constraint. The highest occurring
value in this table is a ‘1’ i.e. (Presence, 0) with three (3) occurrences. This is followed
by the sets (M003, On), (FridgeDoor, Open) and (M003, off) which each have a tally of
two (2) occurrences. Therefore the event in this case is presence-bound.
To prevent the user from sleeping just anywhere (i.e. zone) in the home, the
zones in which it is acceptable for the user to sleep may be explicitly programmed into
the FDMA. In addition, the nodes used in these selected zones may also be explicitly
identified and restricted to a limited set. This way, when the user falls asleep in one of
the acceptable zones, the system will check to see if these nodes are being used and if
not, then the event can be described as anomalous.
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4.2.2.2 To determine the Constraint n: Illustration Two
Given the event DriveAroundTown, the task here is to determine which nodes are
important and how important the specific node Car is. In order to achieve this, a rule
needs to be derived that leads to a Normal outcome which involves explicitly the use
of the desired node η Car. This is for a machine-driven scenario.
Given the scenario Decision Table 4.9.
Node (η) Presence (Pr) Time (τ) Location (Z) Decision
Car ≥ 1 Evening Global Normal
BathTub 0 Evening Bathroom Anomaly
Car 0 Evening Global Normal
Car 0 Morning Global Normal
Car, Cooker 0 Afternoon Global Anomaly1
Table 4.9: Scenario Decision Table Two
From Table 4.9 the following baseline table is derived
1 2 3 4 Y
5 6 3 7 X
1 6 3 4 Y
1 6 8 4 Y
1, 9 6 10 4 X
Table 4.10: To determine the Constraint n: Illustration Two
Condensing the 3 Normals (represented by Y in Table 4.10) gives
1 2 3 4 Y
1 6 3 4 Y
1 6 8 4 Y
Table 4.11: To determine the Constraint n: Illustration Two (condensed)
It can be observed from Table 4.11 that node Car (represented by figure 1) and
Location Global (represented by figure 4) are of equal weighting or cardinality of
1 The nodes are non-proximal.
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occurrence. This is followed by Time (3, Evening) and Presence (6, no user). After this
comes the Presence (2, 1 or more users) and Time (9, Morning).
The conclusion from these outputs is that for a machine-driven scenario, DriveAround-
Town is normal if and only if node = Car and Location = Global. This means that
DriveAroundTown is node- and Location-bound and that presence is not a strict re-
quirement for this event to occur successfully and/or normally.
4.2.2.3 To determine n: Illustration Three
For this illustration, the aim is to determine how important the Location attribute
is in relation to the Cook event. Success for this event requires that the Decision is
Normal.
Presence (Pr) Node (η) Location (Z) Decision
≥ 1 Bed Bedroom Anomaly
0 0 0 Anomaly
≥ 1 Shoe Toilet Anomaly
≥ 1 Cooker Kitchen Normal
Table 4.12: Scenario Decision Table Three
Condensing this gives
1 2 3 X
4 4 4 X
1 5 6 X
1 7 8 Y
Table 4.13: To determine the Constraint n: Illustration Three
The greatest weighting in this case2 = 1 i.e. Presence or Pr. If emphasis is placed
on the scenarios which lead to a Normal output, the presence attribute, even with its
weighting, is ignored and the other relationships that lead to a Normal outcome are
identified. Extracting those relationships therefore give
1 7 8 Y
Table 4.14: To determine the Constraint n: Illustration Three (condensed)
2Row 2 is an Odd Row representing a non-event or an impossibility; it is therefore ignored.
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The other two identified attributes are η (represented by 7) and Z (represented by
8). Therefore, Presence (Pr), Node (η) and Location (Z) are all important to Event
Cook.
4.3 Methodology
This research makes use of both the Inductive and Deductive Reasoning processes.
As explained by David E. Gray in Doing Research in the Real World3, Induction involves
the discovery of a “binding principle”, derived after the examination of multiple cases
with care being taken to avoid basing principles on just one case but instead basing it on
an evaluation of multiple cases or instances. During the Inductive process, after the data
is collected, it is analysed with the aim being to detect relationships between variables.
Deductive Reasoning involves the testing of pre-formed principles, induction involves
the development of a principle or principles after analysis of background information
(e.g. collected data). For the development of the IoT Digital Forensics Framework
(IDFF), an initial framework was proposed. This initial framework was then validated
through communication with experts (interviews) (Subsection 3.7.1) and Deductive
Reasoning through scenario analysis (Section 3.10). For the rule induction and analy-
sis, the PRISM rule induction tool available in Weka is used (Inductive Reasoning,
Section 6.5).
4.4 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter, the concept of a “Happy Home Network” as a security baseline
of a SH network was introduced; the attributes that can be used to define this security
baseline were identified and defined and the relationships that exist between the zones
and nodes in a SH with respect to Anomaly Detection were also identified. The attributes
and relationships that were identified in this chapter are applied in Chapters 5 and 6.
3Pages 4 and 5 and Figure 2.1 in https://uk.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/
58626 Gray Doing Research in the Real World.pdf
Chapter 5
Anomaly Detection Scenarios and
Discussions
5.1 Overview
This Chapter discusses the application of the attributes identified in Section 4.2
in Anomaly Detection (AD) tasks. It also discusses how the use of these attributes
can reduce False Positives detected. The Chapter introduces the focal Smart Home
and Datasets used in this work. The FDMA algorithm and relationships are applied to
several real and realistic scenarios to illustrate how they can be applied to meet real-life
AD needs. The scenarios described range from the relatively simple to the more involved
ones.
For the real scenario, real-life Smart Home (SH) data containing non-simulated
anomalies is fed through the FDMA algorithm. This was done to detect presence-
related anomalies. These anomalies were selected because of their significance to the
real-life security of especially unsupported elderly people who may choose to remain
(in some cases, alone) in their own homes rather than move to public care homes or
communities. In addition, other attributes are combined together in different ways to
analyse hypothetical scenarios and make decisions about whether they are anomalous or
not. Detecting ’presence’-based anomalies is important because the SH occupant might
be a defenceless elderly patient and this system will support their security.
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5.2 Combining FDMA and Classical Anomaly Detection
Methods
This section demonstrates how the FDMA can be used in conjunction with the
train-and-test approach to Anomaly Detection (AD) so that a finer-grained approach
is taken to detect anomalies that may be mis-classified by typical train-and-test AD
methods. To demonstrate how AD tools may mis-classify instances and anomalies,
consider, for instance, the real-life SH occupant’s total sleep and toilet durations in
hours:minutes:seconds as shown in Table 5.1. Support Vector Machines (SVM), if trained
with a dataset like this one, have the capabilities to identify and detect any anomalous
sleep/toilet patterns from this table. These methods will accurately identify that the
user typically sleeps for between 6 to 8 hours per night but did so for over 10 hours on
Day 3. The data shows that on Day 21 the home occupant spent over six minutes in
the toilet and that on Day 10 it appears that the home occupant did not got to the
toilet at all - and these two instances (Day 10 and Day 21) do not fit in with the
typical toilet durations.
Consider the former scenario: from an AD perspective if the threshold set for toilet
visit is that each visit must be less than 6 minutes, then this occurrence is anomalous.
Generally speaking, there are several possible explanations for this scenario: it is possible
that the user went to the toilet more times than usual or, spent too long in the toilet in
one visit. However, making use of the attributes identified in Chapter 4, analysing data
from other data sources, it might be discovered that the user had a stay-over visitor
who also went to the same toilet during the night which made the total duration of
all visits to the toilet abnormally high.
Considering the case where the total toilet duration was 0 minutes, location and
presence data may show that the user went to a toilet but went to a different toilet than
usual (this can be determined from information about which zones were active during
the night). Alternatively, an incontinent SH occupant may have not actually physically
changed location to go to the toilet; in this case a reminder system may be more relevant
to this user, as opposed to a Digital forensics Incident Response Team.
Therefore, considering other features such as the number of presences, active zones,
etc. (referred to as attributes in this thesis) can provide a much more detailed picture
of the goings-on within datasets and thus provide better support for AD tasks whilst
avoiding triggering unnecessary alarms. Very importantly, they can help reduce the
likelihood of a benign event being classified as an anomaly and triggering a false alarm.
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Day Activity
Sleep Toilet
1 07:54:20 00:02:39
2 07:45:01 00:05:50
3 10:05:32 00:03:09
4 07:23:07 00:05:48
5 08:10:47 00:03:04
6 08:38:58 00:05:01
7 06:33:01 00:00:00
8 09:29:22 00:03:25
9 08:51:24 00:03:47
10 07:23:19 00:00:00
11 07:34:21 00:03:28
12 08:57:21 00:01:58
13 07:19:16 00:03:52
14 09:33:04 00:04:21
15 06:46:21 00:00:00
16 07:57:46 00:04:06
17 06:35:01 00:03:18
18 08:32:29 00:04:29
19 08:06:30 00:03:04
20 07:59:38 00:05:18
21 08:05:29 00:06:23
22 08:09:01 00:03:36
Table 5.1: Sleep and Toilet Activities Table
Consider another scenario in which the Sleep event for the day did not start at
the normal time or that the Bedroom is empty when a user is supposed to be inside
it. In this case, if location data - and other behavioural information - is analysed using
the approach proposed in this work, this absence will not automatically be flagged as
an attack. Instead, based on the analysis, the days when the user performs the Sleep
event in an anomalous but benign location, such as a LivingRoom will be logged as
anomalous but will not raise any alarms. This is because Sleep is not a location-bound
event and users may sleep wherever they wish in their own home although, for safety
reasons, there are only certain locations in which sleep may reasonably happen (see
Subsection 4.2.2). The absence of such contextual information may lead the system to
trigger an alarm (False Positive) and even call for assistance (healthcare, security, etc.)
where none is required thus leading to resource wastage.
Therefore, considering certain factors such as current and previous Locations (Z´ and
−Z), Time or period of day (τ) alongside user behaviour - and taking into consideration
the fact that humans change their minds - can reduce an anomalous event from a True
Positive (attack) to an error or even a True Negative i.e a non-anomaly. Additional
factors including duration, Core Events, Core Activities, happens after and happens
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before relationships between activities among others, can also influence the outcomes of
AD analysis processes. Therefore, one way to avoid triggering false alarms is to identify
and apply the correct factors to events. For example, based on the preceding discussion,
for the Sleep event, the following attributes and relationships will be required:
only is not enough to classify events as anomalous or normal.
• Location: BigBedroom
• Total number of human occupants i.e. Presences: = 1
• Sleep start Period: 10 p.m. to 12 midnight
• Core events: M003 and M008 on
• Happens before, happens after relationships: SleepBegins happens before
SleepEnds
If any of these are not as expected then an anomaly can be said to have occurred
where an anomaly can be attack or an error. More information on combining the
attributes and relationships with and activities for the purposes of AD is available in
Chapter 6.
Since it is clear that not all anomalies are the same, the following anomaly rank
mappings have been drawn up with the highest ranking being the most severe (the True
Positive anomaly) and the rank of True Negative corresponding to the least severe.
Box 5.1. Anomaly Rankings
Nothing, Benigna True Negative
”
System/Algorithm Fault: False Positive
”
Error: False Negative
”
Attack: True Positive
aBenign anomalies are those which are excusable or relatively dismissable.
5.3 Datasets
In order to test the FDMA Algorithm at detecting presence-related anomalies, a
publicly-available real-life SH sensor dataset was sourced and obtained from the Internet
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and fed into the algorithm. A brief description of the selected dataset is presented in
Section 5.3.1. The nodes, zones and proximality relationships that exist between the
elements in the Aruba home are also identified. These proximals are first identified
based on observation of the node activities however it is possible for the process to
be automated and for nodes that share proximality relationships to be automatically
identified based on the description of proximality in Subsubsection 4.2.1.3.
In addition, a simulated dataset was used to create several anomalous scenarios
for analysis using the AD approach developed in this work. The simulated dataset is
described in Section 5.3.2.
There are several other real-life datasets publicly and freely available however the
next section describes the Aruba SH dataset and why it was selected for this research.
Some of the other real-life datasets include the datasets (available at BoxLab https://
boxlab.wikispaces.com/List+of+Home+Datasets), Public Datasets for Non-intrusive
Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM) (available at http://blog.oliverparson.co.uk/
2012/06/public-data-sets-for-nialm.html) and the University of Massachusetts Amherst
(UMass) Trace Smart datasets (available at http://traces.cs.umass.edu/index.php/
Smart/Smart).
The challenge of using datasets are that they might not contain the information
required for a particular research need and therefore the data may need to be manipu-
lated with new information introduced or the focus of the research adjusted so that the
data available is adequate for requirements. As an example, in this work, a preferable
situation would have been for a dataset that includes IP data such as IP addresses, and
data from other IoT enabling protocols (see Section 2.2 for examples of IoT enabling
protocols). These datasets are freely and readily-available, the way they were generated
has been demonstrated in peer-reviewed papers and time and money is saved in not
having to build a smart home set up in order to generate data and then validate it be-
fore using it. For example, their dataset took years to generate which was not available
considering the duration of this research work.
5.3.1 The Aruba SH Dataset
The real-life Aruba Dataset was obtained from the WSU CASAS website at
http://casas.wsu.edu/datasets/. The dataset is from a SH set up with three main
types of sensors: the sensors labelled M001 to M031 are Motion Sensors; the sensors
labelled T001 to T005 are Temperature Sensors and the sensors labelled D001 to
D004 are Access nodes (i.e. Doors). This dataset was selected for several reasons.
Firstly, it is a dataset from a real SH. Secondly one of the main focuses of this work
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is on presence detection from motion sensor data and the dataset contains data from
motion sensors. This dataset, which is usefully annotated, has over 100,000 data points
(represented by rows) and relevant features (in the form of columns). The features
recorded in are time, date, location in the SH and motion sensor reading. These were
useful attributes for setting up presence detection scenarios. The presence-detection
algorithm presented in this work is targeted at supporting the security of a single-
occupant home. This is done in recognition of the fact that more and more people
including those who require support and care, will increasingly be enabled by SH smart
solutions to live independently at home. With this solution, the presence of an intruder
can be identified after-the fact from analysing motion sensor data alongside the time,
date data. In addition, the SH is described on the WSU CASAS website as a single-
occupant home and that the occupant had visitors during the duration of their stay
in the home. This was useful combination because the occupant could be treated as
the legitimate occupant while the visitors - the data did not provide any information
about when the visitors came in or left - could be treated as intruders as part of the
physical intrusion detection scenarios. The third reason is because it was discovered,
based on a visual observation, informed by domain knowledge, to inherently contain
presence anomalies1. The fourth reason it was selected is because the dataset is also
annotated with descriptions of which activities were being performed at which times in
such a way that the volunteer’s activities were recognisable and relatable to the sensor
activations and deactivations. This was useful because it added some context to the
sensor statuses.
More details on the dataset and a copy of the dataset itself (available at the time
of writing) can be found on the WSU CASAS website (Dataset number 17 on the list
at http://casas.wsu.edu/datasets/). The layout of the WSU CASAS Aruba Home is
as shown in Figure 5.1.
5.3.2 Synthetic Dataset
In order to generate a synthetic dataset, anomalies were simulated by making use
of the Aruba SH layout but simulating based on the Aruba SH, scenarios that mimic
realistic, anomalous SH situations. The scenarios created were designed to influence
the attributes identified in Chapter 4 so that the “Happy” state of the selected SH is
affected. The scenarios are analysed (Chapters 5 and 6) to demonstrate the applicability
of the attributes, relationships and constraints to AD.
1For this purposes of this work, more than one presence in the SH is seen as a sign of an anomalous
intrusion by a human
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Figure 5.1: The WSU CASAS Aruba Smart Home [1]
C E
A
B F
G
I
H
D
J
K
Figure 5.2: The WSU CASAS Aruba Smart Home [1] - divided into distinct,
(coloured) Zones, A to K
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Following the steps in the AD preparation phase, the nodes, zones and proximality
relationships are identified and the Tables 5.2 to 5.15 can be drawn up for the Aruba
SH. Tables 5.3 and 5.13 show specific motion sensor nodes of the Aruba SH in the first
column and their corresponding inter -zonal proximals in the second column. A ‘–’ means
that the corresponding node has no inter -zonal proximals.
Other relationships and attributes can also be identified and a similar set of tables
can be generated for any other SH. See Appendix C for the full Proximal Sensors table.
In this SH2, there are 11 zones in total and 34 nodes including 3 external access nodes.
These details are fed into the FDMA and are used as part of the decision-making process.
The Core of the FDMA Algorithm is available in Appendix A.
Zone Zone Mapping Sensors
A LivingRoom M009, M010, M012, M013 and M020
B Dining M014
C Kitchen M015, M016, M017, M018 and M019
D SmallBathroom M029 and M031
E Office M025, M026, M027 and M028
F SmallBedroom M023 and M024
G BigBedroom M001, M002, M003, M004, M005, M006, M007 and M008
H Hallway M021 and M022
I BackDoor D002
J GarageDoor M030 and D004
K FrontDoor D001
Table 5.2: Aruba Smart Home Sensors Map
In Tables 5.14 and 5.15 a ‘1’ indicates proximality while a ‘0’ represents non-
proximality.
2Some imaginary nodes, not listed in this table, are added to the SH later in Chapter 6 in order to
simulate hypothetical scenarios for analysis of the AD approach that is introduced in this thesis.
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Zone A Sensor Proximal
M009 –
M010 –
M012 –
M013 –
M014 –
M020 M008 (Zone G)
Table 5.3: Aruba
Smart Home Living
Room Proximals
Zone B Sensor Proximals
M014 M018 (Zone C)
Table 5.4: Dining
Proximals
Zone C Sensor Proximals
M015 –
M016 –
M017 –
M018 M014 (Zone B)
M019 –
D002 –
Table 5.5: Kitchen
Proximals
Zone D Sensor Proximals
M029 M030 (Zone J)
M031 –
Table 5.6: Small
Bathroom Proximals
Zone E Sensor Proximals
M025 –
M026 –
M027 –
M028 M022 (Zone H)
Table 5.7: Office
Proximals
Zone F Sensor Proximals
M023 M022 (Zone H)
M024 –
Table 5.8: Small
Bedroom Proximals
The Aruba SH dataset was introduced in this section. The FDMA algorithm is used
to analyse a section of this dataset and based on the proximals and location, anomalous
presence is detected.
5.4 Scenarios and Discussions
In this section, scenarios are set up (i.e. simulated) to represent different events,
activities and node arrangements that may realistically occur within SH and even non-
SH. Scenarios are used here because of the lack of access to a real-life SH in which these
different permutations of events and activities could have been set up.
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Zone G Sensor Proximals
M001 –
M002 –
M003 –
M004 –
M005 –
M006 –
M007 –
M008 M020 (Zone A)
Table 5.9: Big Bed-
room Proximals
Zone H Sensor Proximals
M021 M018 (Zone C)
M022 M023 (Zone F)
Table 5.10: Hall-
way Proximals
Zone I Sensor Proximals
D002 M016 (Zone C)
Table 5.11: Back
Door Proximals
Zone J Sensor Proximals
D004 M030 (Zone J)
Table 5.12: Garage
Door Proximals
Zone K Sensor Proximals
D001(“M034”) M011(Zone K)
Table 5.13: Front Door Proximals
Zones A B C D E F G H I J K
A 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
B 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
E 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
F 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
G 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
H 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
I 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
J 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
K 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 5.14: Aruba Smart Home Zone Proximals Table
For the simulated scenarios, an imaginary set of realistic sensors - a Fridge,
FridgeDoor, Cooker, BathTub, Bicycle and a Car - are introduced into the SH en-
vironment in order to create realistic anomaly detection scenarios within the selected
SH. These imaginary nodes were selected based on the likelihood that they would be
present in real-life homes including SH. In preparation for a DF investigation, the details
from the home are first acquired according to the steps in the SH Network Preparation
Stage. Other attributes (e.g. modes, types, distance, peripherals) may be included if
applicable.
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Sensors M001 M002 M004 M006 M008 M009 M010 M011 M013 M020
M001 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M004 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M006 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
M008 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
M009 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
M010 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
M011 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
M013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
M020 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Table 5.15: Aruba Smart Home Sensor Proximals (partial Table)
5.4.1 Zone Z, Node η, Mode µ, Proximals ρ
A location-based anomaly is said to have occurred if a node changes location ab-
normally and is discovered to be in a wrong location. The Mode (µ) attribute of a
node and its proximals can be used to detect this abnormal change in location. A node
with a F-F mode should not, as part of its everyday function, change location unless its
circumstances change e.g. a door being removed for repairs or replacement.
This randomisation was achieved manually. The aim of this scenario was to demon-
strate the use of location and mode attributes to detect anomalies. In order to detect
the anomalous location change for nodes with µ = F-F, the normal and current proxi-
mals of the node are compared over time. In addition, the normal location and current
location at different times of the day are compared. The scenarios in Table 5.16 are
used as a basis for a discussion on how changes in location can be detected using these
attributes. The headings of the attribute columns are from the attributes introduced in
Subsection 4.2.1.
Scenario Period τ Node η Mode µ Proximals ρ Nρ Zone Z Previous Zone -Z Decision
1 Morning Bathtub F-F ToiletDoor 1 Bathroom Bathroom Normal
2 Afternoon Bathtub F-F ToiletDoor & Bicycle 2 Bathroom Bathroom Inconclusive
3 Night Bathtub F-F ToiletDoor 1 Bathroom Bathroom Normal
4 Night Bathtub F-F Fridge 1 Bathroom Bathroom Abnormal
5 Night Bathtub F-F ToiletDoor 1 Kitchen Bathroom Anomaly
6 Morning Cooker F-F ToiletDoor 1 Kitchen Bathroom Anomaly
7 Afternoon Cooker F-F ToiletDoor 1 Kitchen Bathroom Anomaly
Table 5.16: Fixed-Fixed Mode Table of Scenarios
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The scenarios are analysed individually and the decisions reached in each case is
explained next.
Scenario 1 is normal. This is because in the morning, the active node is the
Bathtub, which has a a F-F mode. The system detects that the proximal of the Bathtub
is the ToiletDoor and the zone the user is in is the Bathroom. In addition, the previous
(-Z) and current (Z) zones are both the same, and for a node with µ = F-F, this is as
required.
Scenario 2 can be either normal or anomalous. The scenario can be normal
because even though a Bicycle is proximal to the BathTub, a location change anomaly
with respect to the BathTub has not occurred. More information such as the on-going
activity or event will be required to determine which node is being given priority in
terms of consideration. The application of events and activities to Anomaly Detection
is discussed in Chapter 6.
On the other hand assuming that the user does not normally store the Bicycle in
the Bathroom, an anomaly can be inferred based on user preferences or, even, domain
knowledge.
Scenario 3 is normal for reasons similar to Scenario 1. The difference between the
two scenarios is that the first one occurs in the morning while the second one happens
in the afternoon. This result implies that for location-based anomalies (as explicitly
defined in the Definition of Location-based anomaly in Subsection 5.4.1) to be detected,
the time of day does not play a significant part.
The decision in Scenario 4 is anomalous because of the fact that even though the
node (i.e. BathTub) is in the Bathroom and does not change location (Z is the same
as -Z) for the duration of the scenario, its proximal is a Fridge which is in a different,
non-proximal, zone (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 6.2).
Consider Scenario 5. This scenario is anomalous because even though the other
relationships are normal, the previous and current zones are different, indicating that
the node which should have a F-F mode has changed location.
Bearing in mind that Scenario 6 can represent any on-going activity or event (none
is explicitly specified here), if the active node Cooker is taken as the cardinal attribute,
the scenario is anomalous because the Cooker is in the Kitchen (Figure 6.2), the
Bathtub is in the Bathroom and the two zones are non-proximals (see Table 5.14).
Scenario 7 accurately resolves to an anomaly because the only attribute by which
it differs from Scenario 6 (i.e. the Period τ) is inconsequential to the overall decision in
the scenario being analysed.
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A similar approach to the preceding (i.e. using scenario analyses) is used in the
rest of this Chapter and in Chapter 6 to explain how the individual Decisions for each
scenario is reached.
5.4.2 Presence-bound Anomalies
A presence-bound anomaly occurs when a presence is detected where one should
not be or no presence is detected where there should be at least one. Some example
scenarios are used to illustrate the use of Presence (Pr) in Anomaly Detection.
5.4.2.1 Presence Pr, Network Nx, Peripheral Per
This section involves demonstrating the use of the Pr, Nx and the Per attributes
in anomaly detection. Consider a scenario where a user receives a report that their
FridgeDoor is open. Assume in this scenario that the user lives alone and is away from
the house. Combining these attributes, several potential scenarios can be drawn up
which capture this situation.
Scenario Pr Nx Per Node Decision
1 ≥ 1 Up-Normal Kitchen Active Normal
2 ≥ 1 Up-High Kitchen Active Anomaly
3 ≥ 1 Down Kitchen Active Anomaly
4 ≥ 1 Up-Normal Kitchen Active Normal
5 0 Up-NormalKitchen Active Normal
6 0 Up-High Kitchen Active Anomaly
7 0 Down Kitchen Active Anomaly
8 0 Down Kitchen Inactive Normal
9 ≥ 1 Up-NormalBigBedroomActive Anomaly
10 ≥ 1 Up-Normal na Active Anomaly
11 0 Up-Normal na Active Anomaly
Table 5.17: Presence and Network Attributes Scenarios Table
Box 5.2. Presence Pr, Network Nx, Peripheral Per
If (Pr, 0) & (Nxa , Down) & (Per, Inactive) ⇒ (No Anomaly)
aInbound-Outbound, Remote Connections, etc.
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This may indicate that the report is potentially the sign of an anomalous remote
access attack involving the FridgeDoor which is being made to appear open even if it
is physically shut and no one is home. However, if the logs show that the FridgeDoor
was left open before the user left the SH, then an error (which was missed by whichever
SH monitoring system was in place) will be the most likely explanation of the situation.
5.4.2.2 Presence Pr, Network Nx
The attributes network, presence and location can be combined to detect anoma-
lies. To demonstrate this, consider the scenarios in Table 5.18. If the scenarios each
begin with the report that the FridgeDoor is open in a home that is empty (i.e. Pr =
0). Given: FridgeDoor is open and Fridge zone is Kitchen
Scenario Pr Nx Z Fridge FridgeDoor Decision
1 ≥ 1 Up-NormalKitchen Active open Normal
2 ≥ 1 Up-High Kitchen Active open Anomaly
3 ≥ 1 Down Kitchen Active open Anomaly
4 ≥ 1 Up-NormalKitchen Active closed Normal
5 0 Up-NormalKitchen Active open Normal
6 0 Up-High Kitchen Active open Anomaly
7 0 Down Kitchen Active open Anomaly
8 0 Down Kitchen Inactive closed Normal
9 ≥ 1 Up-NormalBigBedroomActive open Anomaly
10 ≥ 1 Up-Normal na Active open Anomaly
11 0 Up-Normal na Active open Anomaly
Table 5.18: Presence and Network Attributes Scenarios Table
Rule Induction is discussed in Chapter 6 but an example rule which is specific
to this particular Aruba SH scenario and which considers the attributes presence and
location is given thus:
Box 5.3. Presence Pr, Location Z
If (Pr, ≥ 1) & (FridgeDoor, Open) & (FridgeDoor, Shut) & (Z, Kitchen) ⇒ (No Anomaly)
Chapter 5. Anomaly Detection Scenarios and Discussions 113
The rule which is drawn from domain knowledge based on the data in the table
states that there is at least one person in the Kitchen, the peripheral was opened then
shut.
In this example, considering that the FridgeDoor can be shut automatically, if that
part of the rule is removed, the decision will still be the same.
5.4.2.3 Presence Pr, Obstacle Factor δ
Given a scenario where two motion sensors M018 and M031 are active at the same
time. To determine if this is an anomalous situation i.e. is there more than one presence
in the home, check the following:
• Are the two nodes proximal? In this case the two nodes are in two different, non-
proximal zones (zones C and D in Figure 5.2). Also, from the data in Appendix C
the two nodes are not proximal.
• Are they edge nodes? The two nodes in this scenario are not because there is a
significant, solid obstacle - a through wall - between them.
Therefore, if two nodes such as M018 and M031 are both on at the same time, even
if they are only separated by a distance that means that they can be proximal nodes,
as long as they are also separated by a through wall or a significant, solid obstacle. the
distance between them will have to be multiplied by the obstacle factor δ in order to
obtain the real distance between them.
5.4.2.4 Presence Pr, Proximals ρ
For this scenario - which makes use of proximals to detect anomalies in physical
presence - it was not necessary to simulate any anomaly or make up any scenarios in
the Aruba WSU CASAS Smart Home dataset which was used as experimental data to
test the presence detection function of the FDMA algorithm.
As mentioned before, an active motion sensor in a zone implies a presence is in that
zone. The data from motion sensors around the Aruba home were used for this analysis
i.e. the detection of at least one anomalous presence based on the proximality rules.
First of all the data is analysed using the SVM algorithm and the result obtained
from that analysis is as shown in Listing One: Anomalous Presence Detection output
- SVM. The SVM approach is a supervised method. this means labelled data is used
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to train the algorithm on what is normal or anomalous. A Clssifier is built using this
training data after which fresh unlabelled test data is analysed using the same Classifier
for it to determine which of the occurrences (in this case, data rows) is anomalous.
STATE SENSOR HOUR MINUTE SECOND ANOMALOUS?
1 26 15 47 48 0
0 22 15 47 49 0
0 28 15 47 50 0
1 27 15 47 52 0
0 27 15 47 54 0
0 26 15 47 58 0
1 26 15 48 0 0
0 26 15 48 2 0
1 26 15 48 2 0
0 26 15 48 4 0
1 26 15 48 8 0
1 27 15 48 8 0
0 26 15 48 9 0
0 27 15 48 9 0
1 27 15 48 10 0
1 26 15 48 11 0
0 26 15 48 12 0
0 27 15 48 12 0
1 26 15 48 13 0
0 26 15 48 15 0
1 26 15 48 17 0
0 26 15 48 19 0
1 26 15 48 27 0
0 26 15 48 29 0
1 26 15 48 41 0
0 26 15 48 43 0
1 26 15 48 50 0
0 26 15 48 52 0
1 26 15 49 11 0
0 26 15 49 13 0
1 26 15 51 27 0
1 27 15 51 27 0
0 26 15 51 29 0
0 27 15 51 29 0
1 26 15 51 30 0
1 27 15 51 32 0
0 27 15 51 33 0
0 26 15 51 34 0
1 26 15 56 3 0
0 26 15 56 4 0
1 26 15 56 46 0
0 26 15 56 47 0
1 26 15 58 19 0
0 26 15 58 21 0
1 26 15 59 32 0
0 26 15 59 33 0
1 26 16 0 12 0
0 26 16 0 14 0
1 26 16 6 47 0
0 26 16 6 50 0
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1 26 16 7 29 0
0 26 16 7 31 0
1 26 16 8 32 0
1 27 16 8 33 0
0 26 16 8 35 0
0 27 16 8 35 0
1 26 16 8 58 0
0 26 16 9 0 0
1 27 16 9 36 0
1 26 16 9 37 0
0 27 16 9 39 0
0 26 16 9 44 0
1 26 16 9 46 0
0 26 16 9 48 0
1 26 16 10 23 0
1 28 16 10 29 0
1 18 16 10 34 1
1 21 16 10 34 1
0 26 16 10 34 0
0 28 16 10 34 0
1 19 16 10 35 1
1 16 16 10 36 1
0 21 16 10 36 0
0 18 16 10 37 0
0 19 16 10 37 0
1 19 16 10 38 1
0 19 16 10 39 0
0 16 16 10 40 0
Listing One: Anomalous Presence Detection output (SVM-derived)
A ‘1’ in the “ANOMALOUS?” column means that the particular scenario is anoma-
lous. The anomalies detected are based on the proximality relationship. However, the
need for explicit labelling makes this method cumbersome. On the other hand, for each
SH that applies the FDMA, a set of relationship tables can be built - which are up-
dated - such that if any of the relationships are breached (e.g. a relationship based on
proximality) an alarm can be triggered.
Therefore, the anomalies detected are correct however the challenge is how to ef-
ficiently and explicitly label data when it runs into the tens of thousands of instances.
Bearing in mind that identifying proximality is an arduous task that requires careful
scrutiny of the node firings and then labelling the ones that ire according to a pattern
a reaction.
A section of the dataset was fed into the presence detection engine of the FDMA
algorithm and the results obtained are shown in Listing Two: Anomalous Presence
Detection output - FDMA. As mentioned, the method does not involve using the classical
AD approach of training and then testing because the rules are explicit unchanging rules
- i.e. not predominantly based on user behaviours which can understandably change -
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but on the attributes of nodes and zones that can be preprogrammed to behave in
particular ways.
S/No. -STATE: CURRENT LOCATION CURRENT SENSOR = NODEID DECISION
10 -Active: Office current sensor = 27 ’’
11 -Inactive: Office current sensor = 27 ’’
12 -Active: Office current sensor = 27 ’’
13 -Inactive: Office current sensor = 27 ’’
14 -Active: Office current sensor = 27 ’’
15 -Inactive: Office current sensor = 27 ’’
16 -Active: Office current sensor = 28 ’’
17 -Inactive: Office current sensor = 26 ’’
18 -Inactive: Office current sensor = 28 ’’
19 -Active: Office current sensor = 26 ’’
20 -Active: Office current sensor = 27 ’’
21 -Active: Corridor current sensor = 22 : Warning! current sensor = 22 last
active sensor = 27 Previous Active Location was Office And current active
Location is Corridor 0 seconds travel time : Non -Proximal !!!!!!! ’’
22 -Active: Corridor current sensor = 21 ’’
23 -Inactive: Corridor current sensor = 22 ’’
24 -Inactive: Office current sensor = 26 ’’
25 -Inactive: Office current sensor = 27 ’’
26 -Active: Kitchen current sensor = 18 ’’
27 -Active: Office current sensor = 25 : Warning! current sensor = 25 last
active sensor = 18 Previous Active Location was Kitchen And current active
Location is Office 0 seconds travel time : Non -Proximal !!!!!!! ’’
28 -Inactive: Corridor current sensor = 21 ’’
29 -Active: Office current sensor = 26 ’’
30 -Inactive: Office current sensor = 25 ’’
31 -Active: Kitchen current sensor = 19 : Warning! current sensor = 19 last
active sensor = 26 Previous Active Location was Office And current active
Location is Kitchen 0 seconds travel time : Non -Proximal !!!!!!! ’’
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Listing Two: Anomalous Presence Detection output (FDMA-derived)
The Active location is the same thing as the current location (Z´).
The FDMA detects anomalies using a combination of the Proximality and (Active)
Zone attributes where presence is determined by a zone being active. The FDMA
(Core) algorithm in this work currently only detects Presence and external access nodes
anomalies without any labelling (unsupervised).
One shortcoming of the method is its inability to determine if there are more than
two (2) presences in a space at a given time. Furthermore, the system can also be
enhanced so that it can be used to determine if the presence detected is that of a pet or
of a human being. The ability of the system to tell the difference between a human and
a pet will be useful in avoiding any false alarms in a home where the home-owner has a
pet where the pet can be mistaken for an intruder. One suggestion for how this can be
done is proposed under further work in Chapter 7, Subsection 7.4.2.
5.4.3 Node η, Peripherals Per
When two nodes are peripheral to each other, they are both activated when stimulus
is applied to only one of them. Nodes that share peripheral relationships include fridges
and fridge doors, cookers and oven doors.
Nodes and their peripherals can be arranged in such a way that, in response to a
common stimuli, one is activated before the other so that any time this pattern is not
adhered to, an anomaly can be inferred3.
Between nodes and their peripherals the following apply: they have the same
location (Z) and respond to stimuli applied to either one of them even if not at
precisely the same time, are active for approximately the same duration, and they can
have common proximals. A peripheral relationship is the type of relationship that exists
between the Fridge and the FridgeDoor in Figure 6.2 and it influences the Decisions
reached in the Scenarios in Table 6.4.
3In some cases it is enough for the peripheral to be active (at all) while the node itself is active; this is
because of how quickly the triggering happens such that it is not easy to observe which one happens
first therefore the happens before relationship can be ignored as long as they are both active.
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5.4.4 External Access Nodes η
For the purposes of this work, it is assumed that in a single-occupant home, over a
given period the following definitions describe External Access node Anomalies:
An external access node anomaly is said to have occurred if two or more external
access nodes (or doors which leas into and out of the SH) are open at the same time.
In addition, irrespective of what type of home is being considered (i.e. single- or multi-
occupant) an external access node anomaly is said to have occurred when one or more
door is open for too long. These rules apply even if the nodes are proximal. For this
scenario, a three-door home is considered with the relationship between the doors as
shown in Table 4.6. The data excerpt presented in Table 5.19, taken from the overall
Aruba SH dataset, is used as a basis for the discussion of this anomaly.
Date Time Sensor State
17/06/2011 12:29:28 D004 closed
17/06/2011 12:29:58 D004 open
17/06/2011 12:30:03 D004 closed
17/06/2011 12:30:22 D004 open
17/06/2011 12:30:26 D004 closed
17/06/2011 14:05:28 D004 open
17/06/2011 14:05:33 D004 closed
17/06/2011 18:09:48 D002 open
17/06/2011 20:35:09 D004 open
17/06/2011 20:36:01 D004 closed
17/06/2011 20:36:13 D002 closed
17/06/2011 21:44:58 D004 open
17/06/2011 21:45:06 D004 closed
17/06/2011 21:45:36 D004 open
17/06/2011 21:45:41 D004 closed
18/06/2011 10:00:00 D002 open
18/06/2011 10:03:25 D001 open
Table 5.19: External Access Nodes Dataset (Excerpt)
From the highlighted section it is clear that D002 is open for too long - approxi-
mately 11/2hours which violates one of the external access node rules. In addition, during
the same period D002 and D004 are both open at the same time. This also violates one of
the external access nodes rule. In order to detect this anomaly, the system is trained on
how long the doors are typically or normally open for and these values stored as normal
baselines and comparisons are made every time the door is opened so that abnormal
durations are detected.
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The Truth table in Table 4.6 provides the rules that can be applied for AD in
External Access Nodes. Observe that this applies to a single occupant home with three
External Access Nodes.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter the attributes identified in Chapter 4 were applied in the analysis
and discussion of one real and several hypothetical but realistic SH scenarios in order
to illustrate how these attributes can be applied to Anomaly Detection (AD).
In addition, the Forensics Decision Making Algorithm (FDMA) was used to analyse
a section of the Aruba Smart Home (SH) dataset and - making use of the location
and proximality attributes - it successfully detected more than one presence in the SH
during the selected period. Even though in this SH more than one presence is a sign of
a legitimate visitor, for the sake of simplicity, more than one presence is described as a
sign of an intrusion in this work. Non-invasive presence detection as demonstrated in
this Chapter is useful for supporting the security needs of SH occupants some of whom
will be elderly who are enabled to continue to live in their own homes because of the
support provided by SH tools and services but who may then become targets of physical
intruder attacks.
The scenario analyses carried out in this chapter as well as the presence detection
output of the FDMA demonstrate the applicability of the methodology to real-life SH
anomaly detection situations.
The rules derived in this Chapter can be adjusted to fit into any smart environment
or space which has zones and nodes. The steps to follow in setting up the smart space
for AD will be that same one described in Chapter 4. The zones and the nodes they
contain as well as the attributes of each of them should first be identified. When the
space is being set up, the optimal security information about the attributes of the nodes
and zones should be fed into the FEMS or any alternative security system as required
by the SH occupant. These base values will form the first set of rules. Similar rules
as introduced in this Chapter and Chapter 6 can then be harvested by the system as
the home is inhabited and users perform their daily activities, with the home adjusting
according to their changing patterns.
It is acknowledged that a limitation in this work is the use of scenarios which,
though realistic, the test of the system can be more rigorously carried out using real
people carrying out real activities and thereby generating real data which can then be
analysed using the attributes introduced in Chapter 4. Another limitation is the fact that
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the Aruba dataset which was used in this research is from a single-occupant home and
that, in reality, even though Smart Technologies in the Internet of Things (IoT) enable
elderly and even invalid people to live independently, some of them will have visitors
and some may also live in multiple-occupant homes. It will be essential therefore to
carry out a similar analysis of the security situation in multi-occupant homes using the
attributes identified in this work.
In Chapter 6 the FDMA and Core activities concept are combined and applied in
the analysis of some additional realistic anomalous scenarios.
Chapter 6
Anomaly Detection Scenarios and
Discussions (II)
6.1 Overview
In Chapter 5, several scenarios involving SH nodes and zones were analysed and
these analyses were used to demonstrate how the FDMA methodology applies to Anomaly
Detection. In this Chapter, several scenarios are used to illustrate how a combination of
“Core Activities” [10], Core Events and the FDMA can be applied to Anomaly Detection
(AD) tasks. A discussion section covers the merits of the approach. Just as in Chapter
5, the formalisms introduced in Chapter 4 are used in this Chapter. For example, Events
and Activities are written in italicised red coloured font.
6.2 Core Activities
Every event is made up of activities (this definition is adapted from [10]). The
FDMA can be trained with SH occupants’ regular events such that every event (or or
Activity of Daily Living (ADL) ) is constrained by certain attributes. For example, for
the purposes of anomaly detection, constraints can be placed on activities and events
such that each one of them must be performed in particular locations using particular
nodes (the use of particular nodes for particular activities is investigated and discussed
in [43]).
A Smart Home (SH) occupant may carry out a particular event in several different
ways. For the purposes of this work each of the different ways in which an event can be
completed is known as an Activity Sequence (ASeq). An Activity Sequence (ASeq)
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can also therefore be defined as one of the different sets of activity steps that can be
taken to complete an event. Activity Sequences are described as making up an Activity
Class. An Activity Class - made up of a series of ordered steps also known as Activity
Sequences (ASeq) - is a potential way by which tasks such as Activities of Daily Living
(ADL) can be accomplished or completed. Each of the Activity Sequences that make
up an event has one or more core activity(-ies) which, if missing from the sequence,
might be indicative of an anomaly.
The relationship between Events, Activity Classes and Activity Sequences is illus-
trated in Figure 6.1.
Activity 
Class
Activity 
Sequence 
(ASeq)
Event
Activity 
Sequence 
(ASeq)
Activity 
Sequence 
(ASeq)
Activity 
Class
Activity 
Sequence 
(ASeq)
Figure 6.1: Relationship between Events, Activities Classes and Activity Sequences
By way of an example, take the event OrderItemsUsingFridge. This event has 3
potential Activity Classes:
• Local Physical Ordering (by Human)
• Remote Ordering (by Human)
• Self-replenishment (by Fridge)
In addition to core activities as a factor of AD, the sequence or order in which
activities and events happen (and the number of times certain types of activities occur
during certain events) play a key role in detecting anomalies in user activities. This
gives rise to the “happens after” [10] and happens before relationships descriptions.
For instance, consider the Activity Sequences list in Table 6.2: observe that activity a9
always occurs after a8. Activity a9 therefore can be described as having a “happens
after” relationship with a8. The “happens” relationship order does not have to be in
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a tightly restrictive order i.e. activities must occur in a general pattern but they do
not have to occur immediately before or immediately after each other for the approach
described in this Chapter to apply.
i.e.
• precedent activity −→ (core) activity −→ subsequent activity •
6.2.1 Core activities Rule
In order to use core activities for AD the following steps are followed: whenever an
event is triggered, the FDMA checks for
• The Core activity as the selected Activity Sequence happens. At the end of the
ASeq, if the core activity is missing, the decision is that the event was not com-
pleted successfully;
• The order of the activities for those with a happens After or happens Before rela-
tionship to ensure they occur in the right order.
Then, for every activity, the system checks for
• The nodes, zones and other attributes that should be involved so that if any of these
attributes are missing or not in their normal state, an anomaly will be flagged;
• event and activity constraints.
The core activities rule can be summarised thus:
Box 6.1. Core activities Rule
Given event E, with activities space
{a1, a2, a3,...,an}
and core activity (for example) ak. For event E to be successful, Core Activity ak
1. must occur AND
2. must occur in E AND,
3. must occur according to a happens after and/or happens before order with respect to the
other activities AND,
4. in some instances, must occur the correct number of times (or frequency) in the Activity
Sequence being followed.
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A related concept - which is not discussed in detail in this work - is the concept
of Core events. A Core event is one which must normally and typically occur, within
a measurable time-frame. An example time-frame is a 24-hour period. Example daily
core events include breathing and brushing. Consider a frail elderly dementia patient
who lives alone in a Smart Home (SH) and takes daily medication. The Core events
of GetUp during the morning period of every day and TakePills at stipulated times are
important. Core events can be time-constrained so that they must occur at certain pre-
defined times failing which an alert can be triggered. Consider too, a child suffering from
teeth issues; her daily Core events may be BrushTeethMorning and BrushTeethEvening.
Core activities and core events are useful for designing and providing tailored lifestyle
services to individual users. This is because a SH security system can be set up to check
for the occurrence of core event and if that event is missing or a core activity in that
event is missing, the system can issue a reminder or even trigger an alarm depending on
how the system is set up.
6.3 Application of Core Activities and FDMA in Anomaly
Detection
In this section the core activities, relationships and constraints are combined to
analyse several scenarios for anomalies. Take as an example the Core Activity Enter-
sToilet as part of the Event GoToToilet. During this event, the user must physically
be inside the BigBedroom (Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2). This means the Presence re-
quirement for this Activity is Presence ≥ 1 and the location requirement is zone =
BigBedroom. Therefore, if activity EntersToilet happens whilst the BigBedroom is
inactive (i.e. empty), it can be correctly concluded that the situation is anomalous.
Box 6.2. Core activities + FDMA Rule
If (Core Events, Yes) & (Core Activities, Yes) & (“Happy Home Network” Attributes, Normal)
⇒ (Normal)
To demonstrate this combined approach four (4) ADLs were selected, each with 3
different ways of performing them: normal-human, normal-machine and abnormal
ways. A suggested list of different activities that make up these events is presented
in the Activities List in Table 6.1 in Section 6.3.1. The Activity Sequences and Core
Activities for each case are as shown in the respective Scenario Sections. Lastly, they
are combined with the constraints identified in this work to detect any anomalies in the
“Home Happiness” status.
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Selected ADLs (or Events) that are considered
ADL1: Replenish Fridge Stock - ReplenishFridgeStock
ADL2: Update Fridge Software - Update Fridgeware
ADL3: Go to toilet -GoToToilet
ADL4: Drive around town -DriveAroundTown
The approach is validated by a detailed analysis of each scenario and the decisions
reached.
As previously explained, each ADL (or event) is made up of a set of Activity
Sequences (ASeq) and each ADL has one or more core activity which, if missing from
the sequence, may be indicative of an anomaly. In addition to these, for them to be
completed successfully and normally, each event and activity requires a set of nodes,
zones, time (or period) of day and other factors. Constraints can also define the
normality of an activity (or event). In some cases, constraints are relatively flexible (e.g.
a home occupant may fall asleep in their LivingRoom instead of in the normal location
of the BigBedroom - based on Figure 5.1 - without triggering an alarm), whilst in
other cases they may not be flexible (e.g. a home occupant may not cook anywhere else
but in the Kitchen thus implying that Cooking can be described as a Location-bound
event).
6.3.1 Activities List
Following from the discussions in Chapter 3, during Stage 3 of the Home Prepa-
ration Phase of the Internet of Things Digital Forensics Framework, the SH system is
(initially) explicitly trained on what is normal by the user after which the system subse-
quently learns and updates itself on what is normal - where normal represents the home
status that is acceptable to the user. The user can also manually update the system and
make adjustments to this ‘normal’ as necessary. Part of what the system learns is which
activities make up events or ADLs. Example activities are as shown in Table 6.1. This
table gives the list of the activities that were used to formulate the Activity Sequences
used in the different scenarios being considered in this Chapter.
For each of the scenarios presented, the aim in the rest of this Chapter is to use
attributes and relationships (described in Section 4.2.1), constraints (described Sec-
tion 4.2.2) and Activity Sequences and core activities (described in Section 6.2) in dif-
ferent iterations - and not necessarily all at once - to analyse the decisions reached in
the different scenarios as presented. Just as in Chapter 5, each scenario is represented
by a row in the scenarios tables. The Decisions reached in the scenarios considered are
evaluated and discussed.
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Label Activity Label Activity
a1 Go to Kitchen
1 a20 Accept Terms and Conditions
2
a2 Go to Fridge a21 User enters Bedroom
a3 M003 On a22 User opens ToiletDoor
a4 Log in to Fridge interface a23 User enters Bathroom
a5 Look up Fridge Contents a24 User closes ToiletDoor
a6 Generate Shopping List a25 User leaves Bathroom
a7 Accept pre-prepared Shopping List a26 User leaves Bedroom
a8 Select Supplier
3 a27 Exit Home
a9 Place Order a28 Enter Car
a10 Accept Receipt a29 Authenticate
4
a11 Log out a30 Start Car
a12 Open FridgeDoor a31 Accept suggested route(s)
a13 Place items in Fridge a32 Decline suggested route(s)
a14 Update Stock List a33 Leave Home
a15 Close FridgeDoor a34 Drive Around Town
a16 Leave Kitchen a35 Return Home
a17 Click “Update Fridgeware” a36 De-authenticate
a18 Select Update Source: Manufacturer website
a19 Select Update Source: USB
Table 6.1: Hypothetical Activities List
According to [90], ADLs are either Basic ADLs (e.g. “bathing, dressing and eat-
ing”) or Instrumental ADLs (e.g. “managing money or medication”). Basic ADLs,
according to the authors, involve “less complex, implicitly learned activities” while In-
strumental ADLs “involve more cognitively demanding tasks”. This Chapter uses the
generic expression ADL to cover both types because it is not necPage essary to highlight
the difference between them in this work.
6.3.2 Activity of Daily Living 1 (ADL 1): Replenish Fridge Stock
Several Activity Sequences (ASeq) that exemplify how the groceries in a Fridge in
a SH can be replenished are shown in Table 6.2 and are discussed in the scenarios in this
section and its subsections. In these scenarios it is assumed that the Fridge is located
in the Kitchen. As with all the scenarios in this Chapter, the ReplenishFridgeStock
1 When motion is detected in a zone, that zone is described as being active.
2 Accepting the Terms and Conditions implicitly begins the Fridgeware Update sequence.
3 In a8 the user identifies the cheapest supplier from a list of websites.
4 Authentication includes identification, authentication, authorisation, and accounting.
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scenarios occur in the SH layout5 in Figure 5.1 and (hypothetical) Kitchen layout in
Figure 6.2.
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Front_Door
Figure 6.2: Hypothetical Kitchen Nodes
The ReplenishFridgeStock ADL can be considered as being made up of two separate
ADLs - the first one being the activities involved in placing the order and the second
one being the activities which occur after the order has been delivered: i.e. placing
the delivered items in the fridge. It is important to know which part of the ADL
is being conducted because they may not have the same Constraints - for instance,
ordering items does not require a physical presence because the user can log in to the
fridge interface without being physically present in the Kitchen. However placing items
in the fridge will require a physical presence.
6.3.2.1 ADL 1, Activity Class I: Locally by Human
ReplenishFridgeStock requires that an activity of OpenFridgeDoor (i.e. a12) is per-
formed and completed by an activity of PlaceItemsInFridge (i.e. a13). In addition, to
ascertain that the OpenFridgeDoor activity actually happened, the FridgeDoor sensor
must fire to an active state. Also, OpenFridgeDoor must be followed by a CloseFridge-
Door i.e. the FridgeDoor must go to the close state thus signifying a complete event.
5The nodes FrontDoor, M1 and M3 were added to Figure 6.2 in order to give an idea of where the nodes
Fridge, FridgeDoor and M3 are, hypothetically, in the Kitchen in Figure 5.1.
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a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 Core Activities
ASeq 1 x x x x x x o x x x x x x x x x a12, a13
ASeq 2 x x x x x o x x x x x x x x x x a12, a13
ASeq 3 x x x x o x o x x x x x x x x x a12, a13
ASeq 4 x x x x o o x x x x x x x x x x a12, a13
ASeq 5 x x x x x x o x x x x x x o x x a12, a13
Table 6.2: Activity Class I for Activity of Daily Living (ADL) 1
In all the Activity Class Tables in this Chapter, a ‘x’ means the activity is part of
the Activity Sequence (ASeq) in question and a ‘o’ means it is not. The core activities
are identified following the approach in [10]. The constraints on the different ways of
achieving the ReplenishFridgeStock (physically by human) event are given in Table 6.3.
In summary, the constraints are that the normal location and current location must be
the Kitchen and there must be a presence.
Core activities a12 and a13
Current location (Z´)Kitchen6
Normal location (Z) Kitchen
presence (Pr) ≥ 1
Table 6.3: Constraints on Activity of Daily Living (ADL) 1, Activity Class I
Considering Presence (Pr), Peripheral (Per) and Proximality (ρ) attributes, a table
of scenarios such as shown in Table 6.4 can be drawn up to represent some of the
possibilities for this event. In this table, each row is a scenario. The decision reached
for each scenario is shown in the Decision column and each of the decisions is analysed
in Section 6.3.2.1 which is the section immediately following the Table.
6 presence is therefore in the Kitchen.
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Scenario Presence (Pr) FridgeDoor M003 Decision
1 0 Open Off Anomaly
2 0 Closed On Anomaly
3 ≥ 1 Closed Off Normal7
4 ≥ 1 Closed On Normal
5 0 Closed Off Normal
6 0 Open On Anomaly
7 ≥ 1 Open Off Anomaly
8 ≥ 1 Open On Normal
Table 6.4: ADL 1 (Activity Class I) Scenarios table
Analyses8 of Table 6.4 Decisions
Each scenario is now analysed and the decision reached in each case explained. It
should be remembered that for every presence-bound activity (e.g. a17 in Table 6.1),
there must be at least one presence (where presence is determined by a motion sensor
in a zone being active).
Consider Scenario 1 in which there is no one in the Kitchen (Pr = 0) and the
FridgeDoor and motion sensor M003 are both active. This is an anomaly because M003
being in state on indicates at least one presence and the FridgeDoor cannot be opened
unless there is someone there.
Consider Scenario 2: there is no one in the Kitchen and the motion sensor M003
is active. The FridgeDoor in this scenario is in state closed. This scenario is considered
anomalous because the M003 is detecting a presence (motion) that is not there.
Consider Scenario 3 in which there is a presence in the Kitchen (Pr ≥ 1) and
the FridgeDoor and motion sensor M003 are both inactive. This is normal because the
other nodes may be active or inactive as long as there is a presence in the Kitchen. A
similar explanation applies in Scenario 4.
Consider Scenario 5, where there is a presence in the Kitchen and the FridgeDoor
and motion sensor M003 are both inactive. This is normal because all the nodes are
inactive and there is apresence in the Kitchen.
7 A Normal Decision can be described as a True Negative or benign situation.
8Note that the next location the user went to is not considered in these analyses. Considering this value
would result in different decisions. For instance, if the user moves from the Kitchen to a proximal
zone, say the Dining and the motion sensor M003 is still active even though Pr in the Kitchen is now
0. This combination of factors (which in fact describe Scenario 2 exactly) may not be the sign of an
anomaly because motion sensors are observed to stay on for some time after the motion that triggers
them.
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Consider Scenario 6. During this scenario there is no one in the Kitchen, the
FridgeDoor is open and the motion sensor M003 is on. This is anomalous because the
FridgeDoor and M003 cannot be normally active without a presence in the Kitchen.
Consider Scenario 7, where there is a presence in the Kitchen (Pr ≥ 1) and the
FridgeDoor is open whilst the motion sensor M003 is inactive. This decision reached
is that this is an anomaly because the user cannot reach and access the FridgeDoor
without triggering motion sensor M003.
Consider Scenario 8, where there is a presence in the Kitchen and the FridgeDoor
and motion sensor M003 are both active. This decision reached is that this is not an
anomaly because even though both nodes are active, as long as there is a presence,
then everything is normal.
Still considering the Activity Sequences and core activities in Table 6.2 and the
scenarios in Table 6.4. Irrespective of the particular ASeq (or, indeed the Activity
Class) which is followed to place the order of the food stock, the FridgeDoor must
be in state open (i.e. a12) before items can be added to the Fridge (since fridges,
currently, do not physically fill themselves). After this, the door may physically be
returned to state closed (a13) - or even left to close automatically. Therefore, for event
ReplenishFridgeStock, with an established set of potential activities (a1 - a16), when
ReplenishFridgeStock is started (making use of any of the Activity Sequences presented
in Table 6.2) the FDMA checks for core activities a12 and a13 and, if either one or both
are missing from the ASeq, the situation is flagged as anomalous.
A discussion on Rule Induction using the Machine Learning tool Weka and the Rule
Induction Algorithm PRISM is done in Section 6.5. Prior to this discussion, however,
some rules based on domain knowledge are drawn up in several sections. An example
rule for the event physically OrderItems in this particular SH can be expressed as follows:
Box 6.3. Pr, Z, ρ, Nx, ASeq, Core Activities
If (Pr, ≥ 1) & (Z, Kitchen) & (ρ, On) & (Nx, na) & (ASeq, correct) & (Core Activities, a12;
a13) ⇒ (No Anomaly)
This rule, as with all the rules in this work are applicable to certain scenarios.
According to this rule, if there is no one in the Kitchen, and the node’s proximal
is on (the network reading is not applicable), the ongoing activity is following a known
Activity Sequence and the core activities are as they should be then no anomaly will
be flagged. To test this rule, consider the event ReplenishFridgeStock during which the
FridgeDoor must be open (one of the core activities). Applying the rule to a scenario
where there is at least one user in the Kitchen, the FridgeDoor is inactive, the correct
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Activity Sequence is being followed and the core activity is happens leads to the decision
that the scenario is anomalous.
Box 6.4. Example: Event, core activity, Per
If (Pr, ≥ 1) & (Z, Kitchen) & (Per, inactive) & (Activity, a13) & (ASeq, correct)⇒ (Anomaly)
This scenario correctly resolves to an anomaly because even though there is a
presence in the correct zone (Kitchen), the activity a13 cannot be completed if the
peripheral FridgeDoor is inactive.
6.3.2.2 ADL 1, Activity Class II: Remotely by Human
In this Activity Class the user places the order remotely. Example Activity Se-
quences for this scenario are shown in Table 6.5.
a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 Core Activities
ASeq 1 x x x o x x x x a4, a9, a10, a11
ASeq 2 x o o x x x x x a4, a9, a10, a11
ASeq 3 x x x o x x x x a4, a9, a10, a11
Table 6.5: Activity Class II for ADL 1
For this ADL, activities a1 to a3 and a16 are not relevant and are therefore not shown
in the table. These activities are not applicable because the user does not physically go
to the Kitchen or the Fridge in order to complete the ADL. As was done with the
previous Activity Class, each of the scenarios and decisions is analysed individually.
The selected example scenarios and their corresponding decisions for this event
are presented in Table 6.6. The premise is that if there is no presence (i.e. Pr = 0)
and the Network (Nx) state is Up-Normal, then the situation is Normal. The list of
allowed websites can be fed to the FDMA during the SH set-up stage as described in
Section 3.8.1 so that during this event, if the websites being accessed are on the list of
allowed websites, the FDMA will take the decision that the situation is normal, otherwise
the decision reached would be that the on-going event is an anomalous. In addition, the
occurrence of presence-bound activities where no presence is expected will be identified
by the FDMA as being anomalous. These factors are taken into account to populate
the decision column of Table 6.6.
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Scenario Pr Location (Z) Activity Network (Nx) Decision
1 ≥ 1 Kitchen a4 Up-Normal Anomaly
2 ≥ 1 Toilet a15 Up-Normal Anomaly
3 ≥ 1 BigBedroom a9 Up-Normal Normal
4 0 n/a a17 Up-High Anomaly
5 0 n/a a18 Up-Normal Normal
6 0 n/a a3 Up-Normal Anomaly
7 ≥ 1 Kitchen a17 Up-Normal Anomaly
Table 6.6: ADL 1 (Activity Class II) Scenarios table
Analyses of Table 6.6 Decisions
Consider Scenario 1, where there is a presence in the Kitchen (Pr ≥ 1), and the
on-going activity is a4. If the Network state is Up-Normal, this is an anomaly because
there should not be a presence in the single-user home for a remote order.
Consider Scenario 2, where there is presence in the Toilet while a15 is ongoing.
Note that a15 requires a presence and can only occur in the Kitchen. In addition, the
order is being placed remotely and can be placed from the Toilet. This scenario is
anomalous because even though there is a presence as required, it is in the wrong loca-
tion of the house (and the location Toilet in question is not proximal to the Kitchen
where the presence should be). it is further anomalous because a15 should not be ongoing
during order items-only.
Consider Scenario 3, where there is a presence in the BigBedroom (Pr ≥ 1) and
activity a9 is ongoing with the Nx at state Up-Normal. This is anomalous because
there is a presence in the Kitchen.
Scenario 4 is anomalous because a17 is not part of the normal ASeq in Table 6.5.
It is also anomalous because the state of the network is Up-High and the network state
is supposed to be Normal for a normal situation.
Consider Scenario 5. This situation is normal because the event does not require a
presence (Pr = 0), there is therefore no active zone, the ongoing activity can be carried
out remotely and the network is at state Up-Normal.
Consider Scenario 6. In this Scenario, there is no presence in the Kitchen, M003 is
on and the state of the network is Up-Normal. This is an anomalous situation because
there is no one in the Kitchen as required by this ADL however, the motion sensor
which detects presence is active.
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Consider Scenario 7. There is a presence in the the Kitchen, the activity ongoing
is a17 which is not part of any of the ASeq for this event. Therefore even if the Nx state
is Up-Normal i.e. an acceptable state, the situation is overall anomalous.
The following Box gives one (possible) discriminant rule that governs all the
cases in this scenario (Order Items Human, Local)
Box 6.5. Pr, η, Per
If (Pr, ≥ 1) & (η, active) & (Per, active) ⇒ (Normal)
This rule adequately captures the scenarios in Table 6.6.
From the perspective of Network-based anomalies, an anomaly can also be said to
be ongoing if there are an abnormally high number of occurrences of certain activities
that should only normally occur once or a few times in every given Activity Sequence
mainly because of the types of activities that they are. Taking as an example Scenario
4 in Table 6.6. Consider activities a4 and a17: too many occurrences of either one of
these activities - i.e. repeated, perhaps, rapidly-occurring (failed) login attempts - may
be indicative of a brute force attack. In order to counter this threat a threshold of a
maximum number of login attempts can be set during the set-up and training stage of
the SH. An example constraint can be Total Number of Login attempts = 5 per minute.
This example demonstrates the combination of the network and activities attributes.
6.3.2.3 ADL 1, Activity Class III: Machine
For the ReplenishFridgeStock to be considered complete - even in a machine-driven
scenario - activity a12 must occur. However, consider that this event is made up of two
sub-events: placing the order online by the fridge and adding the items to the fridge and
that the first sub-event is the one being considered. The Activity Sequences in Table 6.7
give several examples of how this can be accomplished. This event is network-bound
and, unlike with events that are carried out by humans, does not require a presence.
a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 Core Activities
ASeq 1 x o x x x x a9
ASeq 2 x o x x x o a9
ASeq 3 o x x x x x a9
Table 6.7: Activity Class III for ADL 1
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Scenario ω ⊂ W Node (η) Activity Nx Decision
1 yes Fridge a6 Up-Normal Normal
2 yes Fridge a8, a14 Up-Normal Anomaly
3 no n/a a9 Up-Normal Anomaly
4 yes Fridge a7 Up-Normal Normal
Table 6.8: ADL 1 (Activity Class III) Scenarios table
For this Activity Class, activity a11 may potentially be redundant depending on
how the overall Fridge security system is set up. The fridge can automatically log out
for instance. The scenarios in Table 6.8 are used to analyse this Activity Class.
Analyses of Table 6.8 Decisions
Consider Scenario 1. The network state is Up-Normal and the website being ac-
cessed is on the trusted list of websites (ω ⊂ W is yes). The correct node is active
in this Scenario. The ongoing activity (a6) is part of a number of the typical Activity
Sequences (see Table 6.7). These factors together make the overall situation normal.
Observe in Scenario 2 that even if the website which was accessed is on the list of
acceptable websites, the node involved in the scenario is normal and the network state
is Up-Normal, but because a14 is part of the activities happening, the decision reached
is that the scenario represents an abnormal situation.
In Scenario 3 the machine places the order from a website that is not on the trusted
list of websites. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that all the other attributes appear
to indicate that everything is normal, the overall scenario is abnormal.
Scenario 4 is normal because the website is recognised as a trusted website, the
correct node (Fridge) is involved in the scenario, the activity is part of the sequence of
steps that should be taken to complete the ADL and the network state is Up-Normal.
Therefore, taking the preceding analyses into consideration, the following example
scenario correctly resolves to an anomaly:
Box 6.6. ω
If (Pr, n/a) & (Z, n/a) & (ρ, n/a) & (Nx, Up-Normal) & (ω 6⊂ W ) & (Core Activities, a9 ) &
(ASeq, correct) ⇒ (No Anomaly)
Activity Sequences can be expressed in a way that shows the actual sequence of
activities in the specific ASeq. Thus, instead of using a table of several suggested Activity
Sequences such as, for example, in Table 6.7, an ASeq can be expressed as follows:
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• a1 −→ a2 −→ a3 −→ ... −→ an •
where a1, a2, a3 and so on are activities in the Activity Sequence and activity a1
happens before activity a2, activity a3 happens after a2 and so on.
Drawing up such an ASeq involves looking up the activities on an activities list like
Table 6.1 and linking the activities with a −→. The bullet (•) at the start and end of the
Activity Sequence indicates the beginning and end of the sequence of activities. This
representation can be used to express the order of activities as well as show clearly if
any activities are repeated.
Using this method to represent the ReplenishFridgeStock event gives:
• a6 −→ a8 −→ a9 −→ a10 −→ a11 −→ a13 −→ a14 −→ a15 −→ a16•
Assume for this scenario that Pr ≥ 1. An analysis of this ASeq shows that even if
a presence is detected, because of the fact that activity a12 (Open FridgeDoor) is not
part of the ASeq - and this is a required activity for items to be added to the fridge
- this ASeq is anomalous. Essentially, a complete and successful ReplenishFridgeStock
ADL depends on FridgeDoor being in state open i.e. activity a12 must be carried out.
If an activity is repeated in a given ASeq, it can be shown by inserting it into this
sequence more than once. In the following example, a2 is a repeated activity:
• a1 −→ a2 −→ a3 −→ a2 •
This particular notation does not show options (such as alternative activities) or
time however it can be further enhanced. However, optional Activity Sequences for
completing the same event are shown in Tables 6.2, 6.5, 6.7, 6.10, and 6.14.
6.3.2.4 Anomaly Detection using the Order of Activities
As explained in Section 6.2, for AD purposes, if a core activity is missing from an
Activity Sequence then there is an anomaly; this is irrespective of the order in which
the ASeq is completed. However, there is potentially a further anomaly if the order
of activities is wrong. Thus, considering the happens before relationships, from an AD
standpoint, for every ReplenishFridgeStock event, the FridgeDoor must change to state
open (activity a12) before activity a13 can occur. In addition, before the FridgeDoor
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and the Fridge are accessed, node M003 must be accessed first (i.e. activities a12 and
a13).
the motion sensor (e.g. M003) must be accessed too (before the Fridge is reached).
Also, activity a5 must occur before a8. Otherwise, an anomalous event is flagged and
the ASeq is anomalous. Therefore, the following ASeq is anomalous. Thus consider the
following sequence of activities:
• a5 −→ a4 −→ a6 −→ a7 −→ a8 −→ a9 −→ a10 −→ a11 −→ a13 −→ a14
−→ a12 −→ a15 •
Some peculiarities with respect to these particular activity sequence are that:
Analyses of Happens Before/Happens After Relationships Scenarios:
1. a5 can happen before a4 if the user looks up the Fridge contents from a remote
location;
2. having a6 and a7 on the same ASeq may be a potential source of conflict;
3. if a13 happens and it is not preceded directly or otherwise by a12, then the scenario
being described is anomalous.
This entire Activity Sequence is therefore redundant. To avoid these anomalies,
the FDMA can be trained explicitly with activities that have these happens before
and happens after relationships. In general, Smart Home occupants’ regular ADLs
(i.e. events), activities and Activity Sequences can be programmed into the FEMS
(see Section 3.6) so that as they carry out their ADLs, the relationships between these
attributes can be monitored for anomalies.
6.3.3 Activity of Daily Living 2 (ADL 2): Update Fridgeware
The fridge software (referred to in this Chapter as fridgeware) update can be carried
out locally or remotely, by a user, by a remote third-party, or as part of a self-update
event by the fridge. In addition, pre-scheduled auto-updates are possible. This event,
therefore, is not overall a presence-bound event however some of the ways of achieving
it require a human i.e. if the update is being carried out by a person locally and
physically at the Fridge screen. The state of the Network Nx during the update is
however important in determining if this ADL is anomalous or not. In addition, the
average number of bytes per minute and packets per byte values can be used along with
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the number of network connections, to determine the level of network activity, whether
Up-High, Up-Normal or Down. The total number of login attempts during this event is
also vital for anomaly detection. This section analyses several scenarios that describe
how the fridgeware can be updated locally, remotely and by a self-update by the fridge
itself.
6.3.3.1 ADL 2, Activity Class I: Locally by Human
This subsection analyses several scenarios that describe how the fridgeware can
be updated locally. We assume the maximum allowed number of login attempts is 5
(after which the user is locked out and a third-party security company is alerted). One
example ASeq that can be followed to complete this event is
• a1 −→ a2 −→ a3 −→ a4 −→ a17 −→ a18 −→ a20 −→ a11 −→ a16 •
Let the scenarios in Table 6.9 represent several scenarios that occur over a period
in the SH.
Scenario Login attempts Activities Network (Nx) Decision
1 2 a1-a4, a11, a16-a20 Up-Normal Normal
2 1 a8, a14 Up-Normal Anomaly
3 15 a17 Up-Normal Anomaly
4 2 a18 Up-Normal Normal
Table 6.9: ADL 2 (Activity Class I) Scenarios table
The analysis of the decisions reached in each of the scenarios are given next.
Analyses of Table 6.9 Scenarios:
In Scenario 1 the number of login attempts is below the threshold, the activities
are correct and the network state is normal. These factors together make this a normal
situation.
In Scenario 2 the total number of login attempts is less than the maximum of five
(5), the network is at state Up-Normal however the activities being carried out do not
fit within the framework of the ASeq that can be used to accomplish this task. These
activities belong to the ASeq for a different Activity of Daily Living, ADL 1. This
scenario therefore describes an abnormal situation.
Chapter 6. Framework Evaluation 138
Scenario 3 shows a scenario in which the number of login attempts exceeds the
threshold of 5. The event as presented is anomalous. This decision is reached irrespec-
tive of the fact that the activity that was carried out was a normal, expected activity
based on the selected ASeq or that the network was at a normal state.
Scenario 4 is normal because the maximum login threshold is not exceeded, the
activity (a18) being carried out is part of the chosen ASeq and the network state is
Up-Normal.
Taking these attributes into account - along with the attributes website, proximal,
zone and core activities, the following example query for this particular Activity Class
correctly resolves to normal:
Box 6.7. Example: Local Physical Update by Human
If (Pr, ≥ 1) & (Z´, Kitchen) & (Fridge, On) & (M003, On) & (Nx, Up-Normal) & (ω ⊂ W ) &
(Core Activities, a17, a19, a20) & (ASeq, correct) ⇒ (Normal)
This decision is correct because there is a presence (this is required for this Activity
Class since the update is being carried out via the fridge’s physical interface by a human),
the zone is the correct one, the other node that is active besides the Fridge is proximal
to the fridge, the Nx state is Up-Normal, the website is on a trusted list of websites,
the core activities are correct and the ASeq being followed is actually for this activity.
6.3.3.2 ADL 2, Activity Class II: Locally, USB dongle
In this subsection, the Activity Class table itself is first used to discuss how activities
themselves can be used to discover anomalies. Given the three (3) Activity Sequences
in Table 6.10. The aim is to analyse each of them and reach a decision about which one
of them is anomalous? An ‘x’ indicates that the activity in question occurred while an
‘o’ indicates it did not occur.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a17 a19 a20 a11 a16 Core Activities
ASeq 1 x x x x x x x x x a17, a19, a20
ASeq 2 x x x x x x o x x a17, a19, a20
ASeq 3 x x x x x x x o x a17, a19, a20
Table 6.10: Activity Classes II and III for ADL 2
Decisions for Table 6.10
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ASeq 1 is normal because all the activities on the list are necessary to complete
ADL 2.
ASeq 2 and ASeq 3 represent anomalous situations, the former because activity
a20 is missing and the latter because the login session is allowed to expire which may
provide a potential attack opportunity for a malicious party to gain access to the fridge
whilst it is still logged on. An example Activity Sequence (ASeq) of steps in this case
can be
• a1 −→ a2 −→ a3 −→ a4 −→ a17 −→ a19 −→ a20 −→ a11 −→ a16 •
This Activity Class has some presence-bound (Pr), node-bound (η) and location-
bound (Z) activities. For example, the activities a1, a2 and a3 are location-bound and
must happen in the Kitchen. Considering these specific constraints, Table 6.11 can be
drawn up and used to illustrate how these constraints on this Activity Class can be used
for Anomaly Detection. Taking Pr, η, Z and ρ factors into account, the analysis of the
scenarios in Table 6.11 leads to the decisions shown. In this part of this subsection, the
decisions reached are analysed. The proximality relationships are obtained by looking
up the relationships in Table 5.14, the Aruba SH proximals table.
Scenario Activity Pr M003 Z´ −Z Z´4−Z Network Decision
1 a19 ≥ 1 on Kitchen Kitchen Yes up-Normal Normal
2 a5 ≥ 1 on Toilet Kitchen No up-High Anomaly
3 a17 ≥ 1 on BigBedroom Living Room Yes up-Normal Normal
4 a17 ≥ 1 off BigBedroom Living Room Yes up-Normal Anomaly
5 a2 ≥ 1 off Kitchen Kitchen Yes up-Normal Anomaly
Table 6.11: ADL 2 (Activity Class III) Scenarios table
As introduced in Chapter4, Z represents the current location and −Z represents
the previous location.
Taking Scenario 1, a normal decision is correctly reached because a19 is part of
the normal ASeq for this event, there is at least one person in the Kitchen (while this
activity is going on), the only other active node (i.e. M003) is proximal to the Fridge,
the previous zone the user was in is the kitchen and the network is at state Up-Normal.
Scenario 2 is anomalous for several reasons. The first reason is because the activity
shown is not part of the normal Activity Sequence for this event. Secondly, even if the
user was in the correct zone (−Z = Kitchen), because their new (current) location Z´
is the Toilet and the two zones are not proximal (i.e. the user could not have feasibly
moved between these two zones whilst M003 was still in state on), this situation is also
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anomalous. Thirdly, the network state is Up-High and this is indicative of too much
network activity.
Considering Scenario 3, activity a17 is a core activity for this event, a presence is
required and, M003 is at the correct state. However, the user moved from the Living
Room to the BigBedroom. Looking up proximality in Table 5.14, the two zones are
indeed proximal. Since the Network state is at Up-Normal, the scenario is normal.
Scenario 4 describes a situation where during this event (Fridgware update), the
home occupant performs activity “Update Fridgeware” (a17) on the Fridge interface.
However, the current zone (Z´) is the BigBedroom, the zone the user left is the Livin-
gRoom and the network is at state Up-Normal. This situation is anomalous because
node M003 is what indicates that there is indeed a presence in the correct location in
the house and in this case M003 is off.
In Scenario 5, even if there is a report of a presence, because M003 is off, the
situation is anomalous. All the other conditions make the scenario appear normal but
this is not the case.
6.3.3.3 ADL 2, Activity Class III: Remotely by Human
Given the following example normal Activity Sequence for this Activity Class:
• a4 −→ a17 −→ a18 −→ a20 −→ a11 •
Given this ASeq and the constraint that the event is Network -bound (the user
carries out the update over the Internet). Assume that the scenarios in Table 6.12 are
as shown.
Scenario Activity(ies) Pr M003 Z´ −Z Z´4−Z Network Decision
1 a18 0 off n/a n/a n/a up-Normal Normal
2 a20 0 on n/a n/a n/a up-High Anomaly
3 a1, a17, a20 ≥ 1 on Dining Kitchen Yes up-Normal Normal
Table 6.12: ADL 2 (Activity Class IV) Scenarios Table
The analysis of each of the Decisions reached in Table 6.12 is presented next.
Analyses of Table 6.12 Decisions
Scenario 1 is normal because during this scenario, the user carries out an activity
that is part of the normal set of activities for this Activity of Daily Living (ADL).
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Scenario 2 is anomalous because even though M003 is on, no presence is detected.
Scenario 3 is normal because all the activities are correct, a presence is detected
(M003 is on) and the two zones that the user moved between whilst this activity was
ongoing are proximal. Observe that this scenario describes a situation where the user
updates the fridgeware over the Internet - i.e. remotely - whilst being inside the house.
6.3.3.4 ADL 2, Activity Class IV: Self-Update
During this Activity Class, the fridge self-updates its own fridge software. There-
fore, the event is not a presence-bound event. This means that a human presence is not
required for this event to be successfully completed. See the Definition of presence-bound
anomalies in Subsection 5.4.2 for a discussion on presence-bound events and activities.
One example normal ASeq by which this ADL is completed is
• a17 −→ a18 −→ a20 •
Activity a11 is not explicitly included in the ASeq because the Fridge can log the
user out automatically after a maximum allowed log in period. The two core activities
are a17 and a20. Table 6.13 gives some examples of normal and anomalous scenarios for
this event. The presence of a person in the (correct) zone in this case may not necessarily
imply an anomaly with respect to the particular Activity Class being considered.
Scenario Pr Z´ Activity Nx Decision
1 ≥ 1Kitchen a18 up-Normal Normal
2 0 n/a a18 up-Normal Normal
3 ≥ 1Kitchen a18 Down Anomalous
4 0 n/a a18, a20 up-Normal Normal
Table 6.13: ADL 2 (Activity Class V) Scenarios Table
Analyses of Table 6.13 Decisions
Consider Scenario 1. The activity is part of the Activity Sequence for this ADL
and the Nx is at state Up-Normal as required; the fact that there is a presence in the
Kitchen does not indicate an anomaly. The overall scenario is therefore normal.
Scenario 2 is also normal because the activity and network state are as expected.
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Scenario 3 is anomalous because the network state is down implying that this ADL
cannot be completed successfully.
Scenario 4 is normal since activities a18 and a20 are essential for this ADL to be
completed successfully.
6.3.4 Activity of Daily Living 3 (ADL 3): Going to Toilet
6.3.4.1 ADL 3, Activity Class I: Going to Toilet
a21 a22 a23 a24 a25 a26 Core Activities
ASeq 1 x x x x x x a23, a24
Table 6.14: ADL 3 (Activity Class)
Before this ADL is analysed one premise has to be established: there is generally
only one way in which a user can physically go to the zone Toilet. Notwithstanding
this limited set of scenarios, from the standpoint of privacy it would expected that
during this ADL, activity a24 (ClosesToiletDoor) will always happen after the activity
a23 (EntersToilet) in the ASeq. It would also be expected that activity a23 (EntersToilet)
is possible only after activity a22 (OpensToiletDoor).
The only possible normal Activity Sequence for this ADL therefore is :
• a21 −→ a22 −→ a23 −→ a24 −→ a22 −→ a25 −→ a26 •
For a single-occupant SH, taking the preceding conditions into account, therefore,
the following two Activity Sequences are anomalous:
• a21 −→ a25 −→ a24 •
or
• a24 −→ a23 −→ a22 •
This first ASeq represents an anomalous scenario because the user cannot go
from the BigBedroom (see Figure 5.1) to the Toilet without passing through the
ToiletDoor and completing activity a22 in the process. Since this core activity is not
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in the ASeq, the situation is anomalous. The scenario is also anomalous because the
ToiletDoor cannot go to state closed if its starting state was not open.
The second ASeq is anomalous because the user cannot enter the Bathroom if the
ToiletDoor is in state closed.
An example rule that governs this activity can be drawn up as follows:
Box 6.8. GoToToilet ADL Rule
If (Pr, ≥ 1) & (Z, Toilet) & (ASeq, correct) ⇒ (Normal)
There is more on Rules and Rule Induction in Section 6.5.
6.3.5 Activity of Daily Living 4 (ADL 4): Drive Around Town
This event can be completed by a human driving around Town or by a car self-
driving its way around Town.
6.3.5.1 ADL 4, Activity Class I: Drive Around Town - Human
One example normal ASeq which shows how a Human-driven car ADL may be
completed is given thus:
• a27 −→ a28 −→ a29 −→ a30 −→ a31 −→ a33 −→ a34 −→ a35 −→ a36 •
This particular ADL requires a presence (Pr), information on the change in location
(i.e. current location (Z´) versus normal location (Z)), proximals (ρ), and the use of a
specific node (η) which is a Car in this case. In addition, the correct core activity must
also be part of the ASeq and the order of activities in the ASeq must be correct. The
proximals involved must also be correct. For instance, for driving sround Town, the Car
may be proximal to the GarageDoor at the start and end of the event. The formation
of such a relationship will not be flagged as anomalous by the FDMA. If, however, the
Car becomes proximal to the BathTub in the Bathroom in Zone G or node M031 is in
the Bathroom in Zone D (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2), while updating the relationships,
the FDMA will flag this as an anomaly.
Chapter 6. Framework Evaluation 144
Scenario Pr Z´ η Activity ρ´ Decision
1 ≥ 1 Garage Car a33 GarageDoor/D004 Normal
2 ≥ 1 Garage Car a30 TrafficLight Anomaly
3 ≥ 1 Kitchen Car a33 Fridge Anomaly
4 ≥ 1 Global Car a33 TrafficLight Normal
5 0 n/a Car a33 n/a Anomaly
6 0 n/a None a33 n/a Anomaly
7 ≥ 1 Garage Car a31 GarageDoor/D004 Normal
Table 6.15: ADL 4 (Activity Class I) Decision Table
The decisions reached in each of the scenarios presented in Table 6.15 for the Drive
Around Town (Human) ADL discussed.
Analyses of Table 6.15 Decisions
Scenario 1 indicates a normal scenario. This is because there is a presence in the
Garage, the Car is the active node and the activity (a33) is part of a a normal ASeq for
this ADL. The proximals for this node in this scenario are shown to be the GarageDoor
and D004. Based on the SH being considered (5.1), this is normal.
One of the reasons why Scenario 2 is anomalous is because the proximal of
TrafficLight cannot be accurate if the Car is still in the Garage and the user is
still in the process of authenticating (a30), an activity which precedes any activity that
will lead the user to a point where the car’s proximal can be a TrafficLight.
Scenario 3 is anomalous since the user leaves home (a33) but somehow theKitchen
is active and the Fridge is proximal to the Car.
Scenario 4 is normal since the user is anywhere outside the home (Z´ = Global)
in the car, leaving home (a33) and the list of proximals includes a TrafficLight.
Scenario 5 and Scenario 6 are anomalous because the user is not present in either -
and one of the constraints for a human-driven scenario is that a presence is required (see
Subsubsection 4.2.2.2). Another reason the decision is anomalous is because no node is
active in Scenario 6 whereas according to Subsubsection 4.2.2.2, a strict requirement for
a successful DriveAroundTown is that the Car is active.
Scenario 7 is normal since all the required elements for a successful event are
present: there is a presence in the correct zone using the correct, required node and the
activity being performed as part of this ADL is part of what should be on any normal
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ASeq for this ADL. Lastly, the proximals to the Car are the GarageDoor and D004 and,
according to Table 5.14 and Figure 5.1, this is as it should be.
6.3.5.2 ADL 4, Activity Class II: Drive Around Town - Machine
An example normal ASeq for a machine-driven scenario is given below.
• a29 −→ a30 −→ a31 −→ a33 −→ a34 −→ a35 −→ a36 •
If activity a30 is missing, this could be indicative of an unauthorised party trying
to control the car. If activity a31 is missing, it is the sign of an incomplete event because
without a31 the remaining activities cannot happen. Therefore, for security and Anomaly
Detection purposes, the event can be constrained by one of these core activities a30 and
a31 depending on the degree of security that the user is interested in.
6.4 Anomaly Rankings
Drawing from the rule rankings as shown in the TextBox 5.1: the Anomaly Rank-
ings TextBox and the discussion on constraints in Chapter 4, the following conclusion
can be drawn:
Box 6.9. n-bound activities or events, Constraints
The Anomaly Rank is highest when the constraint n is missing from, or inaccurate
during, an n-bound activity or event.
The analysis in this section is used to illustrate how the anomaly rankings as shown
in Anomaly Rankings TextBox apply depending on the outcome of an FDMA analysis
of a scenario. Assume that for each Sleep, Table 6.16 applies
Event Sleep
Normal Location (Z)BigBedroom9
Presence = 1
GoToBed time10 ≥ 12 midnight
Constraints11 Presence (Pr), Time
Table 6.16: Sleep Event Attributes
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Analysis to illustrate Anomaly Ranking:
At 12 midnight (or a few minutes after), the system checks for presence in the
normal zone that the user should be in; in this case this zone is the BigBedroom. If
the BigBedroom is inactive (i.e. user is not present in the BigBedroom) the system
will raise the alarm level to True Positive. The alarm level is highest because the
person should be asleep but appears to be missing.
If the total number of presences in Home is exactly 1 then the anomaly ranking can
be reduced to a False Negative level. The system assumes that at least the legitimate
home owner is in the house even if she is not where she should be. Therefore physical
intrusion is ruled out and the home occupant is not in imminent danger.
The FDMA then checks for the location of the Presence by determining which
zone(s) inside or outside the house is active?
If the Z´ is the Toilet, it checks the previous zone (−Z) and the last event.
Having a presence in the Toilet during the period when Sleep should be happening
or having a presence in the Toilet for too long will change the alarm ranking to True
Negative. This is because the Toilet is a highly-unlikely location for a person to
sleep in safely
If the presence is in the LivingRoom, the FDMA checks the value of −Z and the
last activity in the last Event Activity Sequence.
If the last event was a benign one e.g WatchTV in LivingRoom or MakePopcorn
in −Z = Kitchen, the system will take the decision to do nothing. This decision will
be taken because the home occupant probably fell asleep in the LivingRoom. This
anomaly ranking will therefore be changed to a False Positive ranking.
The decision reached by the FDMA can be corroborated using CCTV video evi-
dence if available.
6.5 Rule Induction
According to [91], “Rule Induction is one of the most important techniques of
Machine Learning”. It involves identifying relationships in datasets that may not be
9 Sleep is not location-bound; the home occupant may sleep anywhere.
10 This time value can be obtained, for instance, from an average of the Sleep times over several
months.
11 The use of Constraints to aid AD and reduce False Positives is discussed in Chapter 6 but is applied
briefly here.
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obvious from human observation. The data that is used for Rule Induction can be pre-
sented in the form of tables; the rows in the tables represent individual cases (described
in this thesis as scenarios), the variables are known as attributes and a decision column
completes each table [91]. Also according to [91] rules can be expressed in the following
form:
Box 6.10. Generic Format of a Rule
If (attribute - 1, value - 1) and (attribute - 2, value - 2) and ... and (attribute -
n, value - n) then (decision,value)
In this Chapter, the following slightly modified format of the rule is used:
Box 6.11. Modified Generic Format of a Rule
If (attribute - 1, value - 1) & (attribute - 2, value - 2) & ... & (attribute - n, value
- n) ⇒ (Decision)
The rule induction algorithm selected for this work is the PRISM classification al-
gorithm [92]. This algorithm was selected because it captures and presents the induced
rules (representing the relationships “within” data) in a non-cumbersome, straightfor-
ward style. PRISM is available in the Machine Learning tool Weka. The goal in this
section is to generate rules which can govern and constrain the relationships and inter-
actions between the different components in Smart Homes. The PRISM algorithm takes
the following steps for induction of classification rules:
Box 6.12. Prism Algorithm
“(assume there are n (>1) possible classes):
For each class i from 1 to n inclusive:
1. Calculate the probability that class = i for each attribute-value pair
2. Select the attribute-value pair with the maximum probability and create a
subset of the training set comprising all instances with the selected combi-
nation (for all classes)
3. Repeat 1 and 2 for this subset until it contains only instances of class i. The
induced rule is then the conjunction of all the attribute-value pairs selected
in creating this subset
4. Remove all instances covered by this rule from the training set
Repeat 1-4 until all instances of class i have been removed”
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Using the PRISM algorithm to evaluate the dataset in Table 6.4, the following
rules are induced for the event ReplenishFridgeStock:
Scheme:weka.classifiers.rules.Prism
Relation: Replenish Fridge Stock Local Human
Instances: 8
Attributes: 4
Presence
FridgeDoor
M003
Decision
Test mode:5-fold cross -validation
=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
Prism rules
If Presence = no
and FridgeDoor = open then anomaly
If Presence = no
and M003 = on then anomaly
If FridgeDoor = open
and M003 = off then anomaly
If Presence = yes
and FridgeDoor = closed then normal
If Presence = yes
and M003 = on then normal
If FridgeDoor = closed
and M003 = off then normal
PRISM Rules for Table 6.4
Consider the following which is the first PRISM rule from Listing 6.5.
Box 6.13. Example PRISM Rule (1)
If (Pr, 0) & (Per, open) ⇒ (Decision, Anomaly)
This rule - and all the other rules induced from Table 6.4 - are quite limiting and
do not represent the reality of the situation in the SH in question. These rules will
potentially capture too many situations and lead to too many False Positive outcomes
if they are applied in digital forensics AD processes.
In order to induce rules which better capture the scenarios, more attributes were
introduced to Table 6.4. The resulting table is Table 6.17.
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Scenario Presence (Pr) FridgeDoor M003Normal Location (Z) Current Location (Z´) Decision
1 0 Closed Off n/a n/a Normal
2 0 Open On Kitchen Kitchen Anomaly
3 0 Closed Off Kitchen Kitchen Anomaly
4 0 Open On Kitchen BigBedroom Anomaly
5 0 Closed Off Kitchen BigBedroom Normal
6 0 Open Off Kitchen Kitchen Anomaly
7 0 Open Off Kitchen BigBedroom Anomaly
8 ≥ 1 Closed Off Kitchen Kitchen Normal
9 ≥ 1 Closed On Kitchen Kitchen Anomaly
10 ≥ 1 Closed Off Kitchen BigBedroom Anomaly
11 ≥ 1 Closed On Kitchen BigBedroom Anomaly
12 ≥ 1 Open Off Kitchen Kitchen Anomaly
13 ≥ 1 Open On Kitchen Kitchen Normal
14 ≥ 1 Open Off Kitchen BigBedroom Anomaly
15 ≥ 1 Closed On Kitchen BigBedroom Anomaly
16 ≥ 1 Closed Off Kitchen BigBedroom Anomaly
Table 6.17: ADL 1 (Activity Class I) Scenarios (Table 2)
Using the PRISM rule induction algorithm to induce rules from this dataset (Ta-
ble 6.17) yields several rules for the presence-bound events and activities:
Scheme:weka.classifiers.rules.Prism
Relation:TableforPRISM -weka.filters.unsupervised.attribute.Remove -R1
Attributes: 12
constraintA = presence in Kitchen
constraintB = location is Kitchen
constraintC = peripheral is open
Presence
Peripheral
Proximal
Normal Location
proximal location
current location
previous location
are active and previous proximal
Decision
=== Classifier model ===
Prism rules
If Proximal = on
and Peripheral = open
and Presence = one then normal
If Proximal = off then anomaly
If Peripheral = Closed then anomaly
If Presence = none then anomaly
PRISM Rules for Table 6.17
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Consider the first rule from this listing:
Box 6.14. Example PRISM Rule (2)
If (ρ, on) & (Per, open) & (Pr, one) ⇒ (Decision, Normal)
This rule more adequately captures the scenarios presented in the table and will
lead to fewer False Positives when applied.
The Decision Tree in Figure 6.3 (which was derived from an analysis of the Ta-
ble 6.17 dataset using the Weka RandomTree algorithm) illustrates how the decisions
are reached. In this Tree the presence values are either one or none unlike in all the
preceding datasets in this work where presence has been either 0 or ≥ 1.
 Figure 6.3: Decision Tree for ADL 1 (Activity Class I) Scenarios (Table 2)
Weka was selected because it is a straightforward tool that has the required algo-
rithm and which presents the output in an understandable format. The Induction of
Rule sets is described as an important Machine Learning technique by [28]. There are
several Rule Induction Algorithms that can be used to derive rules or rule sets from
datasets [28, 91]. A SH Rule set (or rule) may be used in SH expert-systems to support
a more secure planning and design process of smart homes and training of SH AD sys-
tems in order to aid Anomaly Detection (AD), maximum evidence acquisition during
investigations, and reduce false alarms.
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6.6 Chapter Summary
Smart Homes are poised to become more commonplace in the near future. There
is a requirement for security assurance solutions in SH. However, in the event that
implemented security assurance solutions fail and cyber-physical attacks against SH
are successful, the work in this Chapter discusses how the Forensics Decision-Making
Algorithm (FDMA) can be combined with the event, activities, core activities and other
constraints to investigate anomalous occurrences within SH environments. The PRISM
Weka Machine Learning tool was used to induce some rules from two different datasets
- the first dataset had fewer attributes and fewer instances than the second one and led
to less widely-applicable rules which, if applied, would capture False Positive anomalies.
Increasing the number of attributes and the size of the dataset led to a rule that more
fully captured the instances and reasoning behind the scenarios in question.
Currently, no method has been designed to automate the selection and application
of the appropriate rules for any given scenario. This can form the subject of further
research.
It is, just as in Chapter 5 acknowledged that a limitation in this work is the use of
scenarios which, though realistic, the test of the system can be more rigorously carried
out using real people carrying out real activities and thereby generating real data which
can then be analysed using the attributes introduced in Chapter 4.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Directions
7.1 Overview
This thesis introduces an Internet of Things Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF)
and Incident Response Plan which can be applied by Forensics Investigators and Incident
Response Teams during investigations of Cyber-physical attacks in IoT environments
such as the Smart Home (SH). The IoT Framework (IDFF) and IR Plan are introduced
in Chapter 3.
This work also investigated anomaly detection in SH by identifying features that can
be used to describe and build a baseline security model of a SH. These attributes - which
are described in Chapter 4 - include Node and Zone ID, the Modes of nodes, Proximality,
Peripherals, Presence, Location, Type, State, and so on. This model described a SH at
its most secure state, the state at which all these features are at their most optimal or
normal. A SH in this optimal state of security is referred to in this work as being in the
Happy Home state. An anomaly is said to have occurred when there is a deviation from
the Happy state. This deviation can be caused by an error or an attack. Detecting such
an anomaly can be done through the use of a SH monitoring system.
In the Conclusions section of this Chapter a summary of the work done in this
thesis is presented. After this, the Challenge faced during the research is discussed and
potential Future Work or research directions which can be exploited are presented.
7.2 Conclusions
Smart Home (SH) environments are set to become the most prevalent of smart
spaces of the future. Any solutions and methods developed to address security and
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improve Anomaly Detection (AD) in SH will contribute to the overall feeling of well-
being and confidence that SH occupants have in their SH systems.
The methods developed in this thesis can be used to support existing Anomaly
Detection (AD) methodologies and tools whilst avoiding their shortcomings of form-
ing training sets and normal baselines which are heavily focused on human actions and
behaviours. This work instead applies the attributes and (the more stable) relation-
ships formed from the actions and interactions between non-human nodes, zones and
human players in Smart Home environments. A combination of these relationships and
learned normal user behaviours leads to improved approaches to AD.
Existing multivariate Anomaly Detection methods and approaches were reviewed
in Chapter 2.
The Internet of Things Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF) that was developed
from a review of existing Digital Forensics (DF) frameworks and methodologies as well
as from interviews with DF academics was discussed in Chapter 3. An IoT Incident
Response (IR) Plan was also introduced in Chapter 3. An investigation into a realistic
SH Incident Response scenario was used to evaluate the IoT IR plan.
The attributes identified in Chapter 4 can be used to aid existing AD methodologies
and tools in detecting anomalies by creating relationships that are used to build a normal
SH setting such that any deviations from this setting would indicate an anomaly. The
anomaly detected can be further investigated to determine what type of anomaly it is
i.e. an attack or an error, or one of the anomaly types as identified in Section 5.2.
Correctly identifying an anomaly type is useful because it can help reduce call-outs for
non-threatening events thus ensuring time and money savings. This research did not go
further to define a method for differentiating between attacks and errors. This can form
the subject of further research.
In Chapter 5, the Forensics Decision-Making Algorithm (FDMA) was demonstrated
to be useful for anomaly detection in the real-life Aruba Smart Home dataset (Dataset
17 at the WSU CASAS website (http://casas.wsu.edu/datasets/), available as at
the time of writing). The FDMA algorithm (see Appendix A), through the use of the
presence and proximals attributes detected the presence of more than one person in the
home (without prior training data or information). If the assumption is made that any
other presence in this single-occupant SH is that of an intruder, the FDMA was thus
demonstrated to be useful for physical intrusion detection in SH especially for elderly
people living alone.
The approach in this work, which makes use of the attributes of nodes and zones,
human activities and the relationships that are formed between these elements, supports
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existing AD solutions by eliminating the need for training classifiers with significant,
labelled, training datasets. In addition, in real-life, these datasets may not exist until
after an (suspicious) incident occurs thereby reducing the potential for the attack to be
captured in real-time whereas, using the FDMA, once the SH security baseline has been
created the FDMA continually checks for any deviations from the security baseline. The
outputs of this research are as listed:
• The identification of useful attributes and relationships between nodes and zones
in Smart Homes; these attributes can be used to define similar relationships in
different SHs and, possibly, even beyond the SH environment.
• The identification of a ranking method of anomalies from False Positive (non-
event) to True Negatives thus representing fully the spectrum of anomalies that
may occur.
• The combination of the FDMA, Relationships activities, Core Activities and con-
straints to aid AD
• Example rules that demonstrate how the attributes and relationships can be ap-
plied to rules and used to constrain and govern these identified relationships thus
aiding anomaly detection tasks and contributing towards ensuring peace of mind
to the users of SH..
7.3 Limitations and Challenge faced during Research: Rel-
evant Data
Obtaining Smart Home (SH) datasets that closely mimic what is applicable in real-
life anomalous situations is one of the challenges that was faced during this research.
The requirement was for datasets that did not include only generic sensor data such
as motion, temperature, but one that had wired and wireless network data, electricity
readings, all combined. Such a data set was not found to be available during the early
stages of this research.
In order to overcome this challenge, an approach was taken that involved labelling
certain normal, but unusual, instances in the Aruba SH dataset as anomalies. By doing
this, the normal Aruba SH dataset became the presence-detection anomaly dataset.
Irrespective of this workaround - and even though this data deficiency led to the
in-depth visual analysis of the existing Aruba dataset which led to the discovery of the
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proximality attribute - a dataset which has the required IP addresses, port numbers,
and other such networked node outputs would have been useful.
A limitation in this work involved using realistic scenarios. It is however a recom-
mendation for any future researchers that testing this system can be more rigorously
carried out using real people carrying out real activities and thereby generating real data
which can then be analysed using the attributes introduced in Chapter 4.
7.4 Future Work
As part of raising greater awareness of the attributes identified in Chapter 4 (Prox-
imality, Type, Mode, etc.) and the Forensics Decision-Making Algorithm (FDMA) and
how these can be applied to anomaly detection in Smart Homes, a peer-reviewed Con-
ference paper (Presence Detection from Smart Home Motion Sensor Datasets: A Model
[6]) has been published. More publications are also being written up for two Journals.
In addition, the IDFF will be made publicly-available online on ResearchGate which is
a forum through which researchers can invite discussion and obtain immediate feedback
on their work.
The following are areas that were identified during the course of this research as
potential subjects for future research:
7.4.1 Detecting presence in Multi-occupant Smart Homes
The capability to detect a second “presence” in single-occupant smart homes is
useful from the perspective of security for the home occupants e.g. elderly patients who
live alone. An additionally useful capability will be the ability of a SH security system
to accurately detect a third or fourth presence in a home where the normal number of
persons in the home is already more than one.
7.4.2 Pet Detection
It would be useful to be able to identify a set of attributes which can be used to
accurately detect the presence of pets within smart homes. This will help reduce False
Positive firings by AD systems which may erroneously detect the presence of a pet as
that of an intruder. One way to achieve this may be to check the height of the pet in
combination with the nodes most likely used by pets alone e.g. a CatFlap.
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7.4.3 Relationship between Internal Doors
As with external nodes, the relationship between internal access nodes can also be
explored and added to the constraints so that even more anomalies may be detected
and/or False Positives reduced.
7.4.4 Relevant Evidence
A method of determining before an investigation which sources (physical and logi-
cal) and evidence (the information from the sources) are relevant will be useful for DF
investigations. This can be in the form of a framework which helps Incident Response
Teams identify and rank evidence sources that they encounter during investigations in
cyber-physical environments. The ranking can be based on a degree of importance or
relevance. Such a ranking can help investigators save time during investigations because
they will approach their tasks knowing which nodes to give highest priority based on its
ranking in this framework. A ranking method will help them avoid the loss of potential
evidence. The most important sources of evidence can be given the “highest” rank. It
also helps with the application of appropriate security measures to protect assets.
7.4.5 Smart Home Relationships Constraints Ontology
A sample SH Constraints Ontology is presented in Appendix C. This ontology
illustrates the relationships and attributes that exist between nodes and zones in Smart
Homes as discussed in Chapter 4. Intelligent systems such as the Protege framework
(http://www.protege.stanford.edu) or similar can be used to create and test these
relationships and constraints as well as demonstrate their impact on SH operations.
7.4.6 Proximality Index (PI)
The Proximality Index, or PI, is the total number of proximality relationships that
can exist between sensors. For example, the PI of one (1) sensor (with itself) is 1. For
two (2) proximal sensors, the PI1 is as illustrated in Figure 7.2. For three sensors, the PI
is as shown in Figure 7.3. Figure 7.4 illustrates the four-sensor proximality relationship.
The PI for each is calculated.
1Note that, apart from in Figure 7.1, the double arrow heads are used in place of two separate arrows
where one of them will be originating from and the other leading to the node. This does not apply
to the double-headed arrow used to indicate the one-to-one proximality relationship a sensor has with
itself. This arrow is counted as a single arrow only.
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A
Figure 7.1: One-to-One single sensor Proximality
A B
Figure 7.2: Two (2)-sensors Proximality Illustration
A CB
Figure 7.3: Three (3)-sensors Proximality Illustration
A
C
B
B
Figure 7.4: Four (4)-sensors Proximality Illustration
From Figures 7.1 to 7.4, it can be deduced that the rule guiding the Proximality
Indices is calculated thus:
PIi = i
2
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where
i = number of nodes and
PI = the Proximality Index (PI)
Applying the equation PIi = i
2 to calculate the PI for 2-, 3- and 4-sensor proximals
gives
PI2 = 2
2 , which gives 4
PI3 = 3
2 , which gives 9
PI4 = 4
2 , which gives 4
A PI value is a theoretic measure that gives an indication of the density of the
sensors in a location. With respect to “Motion Detection” anomaly detection tasks (from
motion sensor data), the higher the PI value (more motion sensors in a location), the
greater the chances of detecting motion-related activity. Thus, if the distance between
two nodes is reduced e.g. by adding more nodes to a zone, the proximality is increased.
This, however increases the risk of anomalous mis-firing of sensors due to node over-
crowding. A method of calculating how many sensors to deploy within a given space
so as to support motion detection needs and maximize the potential for an anomaly
to be detected through the use of proximality without over-crowing the space will be a
useful future work. Planning the deployment of sensors in this way will help maintain
the balance between the provision of security, user comfort and usability.
7.4.7 Thesis Conclusion
This work has provided a holistic view at Smart Home (SH) anomaly investigations
and proposed a Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF) and an Incident Response Plan for
investigating SH anomalies (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 a method of describing a secure
state of a SH - where all its constituent zones (rooms) and nodes (items in the SH)
- are at their secure state. This state is referred to as the “Happy Home” state. See
Section 4.2 for more on the “Happy Home”. This baseline model was derived through the
identification and use of key attributes including the Node ID, Type, Mode, Peripherals,
Proximals, Time of Day and so on. When these attributes are at their most secure state
- and all activities being carried out in the home follow a recognised Activity Sequence
(see 6.2 for more on Activity Sequences) which have all the relevant constituent core
activity/activities and fall within the Constraints as identified in Chapter 4 - then the
home is said to be in a “Happy Home” state. The secure state of the attributes can be
decided upon by the home occupant or a trusted third party such as a family member
or carer. One example of a secure state can be for all the external access nodes to be
locked by 10 p.m. every night.
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An anomaly is aid to have occurred if there is a deviation from this secure base-
line. Such a deviation can be detected through the use of the FEMS monitoring device
introduced in Chapter 3. The FEMS system runs the FDMA algorithm as part of its
decision-making module. Determining if the detected anomaly is the result of a fault or
human error or the result of a targeted cyber-physical attack can form the subject of
future research.
This work was developed within several limitations. The first limitation is that the
data that was analysed focussed on SH motion sensor data and for future work, Internet
Protocol-based data should be incorporated to observe how the model will scale when
this type of data is introduced. In addition, it would be a useful test to demonstrate
the use of this model in an a real-life SH rather than through the analysis of carefully
designed scenarios which represent realistic anomalous situations that IR Teams will
face in real life. The Aruba SH dataset which was used in this research was obtained
from a single-occupant home. Due to the fact that elderly SH occupants may receive
visitors and even live in multi-occupant homes, applying the attributes identified by this
work to analysing data from multi-occupant homes will be very useful going forward
towards testing its broader applicability.
The Future Work section in this chapter outlines some areas that require further
investigation. These areas are: extending the work to demonstrate its use in detecting
the presence of pets in addition to the Human presence detection that it can be used
for; building a baseline security model to represent the relationship between the internal
access nodes (doors) in a SH; developing a method of identifying what kind of evidence
is relevant and should therefore be captured and analysed during a Forensic Incident
Response exercise in SH environments because this will prevent time wastage on collect-
ing irrelevant information which will also take up storage space; the development of a
SH Ontology which can be used to analyse the effects of the Constraints on a SH; and
the development of a Proximality index as a tool for calculating the optimal number of
sensors to deploy in a space so as to avoid overcrowding the space.
Appendix A
The Forensics Edge Management
System (FEMS) Decision-Making
Algorithm (FDMA) Core
activeLocation = ’’;
activeSens = ’’;
year = 2015;
day = 25;
month = 02;
lastActiveTime = 0;
threshold = seconds (10);
T=table(currSens ,currLoc);
doorList = [4001 ,4002 ,4004]; %List of doors
% sensor (1).type = ’door’
% sensor (1).state = 1
% sensor (1).location = zone (1)
% sensor (1).peripherals = []
% sensor (1).mode = 1 %1 = FF, 2= MF , 3 = FM, 4 = MM
%
% sensor (2).type = ’motion ’
% sensor (2).state = 0
% sensor (2).location = zone (2)
% sensor (2).peripherals = []
% sensor (2).mode = 2 %1 = FF, 2= MF , 3 = FM, 4 = MM
FullHouseSensorStructure;
%for i = 1:314
%for i = 1:66
for i = 1:900 %At row 458 the algorithm stops recognising the correct last active
sensor.
for j= X(:,2)
% First , check if sensor is OFF
fprintf(num2str(i))
160
Appendix A. FEMS Decision-Making Algorithm (Core) 161
currLoc = int8(X(i,2));
currSens = int8(X(i,2));
currTime = datetime(year ,month ,day ,X(i,3),X(i,4),X(i,5));
if (X(i, 1)==0)
fprintf(’ -Inactive: ’);
fprintf(zone(currLoc));
%fprintf ( ’devID=’)
%fprintf(num2str(X(i,2)));
fprintf(’ current sensor = ’);
fprintf(num2str(currLoc));
sensor(currSens).state = 0; %sets the sensor state to be off
% fprintf(’ sensor set to ’);
% fprintf(num2str(sensor(currSens).state));
if(strcmp(sensor(currSens).type ,’door’))
if(testSensorDoorCheck(sensor) == 1)%test for door anomoly
fprintf(’ Door Anomoly ’);
end
end
%need to deactivate
elseif X(i, 1)==1
fprintf(’ -Active: ’);
fprintf(zone(currLoc));
%fprintf ( ’devID=’)
%fprintf(num2str(X(i,2)));
fprintf(’ current sensor = ’);
fprintf(num2str(currLoc));
sensor(currSens).state = 1; %sets the sensor state to be on
if (strcmp(activeLocation ,’’)) %no previousn active location
activeSens = currLoc;
activeLocation = zone(currLoc);
% if (ismember (( currLoc),(num2str(KitchProx(X(i,2))))))
% lastActiveTime= currTime;
else
if(~ strcmp(activeLocation ,zone(currLoc)))
% if (~ strcmp (( currLoc) , KitchProx (1,i)))
% timeDiff = currTime - lastActiveTime;
% timeDiff.Format = ’s’;
if(sensor_proximity(currLoc , activeSens) == 0)
if(timeDiff < threshold)
fprintf(’ : Warning! ’);
fprintf(’ current sensor = ’);
fprintf(num2str(currLoc));
fprintf(’ last active sensor = ’);
fprintf(num2str(activeSens));
fprintf(’ Previous Active Location was ’);
fprintf(activeLocation);
fprintf(’ And current active Location is ’);
fprintf(zone(currLoc));
fprintf(’ ’);
fprintf(num2str(seconds(timeDiff)));
fprintf(’ seconds travel time’);
% AND nodes between the two Locations were
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% NOT ACTIVATED , a highly abnormal situation.
if(sensor_proximity(currLoc , activeSens) == 1)
fprintf(’ : Proximal ’);
else
fprintf(’ : Non -Proximal !!!!!!! ’);
end
end
end
% end
% end
end
end
end %end of 0 or 1 activation if
activeSens = currLoc;
lastActiveTime= currTime;
currLoc = currSens;
fprintf(’ sensor data size = ’);
fprintf(num2str(size(sensor(currSens).data)));
if(size(sensor(currSens).data) ~= [0 ,0])%checks to see if it has data
fprintf(’ has data ’);
end
activeLocation = zone(currLoc);
if(activeLocation == 0)
fprintf(’ Unregistered node detected ’);
end
display(’’)
end
end
Core of the Forensics Edge Management System (FEMS) Decision-Making Algorithm
(FDMA) code
Appendix B
Interview Questions
Interviews were conducted as part of the qualitative validation process for the In-
ternet of Things Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF). The following are the questions
which were put to the interviewees.
1. Do you know of the Internet of Things (IoT)?
This question was asked to find out about their broad awareness and /or knowledge
of the IoT.
2. What challenges, if any, does the IoT pose to forensics as far as existing
frameworks are concerned?
This question was asked to find out if the challenges already identified by the
author of this thesis were pertinent and relevant (or otherwise) and to find out if
there were other challenges that the IoT presented to DF that the author had not
considered.
3. What is your opinion on Automated Forensics?
The method proposed by this work involves the application of Automated Foren-
sics. This question was asked to find out the opinions of the interviewees in this
regard. In summarised form, the feedback in this case was that Automated Foren-
sics has its uses and applications but that it must not be relied upon as the singular
approach to Digital Forensics (DF) investigations; that the roles that human in-
vestigators play in DF investigations is still necessary and significant.
4. Do you think the Internet of Things Digital Forensics Framework (IDFF)
Framework as presented has any merits in terms of its speed, timeliness,
comprehensiveness, approach and direction?
This question was asked to gather specific feedback on the IDFF Framework from
the interviewees.
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5. Do you consider a new, more tailored DF Framework necessary or might
existing ones suffice?
There already exist a number of frameworks within the field of DF, some which
even claim to be applicable to future environments (an example future environment
is the SH as part of the IoT). This question was asked to find out if the interviewees
thought that there was any need for a different, tailored Framework for the IoT or
if existing ones currently meet all the requirements of DF in IoT-type environments
such as Smart Homes.
6. Any suggestions for improving the IDFF Framework as presented?
Each of the interviewees had been given a copy of the (draft) IDFF Framework
to peruse briefly; some of the interviewees were sent the draft IDFF Framework
some days before their interview - others were sent the file during the interview.
The feedback received, as applicable, was used to adjust the Framework.
7. Any other recommendations for Digital Forensics going forward in the
IoT?
This question was to glean any further input that the interviewees might have with
regard to DF as a general field and how it might be influenced by the emergence
of the IoT.
Appendix C
Proximal Sensors Table
An ‘X’ indicates that a proximality relationship cannot be established based on the
sensor readings available or sensor firings; a ‘1’ indicates that the nodes are proximal
and a ‘0’ indicates non-proximality.
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Sensors M001 M002 M003 M004 M005 M006 M007 M008 M009 M010
M001 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
M002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M003 0 0 1 0 X X X 0 0 0
M004 0 0 0 1 X 0 X 0 0 0
M005 0 0 X X 1 X X 0 0 0
M006 0 0 X 0 X 1 X 1 0 0
M007 0 0 X X X 0 1 0 0 0
M008 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 1 X 0
M009 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 X 1 0
M010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 1
M011 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 X X X
M012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X
M013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 0
M014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M019 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0
M021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0
M022 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0
M023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M024 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M028 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M031 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table C.1: The Complete Sensor Proximals table - Part One
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Sensors M011 M012 M013 M014 M015 M016 M017 M018 M019 M020
M001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
M007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M008 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
M009 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
M010 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
M011 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
M012 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
M013 0 0 1 X 0 0 0 0 0 X
M014 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 X X X
M015 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
M016 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
M017 0 0 0 1 0 X 1 0 X 0
M018 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 1 X 0
M019 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 1 0
M020 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 1
M021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0
M022 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M024 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M028 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M031 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table C.2: The Complete Sensor Proximals table - Part Two
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Sensors M021 M022 M023 M024 M025 M026 M027 M028 M029 M030 M031
M001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M014 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M018 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M019 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M021 1 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M022 0 1 X 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0
M023 0 X 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M024 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M025 0 0 0 0 1 X X 0 0 0 0
M026 0 0 0 0 0 1 X 0 0 0 0
M027 0 0 0 0 1 X 1 X 0 0 0
M028 0 X X 0 0 X X 1 X 0 0
M029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 1 0 0
M030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 1 0
M031 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table C.3: The Complete Sensor Proximals table - Part Three
Appendix D
Smart Home Relationship
Constraints Ontology
Figure D.1: Smart Home Relationship Constraints Ontology
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Acronyms and Glossary
A
AAL Ambient Assisted Living, a system that implements sensing of the environment
and decision-making based on the technologies and systems available in Smart
Homes. 1
AD Anomaly Detection, the use of tools and methodologies to investigate anoma-
lous occurrences in Smart Home networks, either in real-tie or from Smart Home
datasets. 13
ADL Activities of Daily Living are all activities carried out by people daily. 1, 7, 8
AT Assistive Technology, Technology-based solutions and services provided to the dis-
abled and otherwise challenged. 1
C
CPE Cyber-Physical Environments, Environments that are composed of both Cyber
and Physical components, co-operating to provide services for human and societal
needs. 7
CPS Cyber-Physical Systems, systems which are both Cyber and Physical in nature.
22
F
FDMA Forensics Decision-Making Algorithm, an anomaly-detection algorithm that
males a decision about whether an occurrence or scenario is anomalous or other-
wise. 8, 58
FEMS Forensics Edge Management System, A system that autonomously performs
security and digital forensics functions within Smart Home environments. These
functions include network management, data mining, logging and alert manage-
ment. 8, 49
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I
IoT Internet of Things, describes the potential for the interconnection of every feasible
relevant thing to every other feasible and necessary things, living or not, animate
or otherwise, depending on requirements. 8
S
SH Smart Homes, these are homes that are equipped with tools and technologies to
sense and actuate in such ways as to provide assistance to their occupants with
their Activities of Daily Living. 1, 13
